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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Genealogies of the “Honor Crime”
I N  2000 the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) published “Lives 
Together, Worlds Apart: Men and Women in a Time of Change” as part of 
the yearly State of the World Population report. The eighty- four- page study, 
published at the turn of the century, focused on gender inequalities between 
men and women, arguing for the importance of “bringing gender inequal-
ity fully into the light and treating it as a matter of urgency affecting both 
human rights and development priorities” (2). The document combines 
country- based reports with research and analysis about the role of states and 
nongovernment organizations in creating safe and healthy environments for 
their communities. Nestled within the document is a section that discusses 
violence against girls and women as a human rights violation that negatively 
impacts their health and well- being. In this section, the document specifically 
names sex trafficking and “‘honour’ killings” as two forms of violence that are 
on the rise and that affect a growing number of children, girls, and women 
worldwide (29). In its discussion of the honor crime, the report estimates that 
“throughout the world, perhaps as many as 5,000 women and girls a year are 
murdered by members of their own families, many of them for the ‘dishon-
our’ of having been raped” (29).1 The report attributes this form of violence 
to “the community’s or the family’s demand for sexual chastity and virginity” 
(29), suggesting that these crimes take place all around “but tend to be more 
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prevalent in, but are not limited to, countries with a majority Muslim popula-
tion” (30).
Since its publication in the UNFPA report, this estimate has become one 
of the most cited numbers on the phenomenon of gender violence known as 
the “honor crime”—often losing its initial reference point or citational ori-
gin. Frequently appearing in a broad array of nongovernment reports, news 
media articles, and academic texts, the UN- endorsed number serves to give 
a name to a specific and distinct form of gender- based violence. This statis-
tic also raises the alarm about the honor crime’s impact on girls and women 
and the crime’s abrogation of their right to life, safety, and human dignity. 
Astonishingly, the UN report provides no information on the methods and 
strategies used to arrive at this estimate but provides the qualification of “per-
haps” to note that the number it cites may, in fact, be an underestimate of the 
crime’s scale or its rate of occurrence. More than a figure that measures the 
number of women murdered in the name of honor, the UN estimate dissemi-
nates and constructs its own truths about the magnitude and scope of this 
phenomenon, which is today speculated to claim the lives of almost 12,000 
women per year (Gill 2018). As a numerical figure that draws its power from 
the authority of its nongovernment purveyors and their stated investment in 
gender equality and women’s rights, this number has become a definitive mea-
sure for honor- related violence and its annual rates of occurrence. Stripped 
of historical and geographic specificity, it operates as a free- floating signifier 
that produces transnational circuitries of knowledge about a social problem 
of macabre global proportions.
Knowledge about the honor crime has sought to reveal both the global 
magnitude of this form of gender- based violence and its specific features or 
identifying traits. Citations of the UN figure do not always acknowledge their 
original source, but they are often accompanied by notes about its limitations. 
In the statistical data section of the Honor Based Violence Network, for exam-
ple, the UN number is included with an introductory note that states that 
“these figures are considered estimates and are widely believed to be severe 
underestimates. Due to lack of focused reporting and recording of Honour 
Killings internationally very little is known about the true extent of HBV 
worldwide.”2 Such remarks do not question the methodology or validity of 
the collected data but point, instead, to their shortcomings and their potential 
underestimation of the phenomenon of honor- related violence. Similarly, an 
article on honor- based violence published in National Geographic alludes to 
the difficulties of counting honor crimes but nevertheless claims that “hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of women are murdered by their families each year in 
the name of family ‘honor.’ It’s difficult to get precise numbers on the phenom-
G E N E A LO G I E S O F T H E “H O N O R C R I M E” •  3
enon of honor killing; the murders frequently go unreported, the perpetra-
tors unpunished, and the concept of family honor justifies the act in the eyes 
of some societies” (Mayell 2002). Oscillating between a figure that estimates 
hundreds and possibly thousands of killings, the author emphasizes the lack of 
accuracy around this form of violence which is attributed to underreporting. 
In other coverage of the crime and its occurrence in the US, Gregg Zoroya 
(2016) of USA Today acknowledges that “no one really knows” how common 
honor- related violence is but states that the “the practice appears to be get-
ting worse, although it’s unclear whether the higher numbers stem from bet-
ter reporting or greater frequency. The Internet appears to play a crucial role, 
both in learning more information about the violence and in creating more 
opportunity for families to track down inappropriate behavior by relatives.” 
Increased knowledge about honor- related violence is here linked to modern 
forms of information collection and reporting through the internet, but the 
author concedes that it is not clear whether the internet generates what we 
know about this violence or whether it simply documents actual higher inci-
dences and rates of occurrence. In other words, even in reports that insist 
on the pervasiveness of honor- related violence, there remains an unresolved 
tension between the claimed figures and the methods used to procure and 
disseminate them.
Global efforts to end the phenomenon of gender and sexual violence 
have predominantly employed two strategies: the first relates to the work of 
“quantifying” the social problem of gender and sexual violence. Typically, this 
includes the production of a measure of the problem or the collecting of data 
and information, which is then translated into numerical evidence. This evi-
dence is then combined with qualitative knowledge (some explicitly stated 
and some implicitly drawn) that is then used to shed light on the magnitude 
or scale of the social issue under study. The second pertains to producing poli-
cies, procedures, and indicators that can help mitigate or end the numerically 
identified social problem. The quantification of gender- based violence has a 
long history, one that has been codified in the various reports, documents, and 
fact sheets produced by the United Nations, nongovernment organizations 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and a large body 
of qualitative academic literature. The need to track gender- based violence 
emanates from a recognition of its global impact and the belief that producing 
numerical knowledge about the problem can assist in efforts to contest and 
end it. Work to quantitatively study gender- based violence draws its legiti-
macy from the power of numbers or the belief that numbers reflect, rather 
than construct, uncontested and scientifically collected bare facts about the 
world. Writing on the practices of measuring and quantifying gender violence, 
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Sally Engle Merry argues that numbers “convey an aura of objective truth and 
scientific authority despite the extensive interpretive work that goes into their 
construction” (2016, 1). Merry’s work explores the links between numerical 
information and the processes of creating indicators or measures of complex 
and not readily traceable or easily calculable phenomenon like human rights, 
gender violence, and sex trafficking. Providing a cautionary note about the 
“seductions of quantification,” Merry’s study reveals that the ability to produce 
numerical figures about such issues operates under the assumption that they 
are, in fact, not only knowable but also quantifiable social phenomenon.
Critical scrutiny of the numerical edifice that surrounds the honor crime 
has been expressed by anthropologist Lila Abu- Lughod who, in her ground-
breaking work on the subject, has stated that “reports regularly note that 
honor crimes are on the increase; however, no evidence or explanation is 
given of how the figures are derived” (2011, 38). Abu- Lughod questions the 
terms of classification on which honor- based violence is identified and then 
counted. She argues that such work requires the disappearance of the con-
text and the specificities of these crimes. Drawing attention to the disputable 
methodologies that inform the nascent claim that twenty- three to twenty- 
seven honor killings occur in the US per year, Leti Volpp (2019) has carefully 
shown how data about the honor crime work in tandem with assumptions 
about the nature of this form of gender violence and assumptions about the 
backgrounds of their perpetrators.3 As Volpp states, “Of course, data has its 
own magic, carrying with it the notions of objectivity, science, and truth. Yet 
there is also a willing belief in the prevalence of ‘honor killings’ among Mus-
lims that aligns with longstanding narratives of the dangerous Muslim man 
and the imperiled Muslim woman” (167–68).4 Despite the important scholarly 
interventions surrounding available numerical data, quantitative information 
continues to converge with a set of structuring, essentialist, and generalized 
narratives about the form of this violence and its perpetrators in order to 
produce the phenomenon that is known as the “honor killing” or the “honor 
crime.” Although no definitional consensus about what constitutes an honor 
crime exists today, data about honor killings produced by the UN and other 
nongovernment organizations, government reports, media accounts, and 
activist interventions against honor- based violence, combined with a bevy of 
scholarly and academic literature on the subject, coalesce to create powerful 
discourses surrounding honor- related violence, its staggering rates of occur-
rence, and its far- reaching scope.5 
Apprehension surrounding the contemporary constructions, deployments, 
and circulations of knowledge about gender violence known as the honor 
crime gives shape to some of the central concerns of this book. This appre-
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hension is not animated by a questioning of the existence of gender- based 
violence that is motivated by and carried out in the name of “honor”; nor is 
it compelled by a desire to disavow such forms of violence as unassociated 
with the religion of Islam and therefore un- Islamic.6 Rather, this apprehen-
sion is informed by a commitment to trace the appearance of this discourse 
and its political, social, and cultural workings in this historical conjuncture 
and understand its power. By discourse, I refer not only to the language that is 
used to identify the honor crime but also to the reports, policies, and practices 
that are produced in and enacted under its name. Following the work of Eliza-
beth Bernstein in providing an ethnography of the sex trafficking discourse, 
I understand discourse to “signal a constellation of words, materialities, and 
practices as they coalesce in historically and culturally situated ways, con-
structing the empirical object under consideration and the social locations in 
which it is manifest” (2018, 25).
I am therefore interested in mapping a set of stories and narratives that 
honor crime discourses elicit and produce. In this book, I trace how these 
discourses enact particular and multiple modes of knowing gender violence 
and how, ultimately, they structure and delimit horizons of antiviolence con-
testations. In paying attention to what now constitute honor crime and honor 
killing discourses, I seek to better understand the various forms of gender- 
based violence that the honor crime describes, invokes, and encompasses. 
Before delving into this discourse and its workings, it is important to note a 
distinction between the “honor killing” as the act of murder and the “honor 
crime,” a term that invokes a broad range of violence, including death and 
murder, that are enacted under the name of honor or rationalized through 
its invocation. In using the term honor crime, I am also pointing to efforts to 
enact laws and regulations that construct this violence, in its various manifes-
tations, as a criminal act. When possible, I have used the term honor crime 
over honor killing unless a text specifically refers to the act of killing or mur-
der. In describing the honor crime, I am primarily referring to forms of gen-
der violence recognized to operate under the logic of honor that is attached 
to “communities defined by their alien difference from us” and subsequently 
unmoored from an understanding of a broader continuum of gender vio-
lence (Abu- Lughod 2013, 128). Throughout this book, my use of the term seeks 
to problematize it, offering a genealogy of its construction, appearance, and 
circulation.7
Gender Violence and the Transnational Politics of the Honor Crime is 
invested in thinking about the ways in which discourses surrounding the 
honor crime operate: how they work in tandem with or separately from a 
range of linguistic, literary, political, and metaphorical texts and contexts; and 
6 •  I N T R O D U C T I O N
how, through their uneven proliferation, they construct particular material 
realities. Discourses around the honor crime are of course not singular, uni-
form, fixed, or unchanging, and they do not operate uniformly across different 
geographic contexts. The discourses surrounding the honor crime appear in 
both hegemonic and dominant forms, and they can also be replicated, cir-
culated, and disrupted. Dominant and mainstream discourses surrounding 
the honor crime continuously insist on its singularity, specificity, separate-
ness, and distinctiveness from other forms of gender violence. As this book 
will show, honor crime discourses that construct this form of violence in this 
singularized way work in complicated ways, distributing meanings unevenly 
and unpredictably. Their appearance, however, is neither sudden or coinci-
dental but historically specific and contingent. Tracking the contemporary 
movements, productions, and deployments of these discourses illuminates the 
unstable and ungovernable means by which they appear to circulate. To better 
understand their tractions and uptakes, I follow multiple and wide- ranging 
narratives and stories about the honor crime, showing how they proliferate 
between and within nation- states. I refer to discourses in the plural in order to 
highlight the multiple texts and contexts that construct the honor crime as it 
is today understood. Through the following chapters, I unpack how these nar-
ratives become tied to interconnected and overlapping forms of governance, 
state power, sexual control, and border management.
This project therefore analyzes a broad range of texts that span legal, polit-
ical, and literary genres and that inform normative and critical understand-
ings and confrontations of gender- based violence known as honor crimes. I 
understand hegemonic honor crime discourses as sets of signs, symbols, and 
rhetorical, discursive, and political practices that appear to describe a unique 
and distinct form of gender violence. While this form of violence is under-
stood to target the lives of both men and women, in this book I primarily 
focus on cases related to violence against women. The cases, sites, and narra-
tives I focus on do not purport to exhaust the wide range of available materi-
als on the phenomenon of the honor crime or the specific contexts in which 
gender violence takes place. Rather, I explore a certain set of narratives to 
examine the knowledge they produce about gender- based violence in general 
and the honor crime in particular. In following these knowledge construc-
tions and narratives, I draw out the relations between the four separate but 
interconnected sites of Canada, the US, Jordan, and Palestine. Far from mere 
geographic proximity or geopolitical intimacies and entanglements, these sites 
are tied together through the nonlinear travels, maneuvers, and circulations of 
these discourses. In placing these sites side by side and analogously, the book 
asks the following questions: How have mainstream honor crime discourses 
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emerged, and for what ends? What is their discursive currency, and how have 
the honor crime’s meanings been constructed and transported from one con-
text to another?
Although a number of critical studies now acknowledge the various com-
plicated and interwoven mobilizations of honor crime discourses, relatively 
unexplored are the ways in which they travel across and between different 
geographies and contexts in multidirectional, uneven, and circular routes.8 
Through its focus on these disparate and interconnected sites and contexts, 
this book provides a transnational feminist examination of the movements 
of honor- related discourses and their shaping of community- based, state- 
sanctioned, and nongovernment responses to and activism against gender- 
based violence. At stake in the study of the intersections between political, 
legal, activist, and cultural discourses surrounding the honor crime is both 
their ascendancy and their regulation of notions and practices of modernity 
and citizenship today. My book demonstrates that the discursive severing of 
the honor crime from the broader continuum of gender violence does not 
emerge suddenly but has a genealogy or a contemporary and nascent history. 
In reading a broad array of texts together, I demonstrate that this discursive 
and textual move has broad political consequences for policies, practices, and 
the law. Throughout the work, I show how the honor crime functions as a sig-
nifier that governs and manages populations and how its meanings travel and 
circulate across and between separate and interconnected circuits of power 
and knowledge.
CIRCULAR DISCOURSES
In 2014 the Clarion Project produced a documentary called Honor Diaries: 
Culture Is No Excuse for Abuse. Coinciding in its release with International 
Women’s Day, the documentary was promoted as the “the first film to break 
the silence on ‘honor violence’ against women and girls.”9 Bringing together 
nine “women’s rights advocates with connections to Muslim- majority states 
who are engaged in a dialogue about gender equality,” the documentary 
focuses on a broad range of topics associated with honor- related violence in 
Muslim- majority states, including murder in the name of honor, child and 
forced marriage, and female genital mutilation and cutting. Featuring individ-
ual and group interviews with the selected activists that are juxtaposed with 
scenes of suffering from around the world, the documentary covers a range 
of issues such as forced and compulsory veiling practices in Iran, the driving 
ban against Saudi women, and honor- related violence and legal statutes that 
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offer perpetrators of such crimes lenient or reduced sentencing in Pakistan. It 
also discusses female genital mutilation and cutting in Sudan and Egypt and 
includes a television interview with an Egyptian cleric who endorses the prac-
tice and roots its origins in Islamic scripture and teachings. Due to the timing 
of its release, the documentary forays into a discussion of the incidences of 
sexual assault and violence against women protesters during the Arab upris-
ings. Connecting such a broad range of documentary priorities is the reality 
that these acts of violence occur in Muslim- majority states and the claim that 
they are inspired by an articulation of “honor” that is directly connected to the 
cultures most shaped by the religion of Islam.
The documentary made its debut at international film festivals and was 
screened in London in partnership with Amnesty International. Moreover, 
a copy of it was delivered to Navi Pillay, the former United Nations High 
Commissioner of Human Rights in Geneva (Prusher 2014). Soon after its 
release, the work was criticized by a number of organizations and Muslim 
women activists, who questioned the political motivations of its creators and 
its funders. The Clarion Project describes itself as “a non- profit organization 
that educates the public about the dangers of radical Islam.” A central part of 
its education campaigns is the making and distribution of films about “how 
radical Islamists use terrorism, murder, subjugation of women, indoctrination 
of children, religious persecution, genocide of minorities, widespread human 
rights abuses, nuclear proliferation and cultural jihad—to threaten the West.”10 
Critics of the film questioned the opportunistic uptake of Muslim women’s 
rights in the documentary, making connections between some of the film’s 
proclaimed experts, such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and right- wing organizations 
with anti- Muslim agendas.11 Attempts to launch screenings of the film on US 
university campuses caused controversy, with some organizers either postpon-
ing or altogether cancelling scheduled screenings (De Bode 2014). The debate 
over the film also played out in the virtual world, where different factions 
impugned or defended the integrity of the filmmakers, the film’s funders and 
promoters, and the various women activists who appeared in it. In their criti-
cism of the film, Azeezah Kanji and a number of Muslim Canadian activists 
argued that the problem with the film is not its chosen focus on the violations 
of women’s rights that occur in Muslim- majority states but rather the miss-
ing contexts of how, where, when, and why such forms of gender- based vio-
lence continue to take place. As they write, “Honor Diaries cherry- picks and 
decontextualizes statistics to bolster its narrative of virtually uniform Muslim 
oppression of women” (Kanji et al. 2014).
Controversies stirred by documentaries like Honor Diaries appear to 
unfold regularly and play out in predetermined and tediously familiar ways. 
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They often begin with the production and release of a cultural object, film, 
documentary, memoir, or novel that addresses the subject of gender- based 
violence or other violations of human rights.12 The focus of the object is 
important, signaling an attempt to shed light on a social problem that spans 
a number of geopolitical and social contexts. Response to the work’s engage-
ment with the selected topic generally cleaves audiences across two positions. 
On the one hand, opponents of works like Honor Diaries call into question 
the ethics and politics of speaking on topics like gender violence in Muslim 
societies. To legitimate a singular focus on such topics in the eyes of oppo-
nents, the object must attend to the structural conditions that shape gender 
violence or demonstrate what Gillian Whitlock terms “communicative ethics” 
(2007, 47). That is, such critics demand reflective and thoughtful engagement 
with the politics of difference and its invocations, arguing that an engagement 
with topics such as gender violence requires attending to the specific contexts 
in which this violence occurs. Speaking on these topics in whatever chosen 
medium must be done responsibly, in a way that acknowledges the current 
anti- immigrant and anti- Muslim political contexts in which issues like honor- 
based violence are often highlighted or brought into view. Such positions are 
produced by a specific set of temporary and geographical constraints. They 
are informed by the recognition that contestations of gender- based violence 
are often appended to a set of discursive and political agendas that authorize 
militarized and securitized interventions domestically and transnationally as 
some of the chapters in this book will show.13 And they are often also shaped 
by a fear that coverage of these highly charged topics would demonize or be 
used to demonize already marginalized groups and communities.
On the other side of the spectrum are those who unequivocally support 
the cultural object itself, arguing that the high rates of gender- based violence 
in Muslim communities warrant the singular and focused coverage it pro-
duces and receives. Adopting the rhetoric of free speech, they defend the right 
to speak, write, and present on these subjects regardless of the intentions of 
their creators or the potential political uses of the work. These audiences are 
situated as concerned citizens who wish to bring attention to atrocities that 
have been concealed, buried, or ignored and that disproportionately impact 
vulnerable populations of girls and women. They speak either from per-
sonal experience or because of a connection to the issues at stake or from a 
righteous motivation to act on behalf of the aggrieved and sometimes dead 
subjects of gender- based violence. In their frenzied defenses of the cultural 
object they support, make, fund, or endorse, they take on a mix of rhetorical 
and political positions that range from ardent support for freedom of speech 
and freedom of expression to staunch opposition of what they deem forms of 
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political correctness, intimidation, and censorship.14 Paradoxically, the raging 
debates disappear from view the phenomenon of gender violence they seek to 
describe and ultimately confront.
The two positions I discuss are reductive, not capable of fully represent-
ing the complicated operations of honor- related discourses in a variety of 
spaces and contexts or the varieties of positions they invoke and the range 
of actors they recruit. Certainly, there are overlaps between the stances I rep-
resent. Meanwhile, there are nuanced and informed viewpoints that cannot 
be captured by the rigid binaries that are set up in this exchange and that, in 
fact, far exceed and complicate them. I begin with this sketch, however, to lay 
bare the ubiquitous ways in which conversations, controversies, and debates 
about honor- related violence publicly unfold and how they appear to struc-
ture the contours of our knowledge about gender- based violence. Writing on 
public framings of honor killings in Germany, Katherine Pratt Ewing argues 
that “the concept ‘honor killing’ obscures the sources of actual, specific acts 
of violence against women by creating a simulacrum—a representation that 
bears an illusory and even deceptive resemblance to something that is claimed 
to be its original” (2013, 164).
In her discussion of the murder of Hatun Sürücü and its public framings, 
Ewing makes a clear distinction between the actual murder of women and 
the phenomenon of honor- based violence as it circulates in media represen-
tations. She thus works to “trace the points at which representations of the 
event diverge, are contested, and congeal into new forms” (165). Although 
the disjuncture between the honor killing as a rhetorically mediated and tex-
tualized event and the actual incidences of gender- based violence the term 
seeks to describe and confront has been identified by scholars like Ewing, the 
transnational emergence, turns, and circulations of the discourses have yet 
to be sufficiently examined. What has spurred the honor crime’s surfacing? 
What are its enduring rhetorical and discursive characteristics and qualities? 
What forms of gender- based violence does the honor crime label contain and 
describe, and how does it travel from one place to another, and for what pur-
poses? Reassessing the ideological assumptions and uses of honor is crucial 
to this task.
ARBITRATING HONOR
The honor crime began to appear in international discussions surround-
ing gender- based violence in the early 2000s. In December 2001 the United 
Nations passed Resolution 55/66, “Working towards the elimination of crimes 
against women committed in the name of honour” (United Nations General 
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Assembly 2001). The resolution called on member nation- states to fulfill their 
obligations to international human rights treaties and to develop specific and 
multidimensional strategies to “prevent and eliminate crimes against women 
committed in the name of honour” through legislative, educational, and social 
measures. It also called on member states and the international community to 
provide actual and potential victims of honor crimes “protection, safe shel-
ter, counselling, legal aid, rehabilitation and reintegration into society” (2001, 
3). The first UN resolution surrounding honor- based violence was spurred, 
in part, by the work of Radhika Coomaraswamy, former UN Special Rap-
porteur on Violence against Women (1994–2003), who began to report on 
honor- based violence as early as 1999.15 Responding to accounts of rising rates 
of honor- related violence globally, Coomaraswamy expressed serious concern 
about this phenomenon and requested information on “such violence and 
measures that are being undertaken to combat it” (UN Economic and Social 
Council 1999, 7).
Coomaraswamy’s initial reporting on honor- related violence identified it 
as a form of family violence that “comprises, inter alia, woman- battering, mar-
ital rape, incest, forced prostitution, violence against domestic workers, vio-
lence against girls, sex- selective abortions and female infanticide, traditional 
violent practices against women including forced marriage, son preference, 
female genital mutilation and honour crimes” (1999, 6–7; emphasis in origi-
nal). In addition to identifying this violence as occurring within the domain 
of the family, Coomaraswamy sought to provide a definition of honor and its 
operations in relation to “traditional family ideology” (7). Her report showed 
how families enact the decision to execute a “female relative” who is deemed 
to have violated honor codes because of the belief or the assumption that she 
has engaged in “adultery, premarital relationships (which may or may not 
include sexual relations), rape and falling in love with an ‘inappropriate’ per-
son” (para. 18, 7).
Coomaraswamy’s subsequent coverage of honor- based violence described 
the phenomenon as one among a number of “practices in the family that 
are violent towards women and harmful to their health” (UN Economic and 
Social Council 2002, 2).16 In a detailed report on “cultural practices in the 
family that violate women’s rights,” the former special rapporteur focused on 
the “dominant ideologies and structures within societies” that help perpetu-
ate violence against women (3). The report amassed information on a num-
ber of harmful cultural practices, including female genital mutilation, witch 
hunting, forced marriage, marital rape, and honor killings. The section on 
honor killings provided a lengthy overview of the crime, delineating how it 
manifests differently and under many labels. Importantly, the UN report also 
listed “crimes of passion” as a form of honor- based violence that is enabled 
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by the existence and codification of legislative loopholes that exonerate men 
who commit violence against women.17 The report emphasizes, however, that 
these crimes share a common constitutive framework that utilizes honor “as 
a magic word, which can be used to cloak the most heinous of crimes. The 
concept of honor is especially powerful because it exists beyond reason and 
beyond analysis. But what masquerades as ‘honour’ is really men’s need to 
control women’s sexuality and their freedom. These murders are not based on 
religious beliefs but, rather, deeply rooted cultural ones” (13). Coomaraswa-
my’s turn towards the recognition of honor- based violence as a harmful cul-
tural practice echoes a shift in public discourse surrounding the links between 
culture and tradition, gender violence, and ongoing human rights violations. 
The report alludes to this shift in the introduction where it notes that certain 
forms of domestic violence have “avoided national and international scrutiny 
because they are seen as cultural practices that deserve tolerance and respect” 
(4). The report rejects the culturally relativist position that invokes culture as 
a legitimation for these crimes, a position that resonates with Article 4 of the 
“Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women” (48/4) which 
insisted that “States should condemn violence against women and should not 
invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obliga-
tions with respect to its elimination” (UN General Assembly 1993, 2). As Sally 
Engle Merry has noted in her study of UN resolutions surrounding gender- 
based violence, the shift in language was intentional, “paralleling a deepening 
critique of culture as an obstacle to human rights” (2006, 60).
Emphasizing the importance and broad influence of Coomaraswamy’s 
reports and their shaping of the UN global agenda on gender- based violence, 
Merry also recounts the resistance that the discursive shift towards linking 
gender- based violence to harmful cultural practices provoked among member 
states, noting that “the discussion of honor killings was particularly conten-
tious” (2006, 63). At stake in the debates surrounding the identification of 
honor killings as a form of gender violence and the assumed role that culture 
and tradition play in sanctioning or exacerbating these crimes is a tension 
between the desire of member states to condemn all forms of violence and a 
fear by some states that the first draft of the UN- level resolution, and its sub-
sequent focus on honor crimes, had “associated crimes against women with 
Islam”18 (UN General Assembly 2000b). Importantly, the press release on the 
adoption of the draft resolution on violence against women noted that some 
member states objected to a film that was shown prior to the presentation of 
the resolution and that they saw the language contained within the resolution 
as “non- objective” (UN General Assembly 2000b). The film in question was 
Shelley Saywell’s Crimes of Honour, which received an Emmy Award for Out-
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standing Investigative Journalism. The film primarily focuses on cases of femi-
cide from Jordan and the West Bank. In response to the perception that the 
film wrongfully linked Islam with certain forms of gender- based violence, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference submitted a letter to the UN Secretary 
General stating that “the member states of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference wish to reiterate that there is no linkage whatsoever between the 
killing of women and girls under any communal banner, including in the 
name of passion, honour or race, and the teachings, practices and values of 
Islam” (UN General Assembly 2000a, 2).19 
This position is also well captured by the statement of the representatives 
of the two Muslim- majority states of Qatar and Jordan. The first statement, 
which was provided by Mr. Al- Mohannadi, the representative of the state of 
Qatar, argued the following:
My delegation would like to offer its views on the draft resolution on crimes 
of passion against women. In Qatar, as in other Islamic countries, we try to 
protect women’s rights, and we have always recognized full equality between 
men and women.
My country believes that all crimes against men and women are equally 
reprehensible, and my country rejects these constant attacks against Islam, 
a religion that has more than 1.25 billion adherents. These crimes are not 
confined to any particular people or region. We believe that crimes called 
“crimes of honour” are crimes against people. Hence, we have reservations 
on the draft resolution entitled “Working towards the elimination of crimes 
against women committed in the name of honour,” and we shall abstain in 
the voting. (UN General Assembly 2000, 6)
The Qatari representative’s concern regarding the singling out of honor- based 
violence in the draft resolution captures a well- shared view that attempts to 
single out this crime were, in essence, thinly concealed attacks on the religion 
of Islam.20 The Qatari representative thus carefully states his country’s opposi-
tion to this resolution, dismissing the need for a specific resolution that con-
demns honor- based violence because all crimes against men and women are 
“equally reprehensible” in the eyes of the state of Qatar.21
Taking a different stance, the Jordanian representative argued that Jor-
dan had abstained from voting on the resolution because the draft language 
would open up all states to the charge of human rights violations for “not hav-
ing exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of such crimes” (UN 
General Assembly 2000c, 7).22 The Jordanian representative argued that the 
draft law would need to distinguish between crimes committed in the name of 
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honor and those committed in a fit of passion or “in a sudden state of rage,” a 
difference that had been disappeared in the text of the resolution. The Jorda-
nian representative’s important point makes a distinction between premedi-
tated crimes such as the honor killing and the passion crime or killing that 
occurs in a fit of fury, a difference that is central to the operations of the law 
in arbitrating cases of women killing. His country’s opposition to the wording 
used in the draft registers a rejection of the potential charge that some states 
were providing impunity to those who murder women through the existence 
of codes in their legal systems that provide lesser or reduced sentencing for 
men who kill, a matter that I return to in more detail in chapter 4.
As Jane Connors reveals in her detailed discussion of the UN agenda 
and the crime of honor, the discussions that surrounded the adoption of the 
resolution made honor- related violence “a matter of human rights” (2005, 
37). While this was an important political move that mandated that mem-
ber nation- states fulfill their obligations to international treaties regarding 
exercising due diligence in preventing, investigating, and prosecuting these 
crimes, “the issue remain[ed] an uncomfortable one, with some delegations 
concerned that a focus on crimes against women committed in the name of 
honour is selective, rather than comprehensive in its treatment of violence 
against women” (37). With the elevation of honor- related violence to interna-
tional and UN- level scrutiny, the crime became one of the most recognizable 
forms of violence against women. The UN resolution against honor- related 
violence and the debates that it invoked at the transnational level showcase 
the charged terrain surrounding discussions of gender- based violence and the 
world of policy making.
The tension between the positions outlined above elucidates a few para-
digmatic and enduring qualities of discussions about honor- based violence. 
First, the debates delineated above chart what Merry names the “turbulent 
waters” of international efforts to produce effective legislation surrounding 
ending violence in general and the need to build momentum for efforts to end 
gender- based violence that have been associated with particular cultural prac-
tices (2006, x). As Merry makes clear, “Diminishing violence against women 
requires cultural transformation” and the remaking of the boundaries between 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of violence against women (25). This pro-
cess is marked by tensions between those advocating for the change and those 
who are wary that such changes are fundamentally a challenge to their tradi-
tions, cultures, and religious practices or an attack on their social structures 
and orders. Second, the debates signal the growing anxieties around the singu-
larized discourse of the honor crime and its linking to particular geographies 
of violence. Despite careful work, the honor crime remains invariably linked 
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to specific sites, regions, and states, and it is thus attached to certain racialized 
bodies, publics, and communities. For example, in the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Rashida Manjoo notes 
that “although honour crimes have occurred in the vast zone spreading from 
the Sahara to the Himalayas, it also occurs in other regions and countries with 
migrant communities” (UN General Assembly 2012, 12).23 Despite the lack 
of specificity around what the honor crime is, the label nevertheless evokes 
rhetorical and geospatial connections between people and places and forms 
of gender- based violence identified as extreme. Third, the debates highlight 
the lingering ambiguities and definitional struggles that surround the honor 
crime as a specific form of gender- based violence. As Mark Cooney states, 
literature on the honor crime “conceptualizes honor violence variously: as a 
crime, as gendered violation, as a violation of human rights, as a discursive 
formation” (2014, 407). In other words, the term is immersed in imprecision 
not only because it describes a number of interconnected forms of gender- 
based violence but also because it is variously employed to criminalize vio-
lations of human rights and to bring attention to particular rhetorical and 
discursive positions, claims, and assumptions about a social problem. The 
explanatory power of the honor crime appears to be simultaneously limited 
and expansive, circulating knowledge that not only describes a phenomenon 
but also gives shape to it.
DEFINITIONAL HAZARDS
In January 2012, following an intense national discussion and debate on 
honor- related violence in Canada, the Canadian Council of Muslim Women 
(CCMW) issued a position paper that addresses the politics of naming 
gender- based violence or femicide. Titled “CCMW Position on Femicide [Not 
Honour Killing],” the paper lays out the organization’s refusal to use the term 
honor killing to describe the phenomenon of the murder of women and girls:
The Canadian Council of Muslim Women is strongly opposed to the use of 
the term “honour killing” to describe the murder of women and girls. Our 
argument is that no murder of a woman should be categorized by the ratio-
nale provided by the murderer, or by society itself, whether it be so called 
honour killing or crimes of passion. 
We urge that all murders/killings be identified as femicide—the killing 
of women and girls simply because they are females. This includes the killing 
of girls as infants—infanticide. This term does not separate women and girls 
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into distinct groups based on race, culture or religion, and murders are the 
crimes committed against anyone of them. 
We hold that all forms of violence against women are regressive because 
somewhere in here lies misogyny and the lessened value of the lives of 
women and girls. (1)
The position outlined above by the CCMW is important because it captures 
the contours of the debate surrounding language used to describe the murder 
of women. CCMW’s rejection of the language of honor in the naming of the 
murder of girls and women is further explained in the lengthy position paper. 
The authors claim that their stance is shaped by an unequivocal rejection of 
the contexts and rationales used to explain away this form of violence. It is 
also informed by a recognition that the language of “honor killing” is often 
divisive and that, when employed in Western contexts, it renders “these mur-
ders exotic, foreign, and alien” (1). CCMW’s stance, however, is shaped not 
only by fears of how this label may be used to portray Muslim communities 
but by an awareness that the label can be utilized by perpetrators, allowing 
them to lay claim to culturally relativist arguments and explanations of their 
violence in social and legal settings. The CCMW’s position, which can be seen 
as a religiously informed defense, refuses to name honor- based forms of gen-
der violence by the label that its perpetrators give it because the group views 
such a discursive act as an acquiescence to the terms used to justify violence 
against girls and women (Mojab 2012). Rather than relying on the language 
of honor, the CCMW advocates for the use of the label femicide, which, they 
argue, “avoids inferences about the motives of the killers, and clearly states 
that violence is used as a tool against females and murders are the extreme 
end of the continuum of violence against women and girls” (2012, 3).
The issue of language is central in discussions of honor- based violence. 
In spite of various international, activist, and scholarly efforts, attempts to 
arrive at a singular definition of this form of violence have not been success-
ful. Welchman and Hossain concede this definitional difficulty in their intro-
duction to an important edited collection on honor crimes where they write, 
“Issues of definition and terminology come to the fore in the current inter-
national focus on ‘crimes of honour’ and their consequent perceived associa-
tion with Muslim societies” (2005, 13). Similarly, Aisha Gill recognizes in her 
extensive work on honor crimes the long history of “discursive wrangling over 
the use of the term ‘honour’ in relation to VAW [Violence Against Women]” 
(2010, 218). In spite of the discursive disagreements around the term, defini-
tions of the honor crime and honor killings abound in scholarly literature. 
In a key article on the honor crime in Turkey, Dicle Kogacioglu identifies 
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the honor crime “as the murder of a woman by members of her family who 
do not approve of her sexual behaviour” (2004, 118).24 Kogacioglu’s analysis 
reveals how the honor crime terminology appears to evoke not only the kill-
ing of women but a range of violent practices that can also be motivated by 
notions of honor if the latter is understood to revolve around the regulation 
of sexual norms and behaviors. Thus, it is not uncommon for discussions of 
honor killings as an extreme form of violence to go hand in hand with dis-
cussions of female genital mutilation and other culturalized forms of gender- 
based violence.
Complicating the quest for academic and scholarly definitional consensus 
further are the various words that are associated with the concept of honor. 
For example, Diane E. King explores how “honor” can also be expressed 
through words like namus and ‘ird in the Kurdish communities in Iraq where 
the author conducted her study. King attends to the “set of ideas and practices 
associated with ‘honor killings’,” arguing that an honor killing is a response to 
an affront to or breach of patrilineal sovereignty (2008, 318). King understands 
sovereignty as the ability of a “lineage and/or state to define its composition, 
to decide how it will utilize its resources, to define its boundaries, and to use 
violence” (318). The definition King provides shows how honor operates at 
the metaphorical and material levels and how infractions of honor, whether 
assumed, imagined, or real can have deadly consequences for girls and women 
in patrilineal societies.
In their study on cultures of honor in rural Turkey, Aysan Sev’er and 
Gökçeçiçek Yurdakul (2001) also note the variety of terms used to describe 
honor in the Turkish language, arguing that the existence of a range of expres-
sions registers the importance of the concept of honor for Turkish society.25 
The authors argue that the violations of namus can have deadly consequences, 
“especially among the rural segments of the population where people are 
much more likely to be traditional, patriarchal, nonsecularly married at an 
early age, and illiterate or uneducated” (980).26 While the authors advocate 
for a recognition of honor killing violence as a form of patriarchal violence, 
their analysis appears to reinforce a division between modern and traditional 
members of Turkish society, associating honor- based violence with rural as 
opposed to urban communities. This analysis reinscribes the modernity- 
versus- tradition framework often used to explain this form of violence which 
inheres patriarchal violence to traditional as opposed to modern worldviews 
and practices.
If the honor crime discourse works locally to produce distinctions between 
modernity and tradition, it is used in multicultural state contexts to both eth-
nicize and racialize the crime. In an article on the dangers of this discourse 
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in the British context, Veena Meetoo and Heidi Safia Mirza argue that the 
appearance of “honour killings as a specific phenomena” is purposeful, with 
government and media applying this language “only among certain minor-
ity ethnic groups” (2007, 188). Meetoo and Mirza are critical of multicultural 
discourses that allow dominant societies to ignore the intersectional workings 
of power and violence within marginalized communities, arguing that “an 
overly sensitive multicultural approach” can rationalize the reluctant response 
from the state to investigate incidences of domestic violence within racialized 
and ethnicized communities (192). Within this context of relative state neglect 
of domestic violence incidences within racialized communities, the authors 
inquire why there remains a singularized focus on honor- related violence: 
“While we recognise that ethnic groups and communities do have specific 
religious and cultural traditions which they may themselves label as honour 
based, why, in the context of ethnicity, is domestic violence treated as a cultur-
ally specific honour crime by our wider organisations and institutions?” (188).
This tension between the politics of naming honor- based violence and 
efforts to include it in a more generalizable category like violence against 
women is well captured in a 2010 article by Rochelle Terman titled “To Specify 
or Single Out: Should We Use the Term ‘Honor Killing’?” Published shortly 
after the highly publicized murders of Aqsa Parvez and Aasiya Hassan, Ter-
man’s article lays out the rhetorical and political positions of proponents and 
opponents of the term honor killings.27 Informed by an understanding of the 
dangers of racism and Islamophobia, Terman’s analysis seeks to develop a lan-
guage that is both “anti- violence and anti- racist” (3). Terman thus charts the 
specifics of the term honor and the aspects that are recognized as the defining 
features of the honor killing, showing how a singularized focus on the crime 
in the West has helped animate the debate between those who are in favor of 
the term’s use and those who are wary of its usages. While carefully charting 
the arguments for and against the use of the honor killing label to describe 
particular cases of violence against women, Terman concludes that the term 
cannot be avoided if we are to confront the specificities of this act of violence. 
As she states, “‘Honor killing’ is a categorization that helps us with a spe-
cific phenomenon that require specific strategies for redress elimination” (26). 
If the label offers a helpful categorization and framework for understanding 
this violence and developing efforts to combat violence against women, what, 
then, constitutes an honor killing?
In a much- cited definition of the honor crime which has informed domi-
nant discourses surrounding honor- based violence, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW 2001) states that honor crimes are “acts of violence, usually murder, 
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committed by male family members against female family members who are 
perceived to have brought dishonor upon the family.” The short explanation 
provided by HRW does not enumerate what types of violence can be included 
in the definition or specify the particular social, political, and cultural con-
texts that give rise to such forms of violence; nevertheless, it suggests that 
honor- based violence is primarily committed against women who “are per-
ceived to have brought dishonor” upon their families. The word perceived is 
important, signaling that women are murdered not for actual infractions of 
honor but because of assumptions that they have broken particular cultural or 
social codes. The definition takes for granted the meaning of honor, allowing 
readers to make causal connections between its infraction and acts of vio-
lence against women, including murder, that are enacted under its name. The 
brevity of HRW’s definition accounts, in part, for its wide circulation and its 
acceptance by some scholars as a “neutral” definition.28
Aware of the conundrums that surround efforts to define honor- related 
violence, UN Women provides the following guidance to advocates and legal 
practitioners working to develop laws and policies that target the honor 
crime.29 The drafting advice provided by the UN (2011) is worth citing at 
length here:
Drafters are encouraged to use an expansive definition for “honour” crimes 
and killings. A definition must be broad enough to encompass “honour”- 
based violence in all its forms, such as murder, attempted murder, driving 
to suicide, rape, gang rape, torture, assault, virginity testing, kidnapping, 
forced marriage, forced eviction, harassment, threats, stove burnings, acid 
attacks and maiming. Legislation should clarify that the detailed list should 
not serve to exclude from sanctions some behavior that is not included.
The UN directive on definitions of honor- based violence and policies that 
confront this violence references both honor crimes and honor killings. While 
killings refer to acts of violence that intend to cause death or result in sui-
cide or murder, honor crimes evoke a broader understanding of violence that 
includes both physical violence such as torture, forced marriage, stove burn-
ings, acid attacks, and maiming, and sexual forms of violence such as rape and 
gang rape. Linking these distinct examples of violence is a broad and loose 
conception of “honor,” which is again never explained or defined but is never-
theless cohered around different examples of gender violence. The document 
gestures towards the complexities of the concept by placing the word in quo-
tation marks and to “imply the absence of ‘honor’ in these crimes.” The UN 
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guidance also makes clear that any list that provides examples of honor- based 
violence is not exhaustive and that other forms of violence, not here listed, can 
be included under this broad conceptualization of violence.
UN Women promotes the use of this language in spite of some of the dis-
cursive and political challenges it poses. As the site explains:
Further, although some argue that designation of “honour” crimes as a dis-
tinct form of violence masks the universal nature of violence against women 
and risks demonizing cultures in which such crimes are more prevalent, the 
recognition of “honour” crimes as a particular, contextually- informed type 
of violence against women rightly acknowledges the unique characteristics 
of such crimes (such as their premeditated and collective nature). Acknowl-
edging these features in turn facilitates the adoption of effective, targeted 
laws and policies to combat “honour” crimes. (2011)
The UN Women’s directive on the work of defining honor- based violence 
serves as a reminder of the high stakes attached to the rhetorical act of nam-
ing violence. Labeling honor- related violence enables lawmakers to regulate 
this crime, to design laws that provide sanctions against this form of violence 
and, thus, seek to prevent its occurrence. To enable this regulatory mecha-
nism, the law must make distinctions between different forms of violence, 
identifying its unique or distinguishing features such as premeditation and the 
collective familial or societal approval that precedes its occurrence. As texts 
that will determine the legal and criminal consequences for committing acts 
of violence, laws on honor- related crimes must be able to specify what, exactly, 
is unique and distinct about this form of violence.
Imbued in a discourse of singularity, the honor crime is arguably among 
the most internationally recognized acts of violence against women. While 
the debates over what actually constitutes honor- based violence have not 
produced a generally accepted or recognized definition of these crimes, pro-
ponents of the distinctiveness of honor- related violence from a broader con-
tinuum of gender violence maintain that three particular features render these 
crimes simultaneously distinct and particular:
 1. Honor- based violence (HBV) is a premeditated act.
 2. This gender violence occurs within a framework of collective family pun-
ishment and is motivated by a desire to control the sexual choices and 
social behavior of women.
 3. Honor- based violence is often rewarded rather than punished.
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These features can be summarized as relating to the crimes’ original intent 
(Was the crime planned for? Did the perpetrator intend to kill? Or did the 
crime take place in a fit of fury or passion?), its form (Was the crime per-
petrated by an individual actor, or was she or he aided and abetted by other 
members of their families or society?), and its consequence (Was the perpe-
trator of the crime ostracized by their family or society after the discovery of 
the crime? Was the perpetrator prosecuted, and, if so, was the sentence com-
mensurate with the severity of the crime?) According to these three features, 
honor- related violence differs from other forms of violence against women 
(including intimate partner violence) because its victims are part of patriar-
chal cultures that see women as the property of men, where men and kin are 
encouraged to regulate the sexualities and social behaviors of women. When 
women act in ways that exceed cultural norms and expectations, they are pun-
ished for their behavior in order to protect the reputation and honor of their 
male kin. That this violence is premeditated and usually carried out by more 
than one member of the female’s immediate and extended family (rather than 
by her husband) is taken as evidence that these crimes do not fit within the 
framework used to analyze other examples of gender violence, including inti-
mate partner, domestic violence, or homicide, which are understood to be 
carried out by an individual male partner acting independently and out of his 
own accord and on impulse rather than with intent.30 Noting the problems 
with this distinction, Sherene Razack argues that “the honour/passion distinc-
tion not only obscures the cultural and community approval so many crimes 
against women have in majority culture, but it reifies Muslims as stuck in pre-
modernity while Westerners have progressed as fully rational subjects with 
the capacity to choose moral actions, even if the choice is a bad one” (2008, 
128 ; emphasis in original).
In challenging arguments about the distinctiveness of the honor crime as 
a form of gender violence, opponents often focus their analysis on the ways in 
which the honor killing is rewarded in the social, legal, and cultural settings 
where they occur.31 Certainly, codes that impugn crimes against women and 
that normalize heterosexual and patriarchal acts of gender violence, providing 
them both legal recourse and moral cover, are examples of legal rewards.32 This 
position assumes a congruity between the letter of the law and its applications. 
Yet to only critique the plainly obvious and even explicit aspects of reward 
exhibited in some legal codes is to miss how manifestations of reward are also 
at work in Western legal and social systems for perpetrators of violence against 
women and violence against other marginalized subjects. More importantly, 
this narrow focus on legal codes ignores how tacit and implicit manifestations 
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of reward operate both within and outside Western legal systems, sanctioning 
acts of violence against national subjects deemed unworthy and unnecessary 
and therefore deserving of state- sanctioned forms of violence.33 In expand-
ing conceptions of reward to include its mutually reinforcing manifestations 
within and outside the law, we begin to witness how certain acts of violence 
are facilitated, encouraged, and even rewarded by state silence, complicity, and 
inaction. This expanded framework reveals some of the difficulties that sur-
round claims of the crime’s specificity, distinction, and difference, especially 
when they are hinged on an analysis of the legal text and unmoored from the 
social and political and cultural worlds in which such texts become animated.
Writing on the specifics of honor- based violence, Shahrazad Mojab argues 
that “considerations of honour and its loss underlie the entire process of kill-
ings, allowing us to distinguish it from domestic violence” (2012, 129). Mojab’s 
work, which draws on her extensive scholarship on honor killings and her 
experience as an expert witness in the trial for the Shafia murders in 2009,34 
presents a complex understanding of honor as a social institution.35 As Mojab 
shows, honor is a central “regulator of gender relations,” and its meanings 
are shaped by the interactions of a set of patriarchal, cultural, and religious 
institutions (129). Based on the social characteristics of honor, Mojab distin-
guishes between domestic violence and the honor killing, arguing that the 
former often occurs “without pressure from family, kin, or community,” while 
the latter is often a response to a community or family expectation or demand 
to cleanse or restore honor that has been lost (130). Mojab’s analysis insists 
on recognizing the particulars of the honor crime and the specific cultural 
contexts in which it occurs, suggesting that its confrontation requires “multi- 
dimensional, multi- disciplinary, and radical approaches” that do not fall into 
the traps of cultural relativism, nationalism, or racism (133).
Critical race feminist studies scholars have sought to contend with the 
ambiguities surrounding the honor crime. In a policy analysis document sub-
mitted to the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding in the aftermath 
of the murder of Aasiya Hassan (Zubair), Zareena Grewal explored some of 
the difficulties that surround the work of naming and contesting domestic 
violence in Muslim and communities of color. Grewal discusses how certain 
forms of violence are always already “culturalized,” signaling to publics their 
distinct nature from a broader continuum of domestic violence or violence 
against women. Grewal (2009) offers practitioners strategies for speaking on 
violence against women; she contends that it is not possible to ignore the cul-
tural aspects of gender- based violence, but, she asserts, “culture alone does 
not cause violence; however, the effects of violence are always cultural, as are 
the conditions that allow the abuse to persist” (13). Grewal’s careful attempt 
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to understand domestic violence beyond the binary of culturalism or rac-
ism serves as a reminder of the difficulties of speaking on and contesting 
these crimes in the often charged political and social contexts in which they 
occur.36 It reveals how when a discourse is so imbued with an a- priori set of 
meanings and assumptions, it also becomes impossible to navigate outside of 
its charged, limited, and constraining discursive frames and referents. These 
efforts remind us that “words inevitably attain their actual understood mean-
ing within contexts that animate specific connotations and references” (Alcoff 
2018, 149). The honor crime, and the discursive terrains that surround it and 
which it helps shape, produces a complicated web of meanings that extends 
beyond the discursive realm into the social and political worlds that words 
animate and construct. In what follows, I do not seek to provide a singular 
definition of the honor crime or claim to resolve the tensions that surround its 
circulated and commonly accepted definitions. Rather, I explore its multiple 
meanings and deployments, offering instead a focus on its heterogenous evo-
cations, usages, and deployments in multiple texts and contexts, showing how 
dominant discourses surrounding this crime work and the political worlds 
they animate.
METHODOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Researching a topic like honor- based violence is a challenging endeavor. As 
the previous sections have shown, honor crime discourses often trap scholars 
and activists between charges of cultural relativism and charges of racism. It 
is impossible to speak or write on honor- based violence without wading into 
the discursive complexities of the term, the various contestations surrounding 
both its usefulness and limitations. A discourse analysis of the honor crime 
necessarily requires assembling a wide array of texts that can help reveal how 
the language of the honor crime works in different contexts, how it neatly 
fits into or how it complicates or defies rhetorical and political expectations. 
In this work, and following the contribution of rhetorical studies scholars, 
“discourses are not seen as neutral ways of describing the world, but as ways 
of reproducing or challenging relations of power and dominance in society” 
(Bartolucci 2012, 564). Thus, my analysis of honor crime discourse attends 
to cultural, social, and political assumptions, desires, and goals of the word’s 
conveyers. It seeks to reveal the web of politics and cultural workings that 
underpin the discourse’s emergence and usage across national contexts. It 
attends to the worlds that the honor killing discourses construct and shape, 
acknowledging the varied and multiple meanings that they disseminate. I am 
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invested in thinking about how the dominant rhetorics of the honor crime 
rely on the use of “the same set of words and linguistic constructions .  .  . 
reproduced and finally naturalised, eventually coming to be seen as common- 
sense” (563).
My goal in analyzing the linguistic formations that surround dominant 
honor crime discourses is to better understand their representation of this 
form of gender violence as singularized, distinct, and particular. By tracing 
the honor crime’s appearance in a variety of texts and contexts, I reveal its 
powers to intervene in political, cultural, and social space. As rhetorical stud-
ies scholar Sara McKinnon (2014) notes, “This level of analysis focuses the 
analyst’s eye on the function of discourse, or what it is doing within the orga-
nizations, institutions, and societies where they circulate. This level of analysis 
is the broadest level used by discourse analysts, and also perhaps the most 
important as discourse analysis cannot be discourse analysis without an exam-
ination of the sociocultural practice of the discourse” (8; emphasis in origi-
nal). My investment in exploring the honor crime discourse emerges from a 
recognition that how we define things impact the strategies and policies that 
we develop to confront them.37 
Definitions of social problems are never really static and are always in 
flux. They are shaped by competing interests and agendas and by the con-
stant reshaping of public consensus about a social problem, its scale, and the 
urgency required to confront it. What we now recognize as the honor crime is 
discursively and rhetorically produced through policies, laws, media reports, 
and scholarly works and activism that aims to confront the social problem of 
gender- based violence. In what follows, I assemble varying texts to explore 
how different discursive materials such as policy, film, music, and the law 
construct the phenomenon of gender violence known as the honor crime. 
Drawing on a range of scholarly and interdisciplinary traditions, including 
critical literary analysis, transnational feminism, feminist rhetorical and dis-
cursive studies, and Middle East studies, this book analyzes the emergence of 
the honor crime as a severe form of gender violence and as a historically spe-
cific phenomenon, produced variably over time and space through a number 
of stories, narratives, ideas, and discourses. My work seeks to “make mean-
ing of how these stories are created and re- created over time and with what 
consequences” (Chowdhury 2011, 15). By privileging the close reading of tex-
tual materials assembled from an array of sources and sites, Gender Violence 
and the Transnational Politics of the Honor Crime explores the constructions 
of the honor crime through a variety of textual, discursive, material, and 
practices. The book seeks to show how words shape our understanding of 
this phenomenon and how it manifests in public conversations and actions 
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against gender violence. Rather than accepting these texts as reflections of 
knowledge about the honor crime, my work shows the active role that texts 
play in shaping knowledge about this phenomenon and efforts to end it. 
By reading diverse textual materials in interconnected ways, my work 
shows the importance of critical reading practices and feminist discourse 
analysis that attend to the relationships between words and their social, histor-
ical, and political contexts. In refusing to attend to the singular manifestations 
of the honor crime discourse in specific geopolitical sites, my study employs a 
transnational analytic framework that identifies links and ruptures that trou-
ble foreclosed boundaries of knowledge formations, inviting an analysis that 
engages how “texts participate in a field, and then in a set of fields, and thus 
in a social and political world” (McAlister 2001, 8). As the previous sections 
have demonstrated, the rise of honor crime discourse is tied to particular 
UN policies and activist efforts at a certain point in time when the agenda 
of women’s rights as human rights was on the rise. But as the dominant dis-
courses surrounding the honor crime began to take hold, certain complexi-
ties also came to the fore, fracturing some of the consensus surrounding the 
shape, form, and scale of this social problem. This work, then, maps some of 
these tensions and complexities, showing how these discourses ebb and flow, 
how they appear and disappear from view, and how, over time, they begin to 
cohere or alter.
The following chapters tell politicized stories about honor crime dis-
courses and their unfolding in separate but interconnected transnational 
contexts. These stories attempt to reveal aspects of this discourse that are, at 
times, highlighted and those that are ignored, downplayed, or even normal-
ized. Following the work of scholars like Yasmin Jiwani in her book Discourses 
of Denial: Mediations of Race, Gender, and Violence, I am interested in map-
ping how honor crime discourses get constructed and how their constructions 
overlap with “multiple and interweaving structures of domination” to define 
the parameters of a “particular subject matter in terms of how it is thought 
of and talked about” (2006, xii). By paying attention to both the everyday 
mundane and the spectacularized appearances of the honor crime in differ-
ent textualities, this work explores the broader contexts and consequences 
of its mobilizations, showing how “separations between structural and more 
interpersonal forms of violence are maintained” (Jiwani 2006, xii). As James 
Ferguson (1994) has noted, “Discourse is a practice, it is structured, and it has 
real effects” (15). Exploring the varying intended and unintended effects of 
honor crime discourses is a central aim of this book.
Gender Violence and the Transnational Politics of the Honor Crime attends 
to the workings of this discourse in multiple spaces to reveal how it unfolds, 
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moves, and travels. It thus brings into view the multiple, uneven, and varied 
consequences of this discourse. It shows the consistencies and inconsistencies 
surrounding its uptake in different geopolitical contexts, tracing the circular 
ways in which it moves from one place to another. Following the work of fem-
inist scholars like Inderpal Grewal, I seek to reveal the continuities and breaks 
in discourses surrounding the honor crime and their transnational circula-
tions. In her study of the movement of consumer culture across space, time, 
and place, Grewal argues that “it is only by examining the production and 
circulation of consumer culture and consumer goods within the context of 
biopolitics and geopolitics that we can see how identity politics operate at the 
complex nexus of political economy, national imaginaries, and related mobili-
zations of desire and individuality within liberal and neoliberal politics” (2005, 
28). A transnational study of honor crime discourses thus requires analyzing 
not only the textual and discursive but also their productions, mobilizations, 
and circulations as disciplinary and regulatory scripts that produce particu-
lar positionalities and subjectivities. These multiple, varied, and overlapping 
circulations map entanglements between states and activists, the realm of the 
law with popular media representations, policies and opinion pieces with 
academic and scholarly work. In attending to these messy and complicated 
entanglements and imbrications, I explore how these discourses construct and 
disseminate notions of modernity and become tied to transnational debates 
around belonging and citizenship.
The transnational study of discourse, as Rebecca Dingo has argued, serves 
to “illustrate a matrix of connections between people, nations, economies, 
and the textual practices present in, for example, public policies and popu-
lar culture” (2012, 12). A transnational feminist approach to the study of dis-
course is, therefore, necessarily multisited, bringing into view both the visible 
and the less visible connections between different aspects of these discourses. 
Following the work of rhetorical studies scholars, this study is developed by 
“considering the transnational paths along which rhetorics travel” (Dingo, 21). 
The analysis in this work is thus guided by the circulations of the discourses 
of the honor crime in geographies I have intimately known and experienced 
either through living in them for extended periods or traveling through them 
as a result of the experiences of studying and conducting this research. While 
grounded in the specificities of these geographies, this work is not based on an 
ethnographic study conducted in these spaces. It is, in essence, a study of the 
political and material worlds that texts and discourses enact and disrupt in the 
specificities and intimacies of particular geopolitical contexts. What has led to 
this inquiry is an investment in contesting forms of gender violence that are 
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intersectional and that require transnational feminist analytics and activisms 
in order to end gender violence in all its manifestations.
My analysis of honor crime discourses draws on multiple years of research-
ing this topic and writing on violence in an effort to think about the ways 
in which feminism has theorized and actively confronted gender violence. 
Despite its grounding in feminist analytical frameworks, however, writing on 
violence that becomes known as honor- related violence raises many ethical 
and political conundrums. What does it mean to be able to write and pro-
duce research on incidences of gender violence that harm women and lead 
to or end in murder? How does one invoke the names of murdered women 
without playing into the sensationalized and exceptionalized rhetorics used to 
record, describe, or contest their murders? How can one speak against these 
crimes without reducing the lost lives of the people it targets to their final and 
macabre scenes? I have tried to address some of these concerns by focusing 
on the political and cultural workings of the discourse surrounding gender 
and sexual violence. I have done this while knowing that, at times, details of 
killing and murder are necessary and that recounting them, while risking sen-
sationalism, is a crucial mode of remembrance and resistance of patriarchal 
erasure and denial of violence. In what follows, I trace what dominant and 
hegemonic honor crime discourses bring into view and what they obfuscate 
or disappear. In doing so, I focus less on the accounts of gender violence and 
more on the particular ways in which these stories are portrayed, represented, 
and, finally, contested. While doing this, I am aware of the dilemmas and pit-
falls that Western- based academics and feminists, such as myself, encounter 
when writing about gender violence. As Nadje Al- Ali (2016) writes, “Repre-
sentations of violence in scholarship, in the media, in popular culture, and, 
crucially, in policy discourses, reveal the complex and fraud [sic] ways our 
respective positionalities shape the registers we use to talk about and chal-
lenge violence” (8). Al- Ali rightly emphasizes the importance of challeng-
ing the limits of our own positionalities by developing our understanding of 
gender- based violence in “materially- grounded work” (11) that attends to both 
the discursive representations of violence and the realities of violence itself as 
it is experienced by people in local contexts. I have attempted to do this by 
not shying away from highlighting the multiple and intersecting experiences 
of gender violence that people encounter, speaking directly against them, and 
not reducing these experiences to the mere level of discourse. 
In spite of this effort, writing on the honor crime in an academic work 
requires an acknowledgment of the violence of theorizing gender- based vio-
lence. It requires contending with how, as academics, the words we write, 
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the books we produce, and the scholarly careers we build on them also enact 
certain omissions, lapses, and violences. There is no comfortable or easy way 
out of this reality—nor should there be. Writing on violence and the ethics 
of recounting violence in anthropological work, David Valentine states that 
this “analysis of violence therefore lies uncomfortably in the territory between 
representation and physical violence—discourse as violence—and how such 
facts are mounted to make a series of claims—violence as discourse” (2003, 
33; emphasis in original). Valentine writes on the role of anthropology in con-
fronting violence in all its messiness and complexities, stating “Violence, pain, 
suffering, like all other arenas of social life, are messy, cut through with ambi-
guity and contradiction. Violence is not only murder or beatings; it can be 
identified in a text or a political position” (45). In writing about the discourses 
surrounding the honor crime, my project also lies in the uncomfortable ter-
rain of discursive violence and violent discourse that Valentine identifies. Like 
other scholars who write on violated or dead subjects, I am aware that a focus 
on discourses surrounding violence does not approximate confrontations of 
gender violence in the field, nor does it amount to a form of activism against 
its continued occurrence.
My goal in focusing on these discourses, tracing their genealogies, and 
the textual politics they deploy is to help develop an analytic framework that 
moves beyond the singularizing of this form of gender violence. To do so, 
I attend to the structural dimensions that give rise to the discourses of the 
honor crime and the multiple dynamics at play in their productions and cir-
culations. I acknowledge that discourse analysis can offer a too- easy reliance 
on texts in order to make sense of the world and that it risks producing its 
own analytic foreclosures and certainties. In Cultivating Development: An Eth-
nography of Aid Policy and Practice, David Moss argues that while attention 
to text is important in understanding policies and practices that are enacted 
in its name, texts “cannot be read at face value without reference to the argu-
ments, interests and divergent points of view that they encode and to which 
they allude” (2005, 15). In presenting honor crime discourses as they are 
named, discussed, and referenced in a broad array of texts, I seek to explore 
both their inner workings and their external associations. I explore the mean-
ings they make when they are presented in tandem with or when they are set 
apart from other texts and contexts. Above all, I seek to present the different 
meanings that these discourses take on and the analytic openings and foreclo-
sures they facilitate or prevent.
My critique of the workings of the dominant discourses surrounding the 
honor crime and their uses does not seek to gloss over the question of the 
politics and ethics of writing on domestic violence and the murder of women. 
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When we write on violated and dead subjects, to whom are we accountable? 
In her 2019 study on gender- based violence in Muslim communities, Juliane 
Hammer articulates a similar tension when she states:
It is equally vexing for me to write about murder and violence in order to 
“reflect” on and develop an analysis of the ways in which domestic violence 
murders are discursively produced and approached. It seems macabre at 
times to theorize death in this way, and I have never achieved any level of 
comfort with participating in this endeavor. My only argument for the sig-
nificance and ethical acceptability of this project is that awareness, public, 
communal, and academic, is an important tool for societal change and thus 
writing about these topics is important. (27)
Hammer’s thoughtful questioning of the ethics and politics of writing on gen-
der violence is significant, charting some of the problems of speaking and 
writing on this topic for academic audiences and academic purposes. In writ-
ing this book, I share many of her concerns and the concerns of other schol-
ars who write on these topics and issues. Like Hammer, I am uncomfortable 
with the work of theorizing gender violence, and I struggle with the ethics of 
making meaning of the horrors inflicted on girls and women in the name of 
patriarchal systems that inhere and seek to regulate moral systems and social 
practices. Hammer finds some comfort in knowing that awareness can conse-
quently create societal change. Like her, I too hope that this scholarly work on 
discourses surrounding gender violence known as honor- based violence can 
contribute in some way to the goal of ending violence that targets the lives of 
people in various ways and in creating safer environments for those struggling 
at the sites of multiple and intersecting forms of injustice and oppression.
A MAP OF THE BOOK
This book offers a genealogical approach to honor crime discourses, focusing 
on their dominant articulations and expressions. It does this by attending to 
past and contemporary historical formations of these discourses, tracing their 
emergence, circulations, and travels in multiple texts and contexts. Thus, Gen-
der Violence and the Transnational Politics of the Honor Crime moves between 
histories, places, and spaces, seeking to unsettle what we know about the 
dominant honor crime discourses and their workings. By mapping these dis-
courses and their appearances in specific historical, geographical, and politi-
cal conjunctures, the following chapters “explore the geographies of public 
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and private that shape power relations, that give meaning to difference, and 
that condition the political” (Staeheli and Kofman, 2004, 10). The chapters are 
organized around an examination of the ideological, institutional, and geo-
political underpinnings of the honor crime and its political uses. This organi-
zation moves between and through different contexts to present the distinct 
and (sometimes) overlapping ways in which honor crime discourses appear 
to work in each of the sites discussed here. In the chapters that follow, I trace 
the appearance of these discourses in public and popular works and explore 
the material, political, and economic conditions that allow for their continued 
acceptance and circulation. I do this by attending to the larger complex of vio-
lence in which gender violence is enacted and confronted.
In chapter 1, I explore how the story of a gender violence and femicide 
that occurred in Canada traveled to the US and then to Israel, to show how 
honor- related violence is depicted in media and the types of activism that 
it generates and helps mobilize. While much has been written about Aqsa 
Parvez and the story of her violent murder through its coverage in the Cana-
dian press, considerably less attention has been paid to the ways in which this 
murder resonated far beyond the borders of the Canadian state. This chapter 
thus traces the travels of the narrative of Aqsa Parvez’s murder from Canada 
to the US and then to Israel to show not only how stories of violence gain 
meaning but also how they make meaning by reproducing national bound-
aries and by reconfiguring relations of dominance, resistance, and power. By 
charting the transnational routes of gender violence as they are exemplified 
in the Aqsa Parvez murder and the narratives or stories it generated and the 
right- wing activism it mobilized, I make connections between the discursive 
and political configurations of this crime. In mapping these stories’ move-
ments and travels, as well as their tensions and contradictions, I show how the 
murder of (certain) Muslim women in crimes that become known as “honor 
crimes” is interpreted and deployed transnationally and in a number of inter-
connected geopolitical sites and registers. I argue that the production and 
commemoration of the honor crime as an exceptional violence authorizes 
posthumous solidarities that serve to buttress right- wing forms of political 
activism.
In chapter 2, I provide an analysis of the context of gender violence in Pal-
estine, mapping the complicated contours of confrontations of gender violence 
in colonized contexts and their centrality to articulations of national sover-
eignty and sites of governmentality. In this chapter, I focus, in part, on the 
release in 2012 of the song “If I Could Go Back in Time” by the hip- hop group 
DAM. I analyze DAM’s contestations of gender violence and the honor crime 
in the form of their popular and UN- funded song, placing this song and the 
controversies stirred by its release within their national and regional specifici-
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ties and a wider discussion of the politics of speaking about gender violence in 
national and international contexts. That the ensuing debates between the art-
ists, academics, and activists shifted to the question of authenticity prompts a 
careful consideration of positionality and accountability as central to feminist 
ethics and contestations of gender violence. This analysis charts the fault lines 
between activist and academic critiques of gender violence.
In chapter 3, I trace recent US government interest in honor- related vio-
lence as exemplified in President Donald J. Trump’s Executive Order 13769. I 
argue that this interest is neither new nor coincidental, placing it in a longer 
historical context attuned to the imbrications between gender violence and 
terrorism in American discourses far before the issuance of this order. This 
chapter examines constructions of the honor crime in public discourses in the 
US and draws on the story of the murder of Tina Isa, an American teenager 
of Palestinian and Brazilian origins, who was killed in 1989 by her parents 
in St. Louis, Missouri. By reading this story and its public framings in rela-
tion to recent government interest in documenting honor- related violence 
and regulating US borders, I explore the messy racial politics underpinning 
national and public discourses on gender violence. This chapter analyzes the 
various political national and transnational registers that are often concealed, 
downplayed, or suppressed in public framings of gender violence in the US 
and their entanglement in debates around borders, migration, belonging, and 
citizenship.
In chapter 4, I turn to the Jordanian state and contemporary efforts to 
end gender violence by confronting the legal codes that are used to prosecute 
gender violence, including the honor crime and crime of rape. I explore how 
the law has become a prime site of analysis and critique in women’s efforts to 
counter gender violence in Jordan. I argue that the state’s investment in coun-
tering gender violence, and the legal codes long believed to sanction honor- 
related violence, enables the Jordanian state to simultaneously position itself 
as a modern state that upholds the rule of law while bolstering its criminal 
and carceral systems and frameworks. Here I show how developing nation- 
states employ efforts to end highly spectacularized forms of gender violence 
such as the honor crime to reconstitute themselves as modern nation- states 
committed to women’s equality and empowerment. Rather than focus only on 
the state’s capacity to utilize such discourse, I examine what is gained and lost 
when women’s organizational efforts to end gender violence become aligned 
with the state in the service of justice that is wedded to the legal and juridical 
domains.
In the afterword, I connect the four geopolitical contexts that this book 
engages by investigating how honor crime discourses, operating differently 
across and between these sites, binds such distinct geographies and what the 
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crime’s contestations reveal about the current contours of the global fight 
against gender violence. In ending this book, I turn to the activist efforts of 
the Palestinian Tal3at movement and their contestations of rising incidences 
of gender violence in Palestine. I center their efforts as an example of transna-
tional feminist praxis that attends to the complicated and messy intersections 
of violence in people’s lives. Ultimately, Gender Violence and the Transnational 
Politics of the Honor Crime is a work about the power of rhetorics, discourse, 
and politics to shape antiviolence agendas and practices. It is a study of how 
this language came to be and of how and why it appears and is used in differ-
ent spaces and places. It provides a critique of the mobilization of dominant 
honor crime discourses for state- building projects that work to cause harm 
and fortify the status quo. An analysis of this language and its working in mul-
tiple sites provides an alternative understanding of gender violence that may 
help us imagine different, more long- term, and sustainable strategies against 
its devastating and deadly effects on transnational communities across mul-
tiple borders and boundaries.
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Transnational Memorialization
The Politics of Remembering  
Murdered Muslim Women
O N T H E M O R N I N G  of December 10, 2007, Aqsa Parvez was strangled to 
death by her father, Muhammad Parvez, and her brother Waqas Parvez. One 
of eight children, Aqsa was a first-generation immigrant to Canada and an 
eleventh- grade student at Applewood Heights Secondary School at the time 
of her death. Her family had moved to Ontario from Pakistan after her father 
was admitted to Canada as a refugee. Aqsa’s father, Muhammad, was a taxi 
driver who, Canadian media reported, held a tight grip on his children and 
controlled their lives.1 In dominant accounts of Aqsa’s story, she is represented 
as an unruly daughter whose actions challenged her traditional, conserva-
tive, and patriarchal father (Mitchell and Javed 2010). Unable to make Aqsa 
adhere to his rules, Muhammad enlisted the help of her brother in carrying 
out her murder. Both pleaded guilty to second- degree murder charges on Jan-
uary 10, 2010, in what Crown Prosecutor Mara Basso described as a “chilling, 
gender- based crime” that was motivated “by patriarchal concepts of honour 
and shame” (qtd in Rosella 2017). In explaining the motivations for his violent 
actions, Muhammad is reported to have told Aqsa’s mother, Anwar Jan Parvez, 
that he had killed his youngest daughter because she had insulted him and 
made him “naked” (CBC News 2010).
In the aftermath of the murder, the dominant story or stories of Aqsa’s 
murder bore the familiar tropes of civilizational clash, culturalized violence, 
and multicultural collapse. In Canada the murder was quickly scripted as a 
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case of honor- based violence, a cruel death that spoke to the unique dan-
ger posed by Muslim immigrants to Canadian national ideals of openness, 
racial harmony, and gender equality. Accounts of Aqsa’s life displayed the 
telltale signs of youthful rebellion and an adolescent desire for freedom and 
social acceptance. And yet media interpretations continually narrated the 
teen’s struggles in a way that emphasized the exceptional circumstances and 
unusual difficulties marking Aqsa’s life. In so doing, Aqsa became recogniz-
able to the Canadian public through her fatal encounters with rigid religious 
edicts and cultural codes that were antithetical to Canadian values. Unsurpris-
ingly, public outcry about the murder was strong and served to amplify calls 
for a stricter interpretation and application of Canadian multiculturalism, a 
national policy codified by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act in 1988.2 Thus, 
Aqsa’s tragic death forewarned of a failing immigration system that ostensibly 
emphasized tolerance over assimilation, difference over sameness, and accep-
tance over coercion and thus promoted cultural practices that were violent to 
women. Her story reverberated far and wide because of audiences’ ability to 
identify with Aqsa’s struggles against her strict and, to many, foreign family 
structure and cultural norms.
The intensive mainstream media coverage of Aqsa Parvez’s murder pro-
duced a discourse that resonated with the stories circulating in international 
press about the murders of Muslim women in multiracial and multicultural 
states.3 Because of its Orientalist and racialized framings, coverage of Aqsa’s 
murder renewed concerns about the status of religious and cultural minori-
ties in Canada, the US, and various countries in Europe who do not assimilate 
into Western communities.4 Functioning as a cautionary transnational tale, 
Aqsa’s murder provided evidence of the dangers experienced by young girls 
and women living in cultural, racial, and religious isolation from within West-
ern societies. As Beverly Weber argues in her work on honor crime discourses 
in Germany, narratives of violent Muslim men intent on victimizing innocent 
Muslim women have become part of a “systematically produced set of state-
ments” that culturalize and exceptionalize familial forms of gender violence 
(2013, 42). Writing on the Canadian context, Yasmin Jiwani notes that “acts of 
violence are constructed as signs of the peculiarities of Other cultural tradi-
tions, peculiarities that reflect the traditional, barbaric, and inferior construc-
tions of the cultures of the Others” (2006, 21).
Feeding into an anti- Muslim historical moment shaped by the global “War 
on Terror,” the mass circulation of the story of this murder has served a num-
ber of competing agendas. News of Aqsa’s death garnered mass condemna-
tion for both her murderers and the Muslim community that some believed 
secretly condoned honor- related forms of violence. Conservative American 
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columnists and openly anti- Muslim bloggers such as Pamela Geller of Atlas 
Shrugs and Robert Spencer of Jihad Watch have capitalized on Aqsa’s murder 
to further anti- Muslim, anti- immigrant, and racist political agendas in the 
US and beyond. In 2011 supporters of these two blogs traveled to Israel from 
the US to commemorate the murder by dedicating the Aqsa Parvez Memorial 
Grove in Jerusalem’s American Independence Park to victims of honor kill-
ings and honor- related violence across the world. Importantly, Aqsa’s murder 
has also inspired feminist interventions from young, racialized, and Muslim 
Canadians who, in forming the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, commemo-
rated Aqsa’s life and death while also condemning gender violence and rac-
ism in Canadian society.5 The range of responses to Aqsa Parvez’s murder lays 
bare the complex and contradictory powers of narratives about honor- based 
violence and the persistence of naming and framing practices that appear to 
simultaneously “specify” and “single out” these crimes (Terman 2010).6
While much has been written about the murder of Aqsa Parvez and its 
coverage in the Canadian press and the politics of naming honor- related 
violence, considerably less attention has been paid to the ways in which this 
murder was memorialized. In this chapter, I trace the story of Aqsa Parvez’s 
murder and its crossings from Canada to the US and then to Israel in order to 
show not only how narratives of death gain meaning but also how they make 
meaning by reproducing national boundaries and reconstituting relations of 
dominance, resistance, and power. In charting the transnational routes of 
honor- related violence as they are exemplified in the Aqsa Parvez murder and 
the narratives or stories it generated, this chapter aims to reveal connections 
between the discursive and political mobilizations of honor- related violence. 
In doing so, it does not aim to minimize the occurrence of gender violence 
and crimes that become known as honor crimes or to shield from critique or 
accountability Muslim perpetrators of honor- related violence and crime (Ziya 
2019). Rather, it seeks to examine how certain acts of violence against women, 
and, in particular, acts of violence perpetrated by Muslim men against Muslim 
women specifically in Western contexts, are invoked, scripted, and utilized to 
further nationalist goals and right- wing political activism and memorializa-
tion efforts in this particular historical and political conjuncture.
Relying on transnational and critical race feminist theorizations of gender 
violence, this chapter charts three interrelated interpretive frames used to sto-
rify Aqsa’s death in popular media and academic accounts. In the first part, I 
read Aqsa’s murder in relation to its dominant framing as a form of “death by 
culture” by utilizing the theorizations of critical race scholars on representa-
tions of gender violence. I then turn to the national depiction of Aqsa’s life as a 
young Muslim girl seeking to belong in a multicultural Canadian nation- state 
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where agency, individuality, and personal choice are cherished, if not always 
realizable, goals. In the final section, I look at the discursive travels of Aqsa’s 
story and narratives of honor- based violence from and between national and 
settler colonial contexts and its memorialization, paying particular attention 
to the deployment of women’s causes for specific national, civilizational, and 
political gains.
Because honor killing narratives—both visual and discursive—gain trac-
tion with audiences from different backgrounds and with varying interests and 
stakes as these stories cross and are crossed between different sites, the effects 
of these narratives are always multiple and cannot be singularly understood 
(Narayan 1997; Whitlock 2007). By mapping these stories’ movements and 
travels, as well as their tensions and contradictions, this chapter shows how the 
murder of Muslim women in honor- related forms of violence is interpreted, 
deployed, and memorialized in a number of interconnected geopolitical sites 
and registers between Canada, the US, and Israel. What this chapter aims 
to reveal are the ways in which stories of Muslim women’s murders become 
mobilized by various nationalist and right- wing actors who turn the bodies of 
murdered Muslim women into subjects of rescue and memorialization.
CULTURE AS VIOLENCE
Shortly after Aqsa’s murder, Toronto Life, a monthly publication covering daily 
news, current events, and social issues affecting Toronto, published a special 
issue dedicated to minority affairs in Canada. The issue features an article 
about Aqsa Parvez, whose picture appears on the cover of the magazine. This 
article alerts Canadians to the deadly consequences of a migration system that 
too readily accepts culture as sacrosanct. Titled “Girl, Interrupted,” the article 
focuses on Aqsa’s life and her desire to belong within Canadian society. In this 
work, Mary Rogan argues that Aqsa’s family had put the teenager in a very 
difficult position that compelled her to make a choice between the stipulation 
that she wear a veil and her desire to be like other Canadian girls.7 Aqsa is 
presented as a teenage victim of culture, whose innocent and youthful aspira-
tions of belonging and desire for Western fashions are starkly juxtaposed with 
unbending cultural norms and fatal traditional expectations. Aqsa’s murder 
leads Rogan to wonder whether this death was “the price of multicultural-
ism” (2008). Throughout her work, Rogan raises serious concerns about the 
threat that fundamentalist Islam and Islamic zealotry pose to Canadian soci-
ety. Rogan’s article thus claims Aqsa as a cultural victim, an innocent youth 
whose presumed social transgressions and the deadly price she paid for them 
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foregrounded the problems of immigration, assimilation, and difference for a 
multicultural state and society like that of Canada.
Mary Rogan’s article was criticized by a variety of groups who denounced 
the misrepresentations of Aqsa’s life and its wholesale condemnation of mul-
ticulturalism. A press conference collectively organized by Muslim Young 
Women, the Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence against Women 
and Children, and the Urban Alliance on Race Relations took place shortly 
after its publication. The organizers advertised this event by situating Aqsa’s 
murder within a larger framework of violence against women: “While this 
feature reveals a recognition that a young woman’s life was tragically cut 
short, it reflects common stereotypes about Muslim and immigrant commu-
nities, diverting attention from the urgent issue of violence against women 
in Canada” (Urban Alliance 2008). The group’s refusal to exceptionalize the 
violence that claimed Aqsa’s life is important because it works against the cul-
tural framework frequently invoked to explain her death. In their rejection of 
the limited and racialized explanatory frame offered in Rogan’s article and in 
dominant media responses to Aqsa’s death, the organizers also recast Muslim 
and immigrant communities as part and parcel of Canadian society. Rather 
than situate themselves at its margin, they assert their belonging within it by 
refusing to distance themselves from acts of gender- based violence that occur 
in their communities and in Canadian society as a whole. The importance 
of this act rests in its insistence on challenging constructions of gender vio-
lence that culturalize its meanings or manifestations.8 Aqsa’s body, through its 
depiction as a body violated by cultural norms and expectations that are at 
odds with mainstream society’s conception of agency, subjectivity, and free-
dom, is situated at the nexus of the framework of culture as violence.9
Over a decade after Aqsa’s murder, it remains true that the growing body 
of works appearing in Canada about this case did not place this crime within 
a broader continuum of violence against women in Canada. Instead, domi-
nant representations of this crime repeatedly exceptionalized Aqsa’s story, 
placing it in a framework that culturalized this murder and reproduced it as 
an imported phenomenon, brought over by immigrants who have refused to 
let go of the collectivist cultural practices in which they were raised. As Eve 
Haque demonstrates in an article on the limits of Canadian multiculturalism 
and Aqsa Parvez’s murder, the discussion remained framed along a binaris-
tic logic that pits those who believed the crime was an honor killing against 
those who argued that the case was an example of domestic violence and a 
manifestation of the universal practices of patriarchal violence. Haque shows 
how this latter argument hinges on the assertion of Islam’s intolerance for 
such crimes. What remained missing from these discussions, as Haque rightly 
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asserts, was a focus on the “socioeconomic material realities which if consid-
ered would throw into crises the linear integrative model which is the mythic 
promise of Canada’s multiculturalism” (2010, 91). Absent from such analysis, 
the reigning stories told about Aqsa’s murder help bolster myths of national 
innocence and reaffirm the image of Canada’s superiority, its moral vigor, and 
its peacekeeping ways—national myths that are central to Canada’s image on 
the national and global scales (Thobani 2007a). To understand the significance 
of this framing and its imaginative and figurative sway on dominant publics, 
we must attend to its liberal and secular underpinnings.
SEEKING FREEDOM: UNVEILED 
AGENCIES AND SUBJECTIVITIES
The killing of Aqsa Parvez was used to raise questions about the national 
belonging of Muslims, the status of Canadian society, and Canada’s official 
commitment to the policy of multiculturalism. As one article that explores the 
meaning of Aqsa Parvez’s murder puts it, the murder pointed to “a sign that 
that loathsome and barbaric practice of Muslim ‘honour killings’ is making its 
way from South Asia and the Middle East to Canada” (National Post 2007). 
This fear that Muslim immigrants would import gender violence to Canada 
masked the reality of its occurrence in Canadian society, helping further per-
petuate the image of a harmonious, gender- equal, and antiracist Canadian 
nation- state (Olwan 2013). As an article published in the conservative Cana-
dian newspaper the National Post put it in an editorial posted a few days after 
Aqsa’s murder:
Since 9/11, Western societies have begun to closely scrutinize the toxic cul-
tural practices of unassimilated Muslims in Europe and elsewhere. These 
practices include not only honour killings, but also anti- Semitism, support 
for terrorism, misogyny, forced veilings and forced marriages. Several high- 
profile conservative columnists—some of whom appear on these pages—
have been particularly vigorous about highlighting these pathologies. And 
so when a young Muslim girl gets killed by her father, there is a natural ten-
dency to see it as an indicator that Canadian Muslims are about to follow the 
radicalized path of militant, unassimilated co- religionists in Paris, London, 
and Stockholm. (Kay 2007)
Painting a grim picture of Muslims as racists with terroristic desires, such 
articles reproduced the idea that Muslims constitute an internalized and per-
T R A N S N AT I O N A L M E M O R I A L I z AT I O N •  39
petual threat for Western nation- states. This article served to retrench the idea 
that Muslim communities in Canada are following a prescribed path toward 
“radicalized” militancy and exclusion, a path that has already been paved by 
their fellow “co- religionists” who now live in and frequently terrorize major 
European cities.
Such editorials contributed to creating and sustaining a hostile environ-
ment in which Muslim immigrants were viewed as risky investments for the 
nation- state. It is this type of logic that, when taken to its full extent, casts 
the policy of multiculturalism as a failing or failed project. In this way, Aqsa’s 
story serves an internal and regulatory function. Here Aqsa’s death becomes 
a cautionary tale, a warning that the continued adoption of multiculturalism 
as a state policy ultimately harms racialized and immigrant women and, more 
significantly, damages an otherwise healthy and nonviolent Canadian society 
and state. Critiques of multiculturalism for its supposed tolerance toward bad 
cultural behavior is not new, and, as Sara R. Farris has shown in her impor-
tant work on the rise of feminist nationalism in multicultural European states, 
“gender equality is presented as a pillar of the western European nation, and 
the declaration of respect for women’s rights has been turned into a condition 
for settlement” (2017, 14).
In accounts of Aqsa’s murder, the failure of multiculturalism as a state 
policy is exemplified in its tolerance of migrants who adhere too rigidly 
to cultural practices such as veiling, which is considered harmful to girls 
and women and inhibiting of their right to equality and freedom.10 This 
is why various articles about Aqsa’s murder reduced Aqsa’s struggles with 
her family to veiling and her desire to dress in Western clothing. The hijab 
or head covering was referenced regularly to instill the point that Aqsa’s 
struggles were both cultural and religious. In one article, Aqsa’s murder was 
referred to as the “Canadian hijab case” (Reuters 2007). To further establish 
this murder as a case of culturalized violence, stories gathered from Aqsa’s 
friends at school emphasized her pursuit of life interests that clashed with 
her family’s religious identity and social norms. These personal testimo-
nies played an instrumental role in constructing Aqsa’s life in a way that 
rendered it legible to mainstream Canadian society. Two of Aqsa’s friends, 
Dominiqua Holmes- Thompson (who was sixteen at the time of Aqsa’s mur-
der) and Natalie Rance (who was fourteen at the time), for example, dis-
cussed the fears that Aqsa experienced in her family life and attributed them 
to her desire to show off her beauty in ways that contradicted her family’s 
values. Their accounts led Michelle Henry and Bob Mitchell (2007) of the 
Star to surmise that “vivacious and outgoing, Parvez wanted to dress like a 
Western woman in tight- fitting clothes and show off her long, dark hair by 
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removing her hijab.” Reflected in mainstream media, the friends’ powerful 
words granted the Canadian public a privileged and arguably accurate view 
into Aqsa’s life.
These personal and intimate—and thus truthful—depictions of Aqsa were 
quickly elevated to the level of testimony. Their frequent citations evidence 
the public’s investment in a particular truth discourse that seizes on Muslim 
girls and women and their bodies as sites of contestation and resistance. As 
various scholars have argued, the power of testimony rests in its ability to 
find receptive audiences who can affirm the truths on which its claims are 
founded. For a testimony to be successful, it must be able to “find recognition 
from those others who will register and witness its truth” (Whitlock 2007, 79). 
By narrating Aqsa’s life and her death in a way that corroborates prevailing 
assumptions about immigrant life in Canada in general, and Muslim girls in 
particular, the interviews with Aqsa’s friends accrued value and played a sig-
nificant—if not singular—role in the “framing of death of Aqsa Parvez as a 
question of culture versus domestic violence, and as the exercise of freedom 
through ‘normal’ Western dress codes and behavior versus the imposition of 
the hijab” (Haque 2010, 86).
Accounts such as those discussed above exemplify the media’s preoccupa-
tion with stories that emphasize individual struggles against communal odds 
and cultural backlash. The implied audience of these narratives is empathetic 
to stories of young women who make provocative and nonconformist choices 
that place them at odds with religious or cultural collectivities. More impor-
tantly, these narratives appeal to audiences’ notions of agency and subjectiv-
ity, concepts associated with the idea of unfettered or free choice. Through 
this lens, Aqsa’s subjectivity is articulated through its refusal to adhere to her 
family’s cultural expectations. Thus, Aqsa’s unveiling efforts enact a form of 
what Saba Mahmood refers to as “positive freedom” (2011, 11). In her study 
of the Egyptian women’s mosque movement, Mahmood argues that liberal 
theorists conceptualize freedom as the “absence of external obstacles to self- 
guided choice and action” (11). Through this paradigm, agency is actualized 
when a subject can challenge “cultural” dictates, when she makes choices that 
contradict practices considered traditional and thus abnormal. As Mahmood 
states, positive freedom “is understood as the capacity to realize an autono-
mous will, one generally fashioned in accord with the dictates of ‘universal 
reason’ or ‘self- interest,’ and hence unencumbered by the weight of custom, 
transcendental will, and tradition” (11). Aqsa enacts this free will by refusing 
to fashion her body through veiling. In the eyes of Canadian society, nonveil-
ing becomes the main act through which Aqsa becomes recognized as an 
agential, independent, and nonconforming citizen/subject.11
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At the heart of this configuration is the young migrant girl whose agency, 
while tentative, makes possible the reconstitution of migrant communities. In 
insisting on placing Aqsa’s bodily and sartorial choices in a framework that 
highlights her individuality, prevailing depictions of her life gesture toward 
Aqsa’s capacity to become like “us,” to be Canadian. This desire to belong is 
emphasized by Canadian media in order to show the disjuncture between 
Aqsa’s choice and her family’s condemnation. While this framing lauds Aqsa’s 
integration in Canadian society, it also signals the dangers entailed in this 
quest for young Muslim women whose bodies become the sites on which 
the battles between modernity and tradition are constantly articulated and 
fought. As Leti Volpp notes in her work on gender violence and cultural dif-
ference, such ideas about Muslim migrants and Western society “presumes a 
host society of the West that is progressive, democratic, civilized, and femi-
nist, in contrast to immigrants—in Europe and in the United States after 9/11, 
most especially Muslim immigrants—as backward, barbaric, primitive, and 
misogynist” (2011, 92).
The frequency and pervasiveness of such ideas is not particularly new or 
unusual. In the 2005 case of the “honor killing” of Hatun Sürücü, an immi-
grant of Turkish origin, German media also underscored Hatun’s successful 
integration into German society by lauding her life choices and her ostensibly 
open expressions of sexuality and her embrace of freedom. This was evidenced 
in her dating of a German man, her navel piercing, and her modern and West-
ernized clothing. Such acts signaled Hatun’s assimilation into German soci-
ety and her escape from her culture, narratives that parallel the depictions 
of Aqsa’s integration and provide a rationale for her murder. In her detailed 
analysis of this coverage, Weber notes that “the figure of Sürücü exists in an 
uneasy space . . . where she has become ‘German’ but can only have done so 
by removing herself from Turkish culture and, by doing so, condemns herself 
to death” (2013, 65). Aqsa Parvez similarly occupies an uneasy space in mul-
ticultural Canada, a space where her body is simultaneously familiarized and 
estranged, remembered and forgotten, always caught in between a competing 
set of discourses that she can neither confront in life nor contest in death.
Drawing on the emotionally charged and politically vexed investments 
and meanings embedded in the bodies of young girls and women, stories 
such as the ones discussed above have the potential to both separate and bind 
audiences across moral and ideological divides (Galusca 2012). These stories 
gain particular meaning and appeal when they are centered on young girls 
whose bodies become sites for imaginative—but not actual—integration fan-
tasies and desires. Though invested in the bodily and the physical, their power 
rests in their ability to conceal the material conditions of gender violence and 
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the embrace of fantasies of freedom. In her analysis of the representation of 
girlhood and victimhood in Canadian media’s coverage of another so- called 
honor crime that claimed the lives of three young racialized women, known as 
the Shafia murders, Jiwani shows how dominant representations often portray 
young women like Aqsa by downplaying “the structural reality of their loca-
tion as marginalized and minoritized [girls] within a dominant host society 
that values whiteness” (2014, 30). In other words, such narratives gain their 
traction and appeal due to their ability to underplay or conceal the hierarchi-
cal values of worth and beauty embedded in a dominant society in which 
whiteness is prized. 
Rather than an analysis of the systemic violence of migration and racism 
and the struggles that Aqsa may have encountered because of her cultural and 
racial differences, what is repeatedly emphasized is Aqsa’s desire to become 
one with Canadian society. As Jiwani states, Aqsa and girls like her capture 
our imaginations because “these young women showed the promise, if not the 
actuality, of being/becoming like us” (2014, 30). This powerful promise relies 
on its ability to foreclose troubling discursive, material, and historical gaps 
that have the potential to unsettle rescue visions embedded in multicultural 
integrative myths. Thus, while it is important to dislodge the various domi-
nant discourses that make Aqsa’s life knowable to Canadian and international 
audiences, it is equally crucial that we attend to the type of work such knowl-
edge performs when it crosses—or when it is made to cross—transnational 
borders and is converged with settler colonial logics.
TRANSNATIONAL MEMORIALIZATIONS
As various articles written on the subject of Parvez’s death showed, acts of 
violence against women are abhorred but they are especially so when they are 
committed by Muslim men whose violence is understood to operate outside a 
continuum of patriarchal and heterosexual violence against women. And yet 
to assume that these narratives simply fuel a national and internal debate that 
remains contained within the borders of Canada is to miss how stories about 
honor crimes also travel and come to influence, stir, and advance nationalist 
and right- wing agendas in settler colonial states outside of Canada, includ-
ing the US and Israel. In this section, I trace how the story of Aqsa Parvez’s 
murder reverberated outside the borders of Canada to demonstrate what Lila 
Abu- Lughod has referred to as the “political work” that honor crime performs 
in national and international contexts (2011, 27).12
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Without a doubt, 9/11, and the concomitant naturalization of the clash- of- 
civilization discourse that has followed these events, has contributed to the 
honor crime’s current discursive and political entrenchment. As various criti-
cal race theorists have noted, the “War on Terror” marked Muslims as threat-
ening to Western nation- states (Thobani 2007b; Razack 2009). But 9/11 alone 
did not catapult into being a new or unusual precarious form of belonging. 
Rather, it shored up new- old ways of constructing racial differences that autho-
rize the violation of Muslim lives at home and abroad. As Inderpal Grewal, in 
her work on the gender and racialized constructions of otherness in the US, 
argues, “The creation of the Middle Eastern Muslim as a terrorist recuperated 
in new ways an old category of the Oriental” (2005, 209). The construction 
of Muslim otherness was solidified through the convergence between state- 
sponsored policies of emergency and representational practices that helped 
embed the figure of the violent Muslim other into American consciousness. 
This configuration of the violent Muslim, Arab, and brown other, as Grewal 
argues, was “gendered through representations of masculine violence, fanati-
cism, and barbarism” (2005, 210).
In this part of the chapter, I discuss the strategies in the representation, 
circulation, and deployment of honor crime narratives outside the national 
Canadian context by right- wing actors located in the US context. I explore 
these media accounts to better understand interest in Aqsa’s story and 
right- wing mobilizations against honor- related violence. In so doing, I seek 
to address two interrelated questions: What happens when such stories of 
gender violence against Muslim women, which are often understood in the 
culturalized and racialized frames of the honor crime, become part and par-
cel of right- wing campaigns in the interests of settler states? What happens 
when they are—by virtue of their subject—“outsourced” (Grewal 2013, 2) and 
appended to global wars predicated on the promise of what Spivak long ago 
labeled “saving brown women from brown men” (1988, 296)?
To begin to tease out the transnational circuitries and travels of Aqsa’s 
murder, one need look no further than an article published in the Toronto 
Sun in 2008 by Joe Warmington, which put into motion the transportation 
of Aqsa’s story from Canada to the US and later to Israel. Titled “Aqsa Parvez 
Rests in Numbered Gravesite: Strangled Teen Dared to Be Different,” the arti-
cle inscribes this violent crime as an inherent feature of Muslim male violence 
against women. While denouncing both the violent act that took the young 
woman’s life and the status of her burial site, Warmington paints a haunting 
picture of a teenager who is discarded in both life and death. He claims that, 
a year after her murder, Parvez lay in an unmarked grave that only bore the 
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number “774.” In his piece, the author laments the grave’s lack of ornament, 
markers, and design, stating that it bore “no name, no date of birth, no date 
of death. No nothing.”
Disturbed by his findings, Warmington asks why Aqsa’s grave remains 
unmarked and, in his view, unremembered, save for the few flowers left at the 
graveside by her high school friends. Relying on the expert opinion of Tarek 
Fatah, a Muslim Canadian writer and journalist who offers regular commen-
tary on issues related to Islam, multiculturalism, and integration, Warmington 
tells his readers that the victims of honor crimes are often left in unmarked 
graves as a punishment in death for the dishonor they brought upon their 
families in life.13 After voicing his disgust at the “barbaric” practice of honor 
killings that “sadly occurs in some Muslim countries,” the author concludes 
by reminding readers that Aqsa’s forsaken grave can be reclaimed because “for 
$580, the cemetery can put a flat marker there—with her name, date of birth 
and death, and at least people can find her if they want to come to pay their 
respects.”
Warmington’s call to action incites the concerned Western reader who is 
impacted by cultural forms of gender violence and impelled to act on behalf of 
Muslim women to protect their rights. Shortly after the publication of the arti-
cle, his appeal on behalf of Aqsa would garner the attention of the right- wing 
American political activist Pamela Geller. Geller is the editor and publisher of 
AtlasShrugs.com and the president of the American Freedom Defense Initia-
tive and Stop Islamization of America, organizations that claim to protect the 
US from Islamist infiltration (Kumar 2012). In 2010 Geller was responsible for 
the successful elevation of anti- Muslim fervor in the US to the level of national 
hysteria over the proposed but never materialized Islamic center known as 
Park 51 or the Cordova House Project (Bever 2015).14 Geller denounced the 
project as the “ground- zero mega mosque” (qtd in Barnard and Feuer 2010). 
In 2012, with the help of Robert Spencer of Jihadwatch.org, Geller held the 
“Jessica Mokdad Human Rights Conference: Islamic Law in America” in 
Detroit.15 Organized by the two organizations, which Geller helped found, the 
conference bore the name of a murdered Muslim American woman despite 
pleas from her family that her name not be invoked for this anti- Muslim gath-
ering. According to Geller (2012), the conference was “dedicated to increasing 
awareness of honor killings and gendercide under the Shariah.”
In her writings, Geller often reproduces the clash of civilizations discourse 
that undergirds the “War on Terror.” Geller’s interest in Aqsa’s murder can be 
read against this ideological backdrop where, as she often asserts, Western 
nation- states are at war with the growing religion of Islam, a religion whose 
followers are posed to overtake the Western world, undo Western freedoms, 
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and defeat Christianity. Geller has issued frequent warnings to Americans 
about the threat that Islam in general, and Muslims in particular, poses to 
the integrity and sovereignty of the US and, by extension, to the health and 
vibrancy of Western states such as Canada and Israel and the world at large. 
Her interest in gender violence and the honor crime is motivated by a pur-
ported concern for Muslim women who, she argues, live under the threat of 
Muslim patriarchal violence. Writing on the central place that Muslim wom-
en’s bodies occupy for neoconservative and right- wing American pundits and 
politicians, Juliane Hammer notes that “pointing out the abysmal situation of 
Muslim women, their oppression by Islamic law, their suffering at the hands 
of Muslim men, and even their own resistance to such oppression all serve to 
legitimate Islamophobic rhetoric in both domestic and international affairs,” 
and it is this interest that provokes right- wing actors to script their political 
ideologies on the bodies of murdered Muslim women such as Aqsa Parvez 
(2013, 33).
Posing as a concerned activist, Geller used the story of Aqsa Parvez to 
further her agendas while claiming to seek justice for the murdered girl. She 
thus asked her readers to contribute to her project to purchase a headstone for 
the “unmarked” grave. With the support of her readers, Geller raised 5,000 US 
dollars. The proposed headstone was to include Aqsa’s full name, her date of 
birth and death, and an epitaph that read “In Loving Memory of Aqsa Parvez 
.  .  . Beloved, Remembered, and Free.” After contacting the Canadian ceme-
tery where Parvez lay buried and acquiring their approval for the new plaque, 
Geller told her readers in January 2008 that all was “going according to plan” 
(Geller 2009). This was until Aqsa’s family, having become aware of the plans 
made without their approval, refused Geller’s efforts to revamp the gravesite. 
Outraged at the sudden interruption of her unsolicited efforts, Geller explored 
the possibility of purchasing a plot right next to Aqsa’s grave. She discovered 
that this would not be possible, and, even more, that she could not make 
any purchase in the immediate vicinity of Aqsa’s grave: “Not a tree. Not a 
rock. Not a bench. All the plots were owned by the Islamic Society of North 
America,” she wrote to her readers on the American Thinker (2009), another 
right- wing American blog dedicated to American foreign policy issues and 
homeland security issues. Angered by her failure to transform Aqsa’s actual 
burial site, Geller sought an alternative memorial site altogether.
Geller’s desire to revamp Aqsa’s grave was briefly realized when she joined 
forces with Scott McLeod, a fire chief of the town of Pelham, Ontario, who 
was also determined to remember the murdered teenager. Having read about 
and seen pictures of Aqsa’s “unmarked” grave on AtlasShrugs.com, the chief 
collaborated with then town councilor Sharon Cook, and together they put 
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forward a motion that would honor “Parvez and other immigrants who are 
caught between cultures” (Robinson 2009). On September 18, 2010, the town 
of Pelham, Ontario, dedicated a bench to Aqsa’s memory that carried the fol-
lowing inscription: “Remembering new Canadians lost to the quest of inte-
grating cultures: In Loving Memory of Aqsa Parvez—Remembered and Free” 
(see figure 1). When asked about the political implications of the inscription, 
Sharon Cook noted that “the memorial isn’t against the Muslim faith. It’s 
against the fact this young girl was murdered, allegedly for trying to integrate 
into Canadian culture” (qtd in Mitchell 2010).
While Geller wrote positively about the town of Pelham’s courage on her 
blog, her public celebrations were cut short when McLeod denied any con-
nection with the controversial blogger in an interview in the Toronto Star 
about the ideological aims of his project (Mitchell 2010). Even though he had 
personally thanked Geller for her efforts and generous financial donations 
to this project, McLeod refused to acknowledge any political motivations for 
his work. Unable to claim victory for her efforts to remember Aqsa in ways 
that bolster her brand of anti- Muslim politics, Geller put into motion plans 
for an alternative memorial site for the dead Muslim Canadian teenager. Her 
chosen spot was in Israel because, as she wrote in an article published in June 
2009, “Considering the fact that Islamic honor killings were a global problem 
(over 90% of honor killings worldwide are Islamic), I approached the Jew-
ish National Fund and worked to plant the Aqsa Parvez Grove in American 
Independence Park in Jerusalem, Israel, where the plaque before the grove 
Fig 1
FIGURE 1. The Aqsa Parvez Bench in Pelham, Ontario. Photo taken by author.
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will read: ‘In Loving Memory of Aqsa Parvez and All Victims of Honor Killings 
Worldwide.’ I loved the idea of a grove of trees that would continue to live and 
grow for decades in their name” (Geller 2011). A few weeks before the dedica-
tion ceremony, Geller encouraged her readers to “Stand with Atlas in Israel,” 
where they could all remember the slain teen and support the State of Israel 
by attending the dedication ceremony and then joining radio commentator 
Glenn Beck’s rally for Israel, which showcased right- wing Christian support 
for the Israeli state (Heller 2011). The plaque celebrating Aqsa’s life is located 
in the American Independence Park in Jerusalem (see figure 2). Within the 
park there exists the “Wall of Eternal Life,” established by the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF) to “provide a meaningful opportunity for the global Jewish com-
munity to tie themselves more closely to the State of Israel while memorial-
izing the life of a loved one.”16 Aqsa’s plaque exists on this wall alongside the 
names of many others.
Such strategies of selective memorialization register how the bodies of 
murdered Muslim women come to signify transnationally for political proj-
ects enacted in support of right- wing politics and settler colonial projects. 
Aqsa Parvez’s inclusion in such public memorial projects specifically under-
scores the imbricated ways in which honor crime stories travel from one site 
to another and how their invocations are embedded in complex and highly 
charged political and historical processes of space claiming (see figure 3).
Geller’s choice of Israel as the ideal location for the commemoration of 
Aqsa speaks to an alignment between the American Christian Right and sup-
Fig 2
FIGURE 2. Entrance to the American Independence Park. Image courtesy of Majd Sidawi.
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port for Israel. As Deepa Kumar has argued, the roots of such convergence lie 
in “a particular worldview that sees Israel as instrumental in advancing Amer-
ican power” (2012, 117). Geller’s support for Israel emanates from the linking 
of Islam with terrorism and sexism—threats believed to be singularly faced by 
both the US and Israel under the dominant logic of the “War on Terror.” This 
convergence often relies on the appropriation of women’s rights discourses, 
rendering the political motivations behind Geller’s selection of Israel as an 
ideal location for the commemoration of Aqsa’s life and death unambiguous 
and tied to a historic conjuncture between right- wing American politics and 
the State of Israel. In this context, the violated and murdered Muslim woman’s 
body is a central instrument for a politically motivated campaign premised on 
the false imperatives of empowerment, rescue, and emancipation that con-
join anti- Muslim discourses in both states. While efforts to memorialize Aqsa 
Parvez in Canada and Israel may operate at the symbolic level, an examina-
tion of the politics undergirding them reveals their material consequences and 
demonstrates that specific forms of gender violence continue to have an active 
transnational social and political life.
REMEMBERING MURDERED MUSLIM WOMEN
What makes some Muslim women’s deaths count? What politics underpin the 
ideologically motivated interest in these murdered bodies? How can we make 
FIGURE 3. Aqsa Parvez’s Memorial Plaque on the “Wall of Eternal Life” in 
American Independence Park. Picture courtesy of Majd Sidawi.
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sense of the inordinate attention given to Muslim women’s bodies murdered 
(or honor- killed) by Muslim men in the context of the settler colonial states of 
Canada, the US, and Israel? Beyond the obvious anti- Muslim racism driving 
the increased attention given to the bodies of some murdered Muslim women, 
what are the ramifications of such interest and concern, and how might we 
ethically oppose gender forms of violence against Muslim women specifically 
and women more broadly? How, in other words, can we confront what Jenni-
fer Hyndman has called the “utilitarian calculus of death and loss” shaping the 
geopolitics of right- wing transnational remembrance practices that are exem-
plified in the story of Aqsa Parvez (2007, 39)? 
In this chapter, I have drawn on the rich body of literature and the theoret-
ical framings of critical race feminism to demonstrate how honor crime narra-
tives are mobilized to buttress the dominant logic of multicultural and settler 
colonial states. I aimed here to show how, in death, Muslim women’s bodies 
gain particular meaning and use value by right- wing actors who are, openly 
and publicly, strong opponents of Islam and Muslims. For these anti- Muslim 
actors, the bodies of murdered Muslim women are convenient subjects of 
remembrance that are routinely and conveniently deployed to perform a num-
ber of regulatory and political functions. In death Muslim women’s bodies can 
be used to redraw civilizational borders, corroborating narratives of Western 
superiority and Muslim difference and inferiority. These narratives buttress 
stereotypical beliefs about Muslim migrants and their experiences of settle-
ment and integration. In this narrative, attention to the political and economic 
constraints of migration disappears, while the individual and cultural failures 
of migrants and their inability to assimilate are overemphasized. As a highly 
gendered script, this narrative necessitates the construction of Muslim women 
as victims of patriarchal violence at the hands of Muslim men. Functioning 
in tandem with one another, these narratives are neither new nor unfamiliar, 
drawing on racialized representations of Muslim alterity and difference.
In tracing the narratives of Aqsa’s death and their memorialized deploy-
ments, this chapter examines the recalibration of stories of gender violence 
in the service of the ideologies and interests of right- wing actors and set-
tler states. It does so neither by diminishing the seriousness of the crime and 
forms of gender violence to which Aqsa was subjected by members of her own 
family, nor by ignoring the vexed political, scholarly, and theoretical terrains 
in which honor- related violence is enacted, enmeshed, and inserted (Terman 
2016). It argues that the confluence of neoconservative, anti- immigrant, and 
anti- Muslim right- wing agendas over the murder of Aqsa Parvez showcase 
how, as victims of gender violence, the bodies of some murdered women, 
and the narratives generated through and on them, are particularly useful 
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and ripe for co- optation. As the story of Aqsa Parvez amply demonstrates, 
Muslim women’s bodies not only mark the ideological, political, and racial 
limits of the Western nation- state but also enable its regulatory functions 
precisely through the assumption of their susceptibility to certain forms of 
cultural and gender violence. Claimed in death, they are also used to cloak 
right- wing, anti- immigrant, anti- Muslim political forms of activism. Attached 
to agendas they cannot contest, the bodies of Muslim women become use-
ful tools, deployed to corroborate assumptions of cultural violence, racial-
ized difference, and inherent victimhood. By experiencing gender violence, 
Muslim women’s bodies acquire special status and relevance because they can 
be used to construct myths of gender equality and to erase and rewrite past 
and ongoing histories of violence, occupation, and war committed in settler 
colonial states. In other words, these dead bodies and the constructed nar-
ratives produced about them count precisely because they cannot refute the 
ideological work to which they are put in death. As such, they are convenient 
subjects for political and ideological remembrance acts that masquerade as 
solidarity and care.
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Between the Artist and the Critic
Palestinian Confrontations of Violence
IN 2012 DAM , a Palestinian hip- hop group, received funding from the United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women to pro-
duce a music video, titled “If I Could Go Back in Time,” as part of its album 
Dabke on the Moon. Featuring Palestinian artists Amal Murkus and directed 
by Jackie Salloum (of the documentary Slingshot Hip Hop), the song was 
widely circulated and garnered the already popular Palestinian band trans-
national acclaim from a number of musical groups, activists and workers 
for justice in Palestine, and women’s and human rights organizations, whose 
multiple locations and heterogeneous social origins and political investments 
traverse neat divides between the foreign and the authentic, the real and the 
virtual, and the local and the global. As an officially acknowledged sponsor of 
DAM’s work, UN Women (2013) commended the song for its commitment 
to “combatting all forms of violence against women,” celebrating the band’s 
work in supporting “women’s advocates and human rights organizations in 
changing the laws that support the [practice of honor killings] in Palestinian 
society.” 
Shortly after the song’s release, however, the band found itself at the cen-
ter of a debate about the politics of speaking about gender violence in colo-
nial contexts that instigated a broader conversation about contesting forms 
of violence directly shaped by the intersecting systems of patriarchy and set-
tler colonialism. On one side of the debate, DAM and its supporters argued 
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for the importance of adding their voices to growing local activist efforts to 
end gender and sexual violence within Palestinian society and in historic and 
occupied Palestine. Despite acknowledging some of the song’s limitations, its 
supporters urged audiences and critics to acknowledge the occurrence of gen-
der violence within Palestinian society. The song’s detractors, while empha-
sizing the importance of activisms against gender and sexual violence, shed 
light on the dangers of advocacy work that does not attend to the intersections 
of these forms of violence with multiple systems of power, including settler 
colonialism and that, in the process, becomes part and parcel of dominant and 
transnational scripting of the honor crime as a “cultural- legal category” (Abu- 
Lughod and Mikdashi 2012a).
Discussed on the pages of Jadaliyya, an e- zine that has played an instru-
mental role in reshaping popular and academic understandings of the Middle 
East during the Arab uprisings and since, the debates brought to light anxiet-
ies over what feminist rhetorical studies scholar Wendy Hesford has described 
as the “ungovernability” of transnational visual, discursive, and rhetorical rep-
resentations of gendered and sexual violence (2011, 98).1 While the two sides 
of the debate surrounding DAM’s song have been understood as diametrically 
opposed, I want to argue that they share a commitment to interrogating and 
confronting sexual, social, and political forms of violence that structure the 
politics of life and death in Palestine today. Despite their diverging methods 
and tactics, arguments for and against DAM’s song become recognizable and 
legible through a focus on issues of authenticity, positionality, and account-
ability—issues central to feminist research methodologies and feminist praxis. 
Both sides thus urge us to ask: Who has the right to speak about gender vio-
lence, and from what locations? What brings together or sets apart academic 
discussions from artistic and activist efforts to end forms of violence known 
as honor- based violence in Palestine and elsewhere? Put differently, what is 
the relationship between theory and praxis, and how can they work (together 
or separately) to end all forms of gender violence, including the violence of 
the honor crime?
To address these questions, I focus on the specificities of settler colonial-
ism and occupation that structure the phenomenon of gender violence in Pal-
estine. I thus map how the category of the honor crime became intimately 
tied to state- making projects in Palestine and what its confrontations reveal 
about the problem of gender violence in occupied contexts. After analyzing 
this context, I offer a close reading of DAM’s video and its transnational recep-
tions. I explore how the song is placed and was later circulated within a laden 
political context that works to spectacularize, exceptionalize, and culturalize 
honor- related violence. Rather than simply rehash the terms of the debate in 
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which this song became deeply imbricated or oversimplify the complex argu-
ments and positions over the song, I explore what its narrow (and narrow-
ing) contours can reveal about the ways in which gender violence is narrated, 
consumed, and confronted in and across settler colonial geographies where 
aid works to govern people’s realities and shape their subjectivities. Primar-
ily I am interested in mapping the tensions that this debate indexes in order 
to reflect on the possibilities and limits of feminist interventions in efforts to 
address forms of violence that are themselves intersecting, cross- cutting, and 
relational.
A central question that animates the discussion I offer in this chapter is 
the issue of authenticity and the question of who gets to speak on Palestine, 
and under what conditions local players can contest gender violence that is 
produced and sustained by both the context of settler coloniality and local 
articulations of patriarchy. I show how the local scenes of Palestinian activism 
blur the line between state and nonstate actors, local organizations and global 
funders, producing complicated sites of intervention in and prevention of the 
phenomenon of gender- based violence in Palestine. 
In what follows, I contextualize mobilization efforts against gender vio-
lence, showing how activism against honor- related violence communicates 
ideas about Palestinian society and its relationship to state- making projects 
and human rights campaigns aimed at ending violence against women. I 
explore how the varying geographies of occupation and settler colonialism in 
historic Palestine shape and delimit efforts to contest gender- based violence 
in protracted, dissimilar, and complicated ways. This chapter brings into view 
what popular representations of the honor crime often disappear and obfus-
cate: namely, the shrinking political space for transnational feminist contes-
tations of ubiquitous and overlapping forms of gender violence that demand 
complex, multiple, and divergent strategies, resistances, and solutions. I use 
the debate surrounding this song to speak to the politics of contesting gen-
der violence in spaces of occupation and settler coloniality such as that of 
Palestine.
CONTEXTUALIZING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
AND STATE- MAKING PROJECTS IN PALESTINE 
In 2011, a year before the release of DAM’s song, the Palestinian cabinet 
endorsed a nine- year national strategic plan to combat violence against 
women, which was developed by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) or 
the Palestinian Authority (PA).2 The plan put into place a series of strategies 
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to identify and address violence against women occurring in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.3 Developed by members of the National Committee 
to Combat Violence Against Women, a committee formed under the auspices 
of the Ministry of the Women’s Affairs of the Palestinian National Author-
ity, the strategy report provides a contextual approach to its understanding 
of the phenomenon of gender violence.4 Violence is seen as a broad term that 
encompasses a range of harms and violations, including discrimination against 
women that adversely impacts their right to live and work. The strategy’s 
authors seek to end the occurrence of violence against women because they see 
it as a public and national problem impacting all Palestinians, viewing its con-
tinuation as an impediment to the overall health of all segments of their soci-
ety, including men, women, and children. The strategy identifies three areas of 
primary concern for its efforts to end violence against women: violence that 
occurs as a result of Israeli occupation, domestic violence that occurs within 
the family, and violence against women taking place in the workplace. Taking 
a dual “developmental” approach to the phenomenon of violence within Occu-
pied Palestinian Territories, the National Strategy to Combat Violence Against 
Women 2011–2019 recognizes the interaction between “the culture, norms and 
traditions which reinforce roles division between males and females” and the 
impact of Israeli occupation on “increasing the marginalization of Palestinian 
women both directly and indirectly” (National Committee to Combat Vio-
lence Against Women 9). The report states:
Palestinian women experience various forms of violence at two levels: at the 
international and national levels, on the one hand, and at the local level, on 
the other hand. At the international level, the Israeli occupation increases 
the level of violence in Palestinian society in general and affects all social 
groups, not women exclusively. Thus, the occupation puts all members of 
Palestinian society, men, women, boys and girls, at risk of getting involved in 
cycles of violence. Yet, for women, the oppressive policies of the occupation 
are a double source of violence, reinforcing the violence they experience as 
a result of their already compromised social role and status at the internal, 
domestic level, where they often find themselves beyond official systems of 
protection in the Palestinian society, especially legal protection. (9)
I cite this part of the report at length to demonstrate the complexities of the 
terrain of gender violence in Palestinian society. Palestinian women face com-
pounded and multiple forms of oppression. As members of communities that 
emphasize traditional specific domestic obligations for women, women have 
social roles that are often truncated and confined to the private sphere. Israeli 
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occupation policies compound these difficult realities, leaving Palestinian 
women prone to abuse and violence, at the hands of both local patriarchs and 
the administrators of Israeli occupation, including the army, whom women 
interact with at checkpoints and other military and administrative posts. The 
multiyear strategy report grounds all its past and future efforts to confront 
violence against women in Palestinian society within the inseparable political 
realms of occupation and the social domain of local Palestinian patriarchy.
Noting the absence of current statistics on gender violence in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territories, the report relies on a number of previous studies 
to represent the scale of the problem of violence in an accurate way. It records 
statistics acquired from the Domestic Violence Survey conducted by the Pal-
estinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) between December 2005 and Jan-
uary 2006 on over 4,212 households in the West Bank and Gaza, where 61.7 
percent of “ever married” women were exposed to psychological violence, 23.3 
percent were exposed to physical violence, and 10.9 percent reported being 
exposed to sexual violence by their husbands at least once during the period 
in which the survey was conducted (2006, 11). The strategy pays considerable 
attention to the killing of women and labels these crimes examples of femi-
cides (or the killing of women) carried out under the pretext of family honor. 
In developing a strategy to combat the rising rates of violence in Palestinian 
society and to protect women from all forms of violence, including murder, 
the report puts forth a plan that relies on cooperation and interaction between 
formal and informal sectors of Palestinian society. The strategy identifies the 
Palestinian Basic Law as an important formal avenue for justice, especially 
when buttressed by international law agreements and framed within the dis-
course of human rights.5
In addressing the necessity of making legislative changes to end the phe-
nomenon of gender violence, the report’s authors note that “the political cir-
cumstances in the oPt, circumstances which affect its legislative process, have 
turned the legal situation in the oPt into a major dilemma rarely faced by 
other societies” (19). Recognizing the multiplicity of actors needed to put an 
end to violence against women, the strategy also attends to “informal protec-
tion mechanisms” that include the tribal and family systems, women’s organi-
zations, and political parties (24). In the document, there is a clear recognition 
of the interplay between the law and the tribal system in enforcing patriarchal 
codes; the strategy goes so far as to identify the extended family system that 
often resolves cases of femicide in ways that benefit the male offender as an 
impediment to efforts to end gender violence in Palestinian society.
The strategy is an important national document not because it registers 
the stated will of a pseudo- government to address the problem of violence 
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against women in occupied Palestine but because it indexes the magnitude 
and the complexity of potential confrontations which are caught between the 
specificities of the Palestinian legal context itself, the realities of settler colo-
nial occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, and the backdrop of patriar-
chal traditions and customs that shape and regulate life for Palestinian men, 
women, and children. Steeped in the rhetoric of development and equality, 
the report is structured by a vision to “promote the principle of the rule of 
law based on respect for women’s rights and improving institutional mecha-
nisms in Palestinian society in order to protect and support abused women 
and allow them to live in a society free from all forms of discrimination, and 
based on equality, dignity, and respect for human rights” (39).
In its identification of gender- based violence as an issue of national con-
cern requiring a multiyear strategy commitment, this report stakes for the 
emerging Palestinian state a definable position through a human rights frame-
work. It shows how local national actors such as the Palestinian Authority 
have engaged gender violence as a site of governmentality, a social problem 
that can be mitigated or stopped through the intervention of state and non-
state actors in issues that challenge the sovereignty and power of an emerging 
and yet- to- be- realized Palestinian state. Gender violence is understood as an 
impediment to the development and progress of Palestinian society and as a 
problem deeply rooted in the nexus of patriarchal and colonial rule that sub-
jects Palestinian people’s lives but one that, ultimately, must be confronted in 
the interests of the state.
As Rema Hammami (2019) has shown, the Palestinian strategy on fight-
ing violence against women emerged from a longer genealogy of combating 
violence against women as a social problem with global and local ramifica-
tions. In Palestine, violence against women was first statistically measured 
through the Palestinian Central Bureau’s statistical report Domestic Violence 
in the West Bank and Gaza (479).6 This measure lead to the establishment of a 
task force for fighting violence against women and later to the authoring and 
release of a government- approved strategy. Hammami’s work brings into focus 
the “complex set of geopolitical relations and processes through which Pales-
tinian domestic violence came to be articulated in specific ways, made visible, 
and then constantly circulated through and across a range of intersecting local 
and global domains, where it became privileged as Palestinian society’s most 
prominent social problems as well as its particular violence problem” (482). 
As we will see, confronting violence against women in general and the honor 
crime in particular had become a nationally identified priority and concern 
before the UN- funded release of DAM’s song. This is due, in part, to the ris-
ing rates of femicide within Palestinian society at the time of the report’s pub-
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lication and the national recognition that the problem’s continuation was an 
impediment to Palestinian statehood and the Authority’s recognition of what 
Hammami aptly terms “the productive life of domestic violence in Palestine” 
(495). It is precisely within this context that DAM’s musical intervention and 
its particular representation of gender violence must be placed and analyzed.
Immediately prior to the release of DAM’s song, the killing of women 
for what honor- related reasons was on the rise in the West Bank and Gaza. 
While the number of reported murders had dropped in 2011 to five cases, the 
figure rose in 2012 to thirteen women and doubled in 2013 to twenty- six.7 The 
staggering rise in murder cases led to increased negative local and interna-
tional media attention to this phenomenon, prompting various women’s agen-
cies to pressure the Palestinian Authority to take a public and explicit stance 
against this violence. This pressure reached a zenith in 2011, with news of the 
discovery of the gruesome murder of Aya Baradiyah, a twenty- one- year- old 
university student, a year after she had gone missing from her family’s home 
in the village of Surif.8 Aya’s family had reported Aya missing the day after 
her disappearance on April 20, 2010. Shortly after news of her disappearance 
became known in the village, rumors impugning her respectability and honor 
began to circulate in her community, and members of her own family stopped 
visiting her parents’ home for fear of having their reputation tarnished by 
association. Prior to her disappearance, Aya was engaged to a man seventeen 
years her senior after she had managed to convince her father of his suitabil-
ity as a suitor. Her father reluctantly agreed to her request but stipulated that 
the marriage not take place until after Aya completed her university studies. 
On the day of her disappearance, Aya had visited the home of her uncle, who 
would later confess to murdering her, with the help of two of his friends, by 
covering her head with a bag and leaving her in a well to die. Aya’s remains 
were discovered there by accident a year after her disappearance from her 
family’s home.9
Aya’s murder gave rise to broad mobilization efforts against the murder of 
women within Palestinian society. In addition to the international and local 
coverage that the crime received, a local campaign called “Mapping Her” was 
developed by a nongovernment organization called Taghyeer for Social Media. 
The organization launched Hamlit Bint Al Balad, releasing a powerful info-
graphic with details of Aya’s murder.10 The campaign’s name translates roughly 
to “Daughter of the Nation” or “Daughter of the Homeland.” It indicates the 
belonging of murdered women in Palestine and the identification of the cam-
paign’s members with them through the insistence on claiming them as part 
of the Palestinian nation. Titled “Discarding Aya Baradiyah in a Well While 
Alive,” the poster includes a picture of Aya that names her as a victim of physi-
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cal violence and provides details of her age and her marital status as a single 
woman. The poster also details Aya’s murder:
The virginal girl Aya Baradiyah, who was 21 years old and a university stu-
dent, was kidnapped and murdered in a cold- blooded and premeditated 
crime at the hands of her uncle and his two friends because of a claim that 
she had established a relationship with a man who had asked for her hand 
in marriage. While she was still alive, the offenders threw her into a well 
located in the remote area of Khalet Abu Sulaiman, which lies to the west of 
her village, Surif, located in the Governorate of Hebron in the south of the 
West Bank. Aya was found there thirteen months after she had disappeared. 
(My translation)
This account of the murder of Aya Baradiyah insists on her sexual innocence 
by introducing her as a “virginal girl” killed by a member of her family based 
on a false claim of social or sexual impropriety. In doing so, the campaign 
reverts to traditional coverage of honor- related crimes that denounces the 
murder of women and invokes sympathy for them by asserting their sexual 
purity and morality. This “hymen status line,” as Ebtihal Mahadeen names it in 
her work on Jordanian media portrayals of honor- related violence, is a com-
mon part of such accounts (2013, 83). It is a rhetorical strategy that establishes 
the distinction between worthy and unworthy victims of gender violence in 
Arab media discourses.
While its presence helps confirm the innocence of some murdered women, 
its absence marks women who have been murdered by members of their fam-
ily or by their spouses as guilty subjects, deserving of the violence they have 
encountered.11 Its appearance in representations of Aya is intentional, verify-
ing her innocence and squelching any gossip that questions her reputation or 
marks her as deserving of her death. The description of Aya’s murder in this 
poster goes further by casting doubt on the veracity of the rumors that she 
had engaged in improper behavior—rumors that may have cost her life. As 
is well known in the literature on honor- related violence, rumors and gossip 
are central drivers of violence against women. They function to first propel or 
initiate the planning of the act of violence and later to sanction its occurrence 
or to diminish its significance.12
In Palestinian accounts of Aya’s murder, Aya is represented as an honor-
able young woman whose reputation was above reproach. Accounts of the 
murder allude to Aya having a relationship that her uncle did not approve 
of; these stories have been refuted with assertions that her father, as the male 
head of household, had approved her engagement. This appeal to the official 
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nature of Aya’s relationship with her fiancé is significant, emphasizing that Aya 
was a respectable young woman who adhered to cultural expectations and 
who therefore did not deserve to be killed by her uncle.13 While the descrip-
tion of Aya’s murder reproduces the morality and honor logics used to sanc-
tion violence against women, the poster also insists on rooting Aya and her 
murder within the specificities of space, place, and time in Palestine. This can 
be discerned through the specific cartographic details given about the mur-
der. Attached to the description of Aya’s murder is a map of historic Palestine 
that shows where the crime occurred, rooting both Aya and her murder in 
the intimate geographies of Palestine. Rather than denying the occurrence of 
this crime or disappearing it from national purview, the poster makes Aya’s 
murder a Palestinian problem, a serious social issue that Palestinian society 
as a whole must confront.
In claiming Aya as a daughter of the nation, or bint al balad, a girl who 
belongs in Palestine, the campaign purposely challenged dominant represen-
tations of murdered Palestinian women as sinful members of society who are 
to be discarded by the nation or cast out by members of their own families 
and communities. By using such strategies, the campaign challenged some of 
the social and discursive frames used to sanction gender violence, employ-
ing what can be understood as a feminist geopolitical praxis that emplaces 
such violence within the geographies of occupied Palestine. The organization 
thus makes the act of mapping political, claiming it as a feminist form of 
activism that can shed light on social issues that have been ignored or previ-
ously denied. As their website states, “Mapping Her is a digital tool, made to 
map the marginalized, harassed, unprivileged, invisible and hurt women. By 
doing so we’ll map their pain for people to find, explore, discover and make 
a change.”14
In addition to placing Aya’s murder within the geographies of Palestine, the 
organization showed that the crime was denounced by Aya’s family members 
(including both her father and her brother) and her Palestinian community at 
large, thus refuting the assumption that honor crimes are tolerated within Pal-
estinian society. In all accounts, Aya is recognized as a valuable member of the 
community and someone whose murder was nationally deplored, contested, 
and mourned. Bint Al Balad ’s campaign to end violence against women in 
Palestinian society was funded by the German nongovernment organization 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung: The Green Political Foundation and other local non-
government organizations, such as Taghyeer for Social Media, the Palestinian 
Counseling Center, the Palestinian Non- Governmental Organization Against 
Domestic Violence Against Women (Al Muntada), and Women’s Media and 
Development.15 This collaboration between a Western- based, nongovernment 
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organization and local NGOs is not unusual in the Palestinian context, where 
interactions between local activists and the NGO discourse on development, 
human rights, and equality shape activist confrontations of gender violence in 
Palestine in highly important ways. The strength of this particular campaign, 
however, lies in its ability to use social media platforms to publicize its mes-
sage among Palestinian youth, recognizing in them a powerful constituency 
that can bring about positive social change. In addition to using posters writ-
ten in Arabic, the campaign developed an interactive application that allows 
community members to add information about violence against women 
occurring in Palestinian society. Following the publication of the poster of 
Aya’s murder, the campaign launched an electronic letter in support of missing 
and murdered Palestinian women that called on Palestinian society to advo-
cate for sweeping legal reforms that would protect women from violence and 
guarantee their right to a dignified and safe living.
A review of media responses to Aya’s murder shows that the crime pro-
duced collective Palestinian outrage that was directed both at the Palestinian 
Authority for its failure to protect Palestinian women and at the murderers 
themselves for taking the life of an innocent woman.16 Calls for the imposition 
of harsh sentences on the murderers were echoed in various media accounts, 
including television programs where young women called for the imposition 
of the death penalty on the perpetrators.17 At her funeral, thousands of peo-
ple joined Aya’s family to mourn the murdered woman. In a letter to Aya’s 
family from Palestinian prisoners incarcerated in Israeli jails, the murder was 
denounced as alien to Palestinian culture and Aya was claimed as a Palestinian 
martyr, a sign of the high esteem in which Palestinian society held Aya and 
their unequivocal condemnation of the murder.18 This particular rhetorical 
and political strategies used by the campaign demonstrates how the murder of 
women deemed honorable can elicit national outrage that allowed Palestinians 
to claim Aya to be a martyr, someone who occupies, through her murder, the 
highest echelons of Palestinian society.
This collective and national outrage surrounding Aya’s murder led Presi-
dent Mahmoud Abbas, in a televised meeting with family members of Aya 
and with her grieving mother and father that was broadcast on Palestinian 
national television, to claim that existing laws would be changed to prevent 
such murders, which are unacceptable “by mind, logic, or religion.”19 Abbas 
would further state, in a paternalistic tone, that no one could be silent in the 
face of such crimes that target “our daughters,” asking God to protect the 
Baradiyah family and their offspring and offering to fund the family’s pilgrim-
age to Mecca that year. Despite the public and performative aspects of Abbas’s 
meeting with the Baradiyah family, there is little doubt that Aya’s murder was 
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a catalyst for national response against gender violence in Palestine. Following 
his meeting, Abbas issued a presidential decree that froze article 340 of Penal 
Code 6 of 1960 in the West Bank and stipulated an amendment to Penal Code 
16 of 1960 enforced in the West Bank, and Penal Code 74 of 1936 enforced in 
Gaza (Melhem 2014).20 The president gestured his opposition to honor- based 
violence by stating his commitment to place restrictions on laws that allow for 
mitigated or commuted sentences for men who murder women. However, as 
many would later note, these changes operated at the cosmetic level only, since 
article 340 functions as part of a trifecta of legal codes that provide extenu-
ating circumstance as cover for perpetrators of violence against women and 
because the president had shown no serious political will to alter or eradicate 
such laws in the aftermath of the murder beyond public spectacle.21
Aya’s murder and honor- related violence in general remained in the spot-
light as a result, in large part, of local activist efforts to pressure the Palestinian 
Authority to adopt a stronger position on violence against women (Odgaard 
2014). One such campaign, launched by a coalition of Palestinian women’s 
groups, called “In Palestine killing is permitted,” issued 120 letters to the office 
of the president to urge him to adopt more stringent laws against men who 
murder women under the pretense of honor.22 After ignoring their various 
calls for legal reform, successful pressure by various women’s organizations, 
including demonstrations in Palestinian cities that sought draw attention to 
this crime, led the president to sign a number of international human rights 
agreements focused on women’s rights, including the ratification of the Con-
vention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) on April 2, 2014. In ratifying this agreement and others like it, the 
Palestinian Authority sought to establish itself as an independent entity, one 
that had the power and sovereignty to enter and enforce international agree-
ments. While ostensibly informed by a commitment to women’s rights and 
the protection of their safety, such acts also reflect the desire of the Palestinian 
Authority to be recognized by the international community and its willing-
ness to opportunistically seize on the women’s rights discourses to improve its 
image and legitimate its authority.
The rush to ratify national agreements that ensued in this period coin-
cides with the Palestinian Authority’s statehood bid that was submitted to 
the United Nations Security Council and was preceded by the granting of 
Palestine observer and nonmember status at the United Nations in 2012.23 
Such acts are important for their political as well as their symbolic meanings, 
showcasing how the uptake and deployment of human rights discourses can 
mark entry to or exclusion from the project of modernity for nation- states 
and their citizen subjects. To be admitted into the international community, 
62 •  C H A P T E R 2
civilized nation- states and governments must revoke gender violence at the 
national, legal, and cultural levels. They do this by publicly stating their oppo-
sition to violence and declaring their commitment to instituting laws, poli-
cies, and practices that guard against violence against women and guarantee 
women’s right to security and safety. Progress on challenging these crimes not 
only provides states platforms to assert their concern for women’s rights on 
a global stage but also opens opportunities for membership and recognition 
within the international community of nation- states, where stated commit-
ments to women’s rights, progress, and development are essential rhetorics 
of statehood.
As Sally Engle Merry has argued, ratifications of international agreements 
such as CEDAW occur within “the spaces of transnational modernity” where 
state representatives “produce a social reformist, fundamentally neoliberal 
vision of modernity governed by concepts of human rights” (2006, 100). By 
representing itself as a state that is not only conversant in but also compliant 
with human rights instruments for measuring and ending violence against 
women accepted and adopted worldwide, the Palestinian Authority sought 
to acquire a place for itself among international state players.24 In essence, it 
hoped that the ratification of such agreements would register its readiness to 
become a recognized nation- state in fulfillment of the promises of the Oslo 
Agreement signed between the Palestinian Authority and Israel in 1993.25 Such 
efforts reflect the opportunistic nature of state discourses surrounding gender- 
based violence, discourses that often use and usurp local activism in the name 
of protecting women from violence.
For various developing states, commitments to contesting gender violence 
are often intimately tied to funding opportunities in the form of international 
aid and nongovernment donations.26 This includes funding from nongovern-
ment organizations and entities such as the UN, funding that also supported 
the project of monitoring the progress of the PA on its national strategy for 
confronting violence against women discussed earlier.27 In the case of Pal-
estine, the promise of nationhood has become intimately connected to the 
Palestinian Authority’s ability and willingness to repudiate legal codes that 
exonerate male perpetrators of honor- related violence or that provide them 
lenient or reduced sentences. President Abbas’s decree and his stated com-
mitment to end gender violence in Palestine cannot be separated from the 
broader national and international contexts that use the stated position of a 
government on issues of gender and sexual violence and women’s rights as 
a measure of its worthiness and ability to belong to the international com-
munity. While DAM’s musical work on gender violence in Palestinian society 
does not directly emerge from the context of the occupied Palestinian ter-
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ritories of the West Bank and Gaza, placing the group’s intervention within 
this landscape serves to simultaneously historicize and de- exceptionalize their 
efforts to combat violence in Palestine. It shows how such efforts are always 
already shaped by local and transnational politics of modern subject- making 
that demand that gender violence be understood within the recognizable 
framework of human rights infractions. It also situates activism against gen-
der violence and the murder of women in Palestine against the backdrop of 
state- making practices that seize contestations of violence against women as 
sites of governmentality.
FEMICIDE IN PALESTINE
In an important article on the politics of gender violence, Nadera Shalhoub- 
Kevorkian (2002) named the violence that occurs in Palestinian society a 
form of “femicide,” referring to the forms of abuse that women experience as 
“‘living death’” (2003, 591). Through her scholarship and advocacy, Shalhoub- 
Kevorkian attends to the personal and political dimensions of gender and 
sexual violence. Her work uses an intersectional form of analysis that pays 
attention to the details of the killing of women and does not begin at the site 
of the murdered body but with attention to the social and political contexts in 
which women experience violence, including verbal, psychological, physical, 
and emotional abuse and the threat of murder. Refuting the singular focus on 
honor- based violence that dominates accounts of violence against women in 
Palestine, Shalhoub- Kevorkian invited researchers to “learn more about wom-
en’s realities by mapping the political landscape of these contexts and analyz-
ing their relationships and intersections with women’s lives in general, and 
with women’s lives within the family in particular” (2003, 593).
I begin with this theoretical framework in order to explore the complex 
political, social, and legal context of femicide in historic Palestine, showing 
how activists and local actors confront increasing rates of gender and sexual 
violence against the backdrop of Israeli settler colonialism where Palestinians 
live in conditions of poverty, compounded by limited educational and work 
opportunities (Sultany 2012). If the previous section provided some insights 
into the terrain of confrontations of gender violence in the shadow of the 
Palestinian yet- to- be- realized state, this section showcases the difficulties and 
complexities of this work within the settler colonial state of Israel for Pales-
tinian subjects/citizens who experience a form of double marginalization as 
a minoritized population in the Jewish state that is relegated to what Nimer 
Sultany describes as “separate and unequal status” within Israel (194).
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Palestinian citizens of the state of Israel constitute 20 percent of the popu-
lation, or roughly 2.2 million of Israel’s nine- million- plus population.28 They 
exist in what is known as 1948 Palestine, or within the “green line.”29 They 
are the descendants of Palestinians who, at the founding of the Israeli state 
in 1948, either remained or were able to stay in their own towns and villages 
or became internally displaced persons within the green line. As a minor-
ity population existing within a Jewish majority state, some Palestinians 
were granted citizenship within Israel, but their citizenship was immediately 
restricted through emergency regulations that curtailed their movement, their 
ability to purchase land, and their ability to pass citizenship on to members 
of their own families.30 Such regulations were implemented to guarantee the 
growth of a Jewish majority state. As Nadim N. Rouhana and Areej Sabbagh- 
Khoury (2015) explain, the form of citizenship granted to Palestinians in 1948 
evolved over four distinct historical periods that worked to consolidate what 
they describe as a “settler- colonial citizenship” practice employed to manage 
and regulate the life of Palestinians in the Israeli state.31
As second- class citizens, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship often live in 
cities and towns that are socioeconomically impoverished and geographically 
marginalized. In these geographies of engineered difference and inequality, 
poverty rates within the Palestinian population are double that of the Jew-
ish Israeli population. A recent report found that 47.1 percent of Palestinians 
live below the poverty line as opposed to a national average of 28.4 per-
cent (Middle East Monitor 2018). In 2018 a report published by the Knesset 
Research Center covering the period 2014 to 2017 found that there were, on 
average, 100 murders per year in Israel, and that 64 percent of the victims of 
such murders were non- Jews (Khoury 2018). The report points to the lack of 
security experienced by Palestinians, a situation shaped by a combination of 
government neglect and worsening economic conditions that impact Israeli 
society as a whole but that target the Palestinian population as a minoritized 
population systematically locked out of economic opportunities and racially 
targeted for management, surveillance, and incarceration. Such facts are exac-
erbated by urban planning policies and practices favoring the Jewish popu-
lation and confining Palestinians to geographies of poverty, criminality, and 
exclusion.32 Tamer and Suhell Nafar, lead singers in DAM, for example, hail 
from a town known for high rates of poverty, drug trafficking, and violent 
crime.33 It has been dubbed a “murder city,” and accounts of drug- and gun- 
related violence in the city and other “mixed cities” proliferate in local Israeli 
media and in the international press, often blaming this type of violence on 
Arab and Palestinian residents (Patrick 2013).
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At the time of DAM’s release of the song, there was a noticeable increase 
in recorded instances of violence against women in the context of 1948 Pales-
tinian towns and villages. In Lyd, a city twenty minutes from Tel Aviv, at least 
thirty- five women had been murdered between 2004 and 2014. In explain-
ing the staggering rates of violence, activist Samah Salaime explained that 
the issues facing Palestinians living in Lyd are not the concern of the Israeli 
authorities (Salaime 2014). As Salaime makes clear, poverty and easy access 
to weapons have created unsafe living environments for women and children, 
making violence ten times more likely to occur in this town than in other 
Palestinian towns and villages. This assessment resonates with those of Aida 
Touma- Sliman, who served as the chairwoman of the Knesset Committee for 
the Advancement of the Status of Women in 2016. During that time, Touma- 
Sliman took a strong stance on the rising rates of violence against Palestinian 
women, calling out Israeli police for their refusal to fully investigate the mur-
ders of Palestinian women and for their failure to provide adequate protec-
tion to Palestinian women facing violence (Harkov 2016). This position has 
also been shared by the political party Balad, which advocates for the rights 
of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship. In 2016, after a staggering rise in the 
number of murders of women, the party released a statement condemning 
such attacks, reminding Palestinians that femicide was a crime against the 
entire society and that confronting these crimes was a collective responsibil-
ity of Palestinian society. In its statement, the party also decried Israeli state 
reluctance to curb this violence, arguing that many of the Palestinian women 
victims had, in fact, requested the state’s protection prior to the occurrence of 
violence that lead to their death, but that this protection was not granted even 
though the state regularly monitors and surveils Palestinian people. Balad’s 
statement reflects a general sentiment shared in Palestinian society that the 
death of Palestinian women within the state of Israel is not the subject of the 
state’s concern.
Based on this condition of state neglect, Palestinian feminist scholars have 
shown that the disappearance and murder of Palestinian women cannot be 
understood outside the particulars of Israeli colonization of Palestinian life. 
Writing on honor- related violence in Palestinian society, Manar Hassan states 
that such violence is a “product of a conscious policy of social and political 
control whose price tag is minimal: no more than a few [Palestinian] female 
corpses per year” (2002, 23). In Israel the murder of Palestinian women in 
the name of honor is an institutionally sanctioned crime, upheld through the 
actions and inactions of both the Israeli police and welfare and social depart-
ments responsible for protecting citizens of Israel. These crimes are thus often 
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simultaneously culturalized and tacitly condoned, revealing a blatant disre-
gard for the life and death of Palestinian citizens of the Israeli state. As Nadera 
Shalhoub- Kevorkian and Suhad Daher- Nashif state in their study on gender 
violence and the politics of colonization in Palestine, the police “do not treat 
the murder of Arab women as homicide cases, but as expressions of a cultural 
norm, or of ‘traditional’ attitudes toward woman” (2013, 306).
By labeling violence against women in Palestinian society “crimes of 
honor,” police are released from the duty to fully investigate them and read-
ily relegate them to an internal Palestinian affair demonstrating this society’s 
regressive social, moral and sexual codes. This fact is widely known in the 
Palestinian context, and Palestinian women activists have long lobbied the 
state to alter the language it uses to describe gender violence against Pales-
tinian women. Samah Salaime, founder of the NGO Na’am- Arab Women in 
the Center, states her opposition to the use of the term honor because of the 
role it plays in licensing police neglect. As she argues, “What made us really 
angry is how police deal with gender crimes [in the Arab sector] and how the 
Israeli media are talking about it . . . They say it’s ‘honor crimes,’ that ‘this is 
Arab men doing what they’re taught to do.’ It’s not about the honor of anyone, 
it’s about men who want to control a women’s [sic] life” (qtd in Lidman 2016). 
In opposing such discourse, Palestinian women activists recognize how the 
language of honor can be used to cover up and sanction crimes committed by 
Palestinian men under the guise of protecting and upholding Arab cultural 
codes and thus rationalize state nonintervention. Activists oppose this label-
ing because it provides license to Israeli society and Israeli state apparatuses 
(such as the police and the criminal justice system) to ignore these crimes, 
and to dismiss them as endemic to Palestinian society and as signs of Palestin-
ian social and cultural inferiority. It also allows Israeli policy to affect displays 
of cultural sensitivity and respect toward Palestinian society and its internal 
system for the management of gender violence.
In 2010 Palestinian Knesset member Ahmad Tibi proposed a law that 
would ban the use of the term honor killings (Lis 2010). The proposed law 
aimed to prohibit Israeli police, courts, and media from using the term to 
describe the murder of Palestinian women (Lidman 2016). Although the law 
did not pass, the police stopped using the language of honor killings and its 
variant of explaining a murder as being killed for “romantic reasons” in 2012 
(Weinglass 2015). The state thus shifted the language it used to describe these 
crimes to another troubling discourse that places blame on the victim’s “inde-
pendent conduct,” implicitly attributing this crime to the behavior of the vic-
tim. This discourse was used when the Israeli police finally made arrests in the 
case of the 2014 murder of Bisan Abu Ghanem, who was the tenth victim in 
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her family to be murdered, in the town of Ramleh.34 The Israeli police used the 
language of “independent conduct” to avoid accusations of culturalizing this 
form of violence (Salaime 2015). The result, as Samah Salaime rightly points 
out, is the further subjugation of Palestinian women and the questioning of 
their right to act as independent human beings. Salaime (2015) writes, “If until 
now the grounds of honor killing pointed the finger toward a woman’s sexual 
conduct, and hinted at control over her body and her sexual life, now comes 
‘independent conduct’ and expands the domains of control in almost every 
conceivable direction.” 
At stake in this formulation is the assumption that a Palestinian woman 
is not a fully independent subject, a person having the right to act indepen-
dently and freely. Instead, the Palestinian woman is configured as a dependent 
subject, a person who must be punished for her actions and behaviors if and 
when they constitute a break with common and collective cultural norms and 
understandings by members of her own community. In other words, in an 
effort to stop culturalizing this violence, the Israeli police have adopted 
victim- blaming rhetoric that robs Palestinian women of their agency. Signifi-
cantly, Palestinian feminist discursive contestations against the culturalization 
of violence against women by Israeli state apparatuses and the press are not 
simply about language or its problematic usage but over the right (and the 
likelihood) that cases of gender violence against Palestinian women will be 
adequately investigated by the police and that the perpetrators of these crimes 
will be prosecuted for their criminal acts to the fullest extent of the law and 
not provided reduced sentences by the colonialist state apparatuses.35
If the Israeli police response to this type of violence frames it within a 
logic of culturalization, the response from state welfare departments extends 
this logic by confronting what they view as regressive and traditional social 
codes in Palestinian communities. In attempting to protect Palestinian women 
fleeing violence or experiencing the threat of it, welfare departments often 
enforce upon Palestinian women solutions that render them vulnerable and 
make them outcasts in the eyes of Palestinian society. One such example is the 
insistence on placing Palestinian women in shelters outside their communities 
in predominantly Jewish cities (Shalhoub- Kevorkian and Daher- Nashif 2013). 
Stuck between colonial and patriarchal logics of informal and formal, state 
and nonstate institutions, Palestinian women are compelled to resort to the 
protection of a local network of Palestinian men who are positioned as medi-
ators between the Israeli state and Palestinian society (Shalhoub- Kevorkian 
2014). This network is empowered to intervene in such cases through a strong 
alliance with the formal sectors of the Israeli state. Extended the title of “hono-
rables,” this group of men (often including men from the clergy, the courts, 
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or those who have prominent roles in their families due to age, profession, 
wealth, or reputation) are sometimes able to prevent violence against women 
by appealing to traditional family values and the need to preserve Palestin-
ian social connectedness and cohesiveness in the face of Israeli colonization 
(Lang 2005; Shalhoub- Kevorkian and Daher- Nashif 2012). Poised as media-
tors between the family and the girl or woman who experiences violence, 
these men often enact their power in ways that confirm, rather than chal-
lenge, patriarchal control structures. To secure and protect women who live 
under the threat of violence, bargains with local patriarchies are struck that 
help further strengthen their grip over Palestinian women’s lives. Palestinian 
women experiencing or facing the threat of gender violence are thus caught 
between two powerful systems that consolidate control over women’s lives in 
ways that extend, rather than challenge, the settler colonial logics of the Israeli 
state (Shalhoub- Kevorkian and Daher- Nashif 2012).
Due to its complex manifestations, Palestinian women’s resistance to the 
phenomenon of femicide in 1948 Palestine is multifaceted and ongoing. Wom-
en’s groups have called into question state neglect of the murders of Pales-
tinian women while also challenging patriarchal codes and structures within 
Palestinian society that seek to control and delimit women’s lives. They have 
also shown how conditions of settler colonialism create unsafe and unhealthy 
environments in which women’s lives become both disposable and dispens-
able. Palestinian women activists have thus sought to ground their analysis 
and praxis in a critique of gender violence that does not abnegate or disap-
pear from view the settler colonial context of Israeli occupation and its role in 
producing conditions that render gender violence against Palestinian women 
possible. This type of analysis holds a multiplicity of actors and a complicated 
set of structural factors accountable for femicides against Palestinian women, 
furthering a politics of contestation that simultaneously refuses to pathologize 
Palestinian society in the interests of the Israeli state or to absolve it of the 
responsibility to protect the lives of Palestinians from everyday forms of vio-
lence, including the violence of family members and the settler colonial state, 
an analysis that will be put into praxis in the work of the feminist group Tal3at 
that I discuss in the afterword.
Against this intricate and complicated backdrop, DAM’s intervention into 
gender violence in Palestine is informed by a commitment to altering the 
conditions of social and political life for Palestinians. DAM, like other mem-
bers of Palestinian society, understands the interconnected and multilayered 
ways in which violence against women in Palestine is enacted. As Tamer Nafar 
states in an interview after the release of the group’s album Dabke in the Moon, 
featuring DAM’s musical intervention on gender violence in Palestine:
B E T W E E N T H E A R T I S T  A N D T H E C R I T I C  •  69
There is a huge connection, directly and indirectly, between violence and the 
occupation, especially as regards Arab- on- Arab violence. Lyd, where I live, 
is considered one of the biggest crime and drug markets in the Middle East. 
When Arabs [in Israel] get killed, cases are not even opened, no one inves-
tigates, and no one is arrested. It’s easier to pull a trigger on another Arab 
knowing nothing will happen to me. This is general, and it similarly impacts 
Arab women. Of course when there is occupation, there is poverty, when 
there is poverty, there is less education. Honor killings happened before the 
occupation, but the occupation is responsible for increasing the percentages. 
(qtd in Nesheiwat 2012).
DAM’s work in confronting gender violence does not part from an intersec-
tional comprehension of the operations of colonial structures of power and 
their impact on the social problem of gender violence. In their recognition 
of the interconnections between gender violence and colonial contexts, DAM 
engages an analytic and political framework furthered by Palestinian feminists 
that readily places instances of gender violence within its historical, political, 
and socio- economic contexts. Whether this framework was incorporated and 
reflected in the song “If I Could Go Back in Time” or not would become a 
central point of contention in the debate that ensued after the song’s release.
BETWEEN AGENCY AND AUTHENTICITY
DAM’s first appearance on the international musical scene coincided with 
the group’s recording and distribution of the hit song meen irhabi (or “Who’s 
the Terrorist?”), in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the American- 
led “War on Terror,” and in the midst of the second Palestinian intifada, or 
uprising.36 Composed originally of the two brothers Tamer and Suhell Nafar 
and their friend Mahmood Jrery, DAM is a Palestinian hip- hop group whose 
work engages a diversity of issues, including occupation, settler colonial-
ity, Zionism, racism, freedom, gender equality, and Arab nationalism.37 An 
abbreviation for Da Arabian MCs, the band’s name also spells out the Arabic 
word dam, which translates to the noun blood and the verb remain or stay. 
This naming works to tie the group to the land of Palestine and to discourses 
of resistance and revolution that the blood analogy is meant to invoke. The 
group members’ ability to write and perform songs in Arabic, Hebrew, and 
English, as well as their particular experiences as marginalized Palestin-
ian citizens of the Israeli state and as residents of 1948 Palestine who deftly 
negotiate an online presence and multiple local and global audiences, have 
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allowed them to reach audiences across vast geographical, racial, and linguis-
tic boundaries.
Since its beginnings in the 1990s and its rise to fame, DAM has become 
known for their subversive musical lyrics that speak to the realities of dis-
possession, marginalization, and oppression punctuating life for Palestinians 
within historic Palestine and in the diaspora. As grandchildren of the genera-
tion of Palestinians who experienced the Nakba, or the ethnic cleansing of Pal-
estine in 1948, and who continue to live on lands that have been appropriated 
and that now exist within the borders of the Israeli state, this group navigates 
the difficult position of being a minoritized indigenous population in a pre-
dominantly Jewish state that is also the occupier of at least four million Pales-
tinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Writing on this particular point, Sunaina 
Maira, in an important book on Palestinian hip hop, notes that “one of the 
central paradoxes created by the settler colonial state for [1948] Palestinians is 
that their citizenship in Israel makes them suspect for other Palestinians and 
Arabs, yet their identity as Palestinians is erased and suppressed by Israel” 
(2013, 97).38 In response to this dual position, DAM members have created 
music that addresses their minoritized status and that speaks frankly about 
issues of policing and surveillance characterizing their experiences within the 
Israeli state. In their music, they repeatedly emphasize their belonging in spite 
of Israeli violence and their indigeneity and emplacement within Palestine.39 
Although navigating this terrain of identity is at the heart of DAM’s work, the 
group has also not shied away from making discussions of gender and sexual-
ity, as well as Arab patriarchy, central to their musical legacy.
In fashioning its musical style, DAM has emphasized its ability to write 
songs that simultaneously look inward toward Palestinian society and out-
ward toward its colonial oppressor.40 As band member Mahmood Jrery states 
in an interview, “It’s a matter of growing up .  .  . We realized that if we want 
to take on the state that is conquering the Palestinian people, we must be 
brave enough to look in the mirror and criticize our own society. There are 
a lot of things in our society that we hate, and the time has come to talk 
about them, not to keep silent” (qtd in Shalev 2012). This idea of breaking 
the silence surrounding violence and other issues taking place in Palestinian 
society is significant, as the band members continually position themselves as 
a groundbreaking force, unafraid of speaking about topics that are considered 
social taboos. This is why, in other songs, they have discussed issues like vio-
lence against women and the relationship between liberation and feminism 
(in “Freedom for My Sisters”). In response to the criticisms they have received 
regarding their focus on gender violence in Palestinian society, DAM released 
a new song, “min inta” (“Who You Are”), which takes aim at Arab patriarchy 
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and challenges hegemonic and toxic forms of masculinity.41 With the addition 
of Maysa Daw, a female lead singer, to the group in 2014, the band’s music 
has explicitly addressed sociopolitical issues pertaining to Palestinian soci-
ety, including the control of women’s bodies (“jasadik- hom,” or “your body 
of theirs”) and, most recently, the pressure placed on Palestinian men and 
women to marry (in “emta njawzak yamma”).42
“If I Could Go Back in Time” centers on a story of a woman who is killed 
by her family. The video suggests that she is murdered because she refused 
to marry her cousin and had prepared to run away from her home. In the 
video and in the lyrics, the song documents the woman’s life but narrates it in 
a shifted time frame: It begins with her murder and segues back to her birth 
while offering snapshots and glimpses of her adult life and her experiences 
with her family. The first part of the song thus states:
Before she was murdered, she wasn’t alive
We’ll tell her story backwards from her murder to her birth
Her body rises from the grave to the ground
The bullet flies out of her forehead and swallowed into the gun
The sound of her echo screams, she screams back
Tears rise up from her cheeks to her eyes
Behind the clouds of smoke, faces of her family appear
Without shame, her brother puts the gun in his pocket
Her father throws down the shovel and wipes the sweat off his forehead
He shakes his head, satisfied from the size of the grave
They drag her back to the car, her legs kicking
Like a sand storm, she’s erasing her own tracks
They throw her in the trunk, she doesn’t know where she is
But she knows that three left the house and only two will return
They reach the house; throw her to the bed in violence
“So you want run away huh?” they wake her with violence (“If I Could Go 
Back in Time Lyrics”)43
The first scene opens with a bloodied woman rising from her bed to face the 
barrel of a gun directed at her face. The violent scene depicts the woman’s 
brother shooting his sister and her father digging the grave in which she is 
buried. Through its rewinding techniques, the song constructs an imaginary 
modern- day honor crime, showing the role that family members (both men 
and women) play in planning, negotiating, and ultimately carrying out this 
form of gender violence. As the woman is dragged back into the trunk of a 
car, she becomes aware of the fate that awaits her: “But she knows that three 
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left the house and only two will return. They reach the house; throw her to 
the bed in violence ‘So you want run away huh?’ they wake her with violence” 
(“Lyrics”). This rhetorical question shifts the blame from a brother who shoots 
his sister and violates her right to life to a woman who has broken unspecified 
social mores in pursuit of individual goals and desires, and thus invites death 
upon herself.
Alternating between “real” depictions of family life and a fantasy of life 
after death, the song situates the gender violence that the woman experiences 
in a broader social context where women are subjects of patriarchal control, 
discipline, and punishment. This tension between communal demands and 
individual desires undergirds the entire song, catapulting outrage and moral 
condemnation from both listeners and viewers. The violent opening scene is 
followed by the chorus, which is performed by Amal Murkus:








Joined by a number of women who appear happy and jovial, Murkus is in a 
fantasylike space. Within a few seconds of seeing Murkus singing, the woman 
who was shot by her brother in the song’s opening scene finds herself on a bed 
surrounded by trees, shimmering light, and glowing colors. She awakes, after 
her murder, happy and smiling, while Murkus sings about what it would mean 
to go back in time and how she would, if given the chance, draw, write, and 
sing. The jarring juxtaposition between this fantastical scene of life and the 
gloomy opening scenes of death makes gender violence and the honor crime 
appear to be a common and festering problem in Palestinian society.
By blurring the boundaries between truth and fiction, “If I Could Go Back 
in Time” depicts the struggles faced by the woman in simplistic ways: her 
choices and sexual freedoms are placed at odds with social demands and cul-
tural expectations. In DAM’s condemnation of gender and sexual violence, 
agency is depicted as the powerful and independent rejection of familial pres-
sures and patriarchal interventions; it is the enactment of a desire to live a 
willful life, uncomplicated by the choices, demands, or expectations of those 
with whom we may share a sense of space and place (Abu Lughod and Mik-
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dashi 2015). The woman’s tasting of “forbidden fruits”—a reference in the 
song, indicating that she may have broken some unnamed but known code or 
expectation—her unwillingness to marry her cousin, and her departure plans 
all evidence her commitment to an independent reality, an alternative future 
freed from the demands of her family and collective life. It is this active resis-
tance to a predetermined life path that renders the story of her death so tragi-
cally familiar to its audiences. The struggles that the main protagonist appears 
to embody resonate with audiences because the figure of the oppressed woman 
whose independent will is undercut by the collective will of those around her 
is situated in the familiar enclosures of freedom and unfreedom.
In her refusal to adhere to social norms, the protagonist’s agency becomes 
known to listeners and viewers, and she becomes recognizable as an inde-
pendent and worthy subject who desires freedom as an articulation of her 
right to be fully human. Through this paradigm, agency is actualized when 
a subject challenges cultural norms, when she seeks freedoms that affirm her 
individual identity and her desires, and when she confronts practices consid-
ered traditional and thus harmful—even at the risk of experiencing further 
violence, a theme earlier witnessed in narratives about Aqsa Parvez’s murder. 
Noting the complex ways in which individuals negotiate and develop their 
sense of agency in relation to rather than in opposition of cultural demands, 
Diane Baxter contends that “agency, in this sense, is not about the efforts to 
achieve one’s efforts against the weight of hegemonic forces, but rather as part 
of a specific set of hierarchical relations” (2007, 745). DAM’s song resonates 
because the struggles of its doomed protagonist to assert herself by escaping 
her fate are effectively rendered cultural and exceptional; she is posited as an 
individual fighting against a collective family structure that wishes to rob her 
of the ability to make decisions that are her own.
A critical look at this construction calls into question what Inderpal Gre-
wal and Caren Kaplan have named the “tradition- modernity” binary. In 2001 
the authors called upon theorists of gender and sexuality studies to rethink 
models of inquiry that inhere sexuality as a site of knowledge formation and 
excavation separate from broader studies of race, class, nation, and religion 
(666). They emphasize the importance of placing the study of sexuality in a 
framework that recognizes varying “conceptions of the body” and that attends 
to “the political economies of the family” (667). Without such analysis, theo-
rists risk creating “sexual subjects as traditional in order to create feminist 
modern subjects” (669). By recentering normative understandings of sexual-
ity and freedom, the song alludes to the possibilities and promises of normed 
subjectivities and subject positions that are vacated from complex iterations 
of individual and collective identities, histories, and experiences. In DAM’s 
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song, the Palestinian woman is cast as the individual victim of tradition, 
while transnational audiences are placed as the idealized subjects of moder-
nity who have the agency to experience freedom and who can, in turn, seek 
and secure it for others. DAM’s song reproduces the powerful binary of static 
and unchanging tradition versus progressive and malleable (and thus sexual) 
modernity. In DAM’s video the Palestinian woman is stuck between her desire 
for freedom and her family’s restrictive expectations. Against these odds, she 
chooses to flee, to escape her family’s grip and to seek an alternative life out-
side of Palestine, a depiction that invariable leads to the disappearance of the 
“very thickness of Palestinian lives” (Abu Lughod and Mikdashi 2012a).
In their response to DAM’s song, Lila Abu- Lughod and Maya Mikdashi 
(2012a) argue that the song disappoints its fans because “it succumbs to an 
international anti- politics machine that blames only tradition for the intrac-
tability of (some) people’s problems.” Highlighting the vanishing context of 
Israeli occupation in which gender violence in Palestine occurs, a context 
that this chapter has sought to bring to the fore, Abu- Lughod and Mikdashi 
focus on the ways in which such depictions help reify Orientalist assump-
tions about and stereotypes of Palestinian men and women and thus con-
sciously and unconsciously misrepresent their realities. But this critique, as 
the response of DAM to its critics suggests, does not comfortably fit when it 
is transfixed on Palestinian society. To dismantle the claims of the authors, 
DAM takes aim at their location in the US academy, ignoring their trans-
national and long- standing connections and embeddedness in the region. 
Undergirding DAM’s defense of its work is a troubling claim to authentic-
ity that enshrines the right of practitioners to produce interventions (artistic 
or otherwise) placed beyond the pale of critique (academic or otherwise). 
In defense of their work, DAM maintains that their musical interventions 
are not only warranted but are also direct products of the “greatest histori-
cal moment” of 2012, when uprisings across the Arab world signaled hope-
ful social and political transformations for many disenfranchised Arab youth 
(Tamer Nafar, Suhell Nafar, and Mahmood Jrery [DAM] 2012). This is why 
DAM argues that “we should dispense with concerns over how we may be 
read (particularly by the West)” and focus, instead, on issues that have been 
identified as “society’s taboos” (Tamer Nafar, Suhell Nafar, and Mahmood 
Jrery [DAM] 2012). As DAM members boldly proclaim, they are part of a 
“new artistic movement in Palestine that is secure enough to take on occu-
pation and domestic violence, [as well as] racism and sexism” (Tamer Nafar, 
Suhell Nafar, and Mahmood Jrery [DAM] 2012).
Orientalism, DAM seems to suggest, does not function in a uniform or 
singular fashion; its contestations thus need to be attentive to differential 
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geographies of power and resistance: where we are located inflects how we 
encounter and resist gender violence. While challenging Orientalism can hold 
some intellectual promise and political appeal for academics in Western con-
texts, it may not be the end goal of activisms and pursuits situated outside 
these spaces. As DAM says, “When we write songs, we do not sit and think, 
‘what would America or Israel think of this?’ We open the window and docu-
ment what we see” (Tamer Nafar, Suhell Nafar, and Mahmood Jrery [DAM] 
2012). Although I am sympathetic to the arguments made by DAM regard-
ing the importance of activisms informed by the immediacy of place and the 
situated realities of experience, two core imperatives of embodied forms of 
feminist activism, I am wary of arguments that stake for activists a position 
of innocence or moral high ground and that cleave academic debates from 
artist and activist endeavors, enshrining the latter beyond the pale of critique.
In this context, academics are seen as detached from the social problems 
they study and analyze by virtue of the politics of where they are located and 
the spaces from which they lodge their critique and their mode of analysis. 
This specific point is conveyed by Tamer Nafar in response to criticisms DAM 
received regarding the song. As he states, “We were attacked in an article, 
saying that we are giving fuel to Western propaganda. The funny thing is we 
wrote the song in Arabic, in Palestine, and the ones criticizing us are sitting in 
America, writing in English, on an American website, in an American univer-
sity” (qtd in Nesheiwat 2012). Not only do Nafar’s words claim for himself and 
DAM a position of proximity and authenticity vis- à- vis Palestine and Arab 
culture and the Arabic language in which they often sing in; they do so by 
simultaneously dismissing DAM’s song’s detractors precisely because of their 
assumed lack of proximity to or their actual distance from these markers of 
authenticity due to their location in the US, their use of the English language 
for the production of knowledge, and their employment within the American 
academy.
Here we see how the claim of authenticity can be wielded to defray the 
charge of complicity. While I am aware of the privileges that academic spaces 
such as those of the US academy can afford some academics, privileges that 
Nafar alludes to and that I, too, benefit from as a Palestinian academic located 
in a US university who writes in English to English- speaking audiences and 
who has not lived in occupied Palestine, I am interested in thinking about 
the ways in which Orientalism as a structuring logic and a disciplinary power 
haunts confrontations of gender violence and the honor crime in DAM’s musi-
cal intervention. I am invested in thinking about how Orientalist tropes work 
to suture DAM’s analysis to a discourse that works to exceptionalize honor- 
related violence by activating, intentionally or unintentionally, entrenched 
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ideas about Arab violence and patriarchy often used to cast Arab societies as 
backwards, oppressive, and antiwoman.
In DAM’s song, Orientalist representations of Arab life proliferate, serving 
to culturalize familial forms of gender violence. The list of angry, irrational, 
and violent Arab characters who populate the three- and- half- minute video 
is long: we have the violent Arab brother who beats and later kills his sis-
ter by pointing a gun at her face; there is also the father who, together with 
other men in his family, plans and authorizes his daughter’s murder. There is 
a mother who collaborates with family patriarchs by revealing her daughter’s 
escape plans and thus willfully endangering her life. In their interactions with 
one another, family members are emotional and aggravated. These scenes rest 
on assumptions about Arab men and their propensity for violence against 
Palestinian women, who are depicted as victimized subjects whose power to 
make choices that are their own is repeatedly foreclosed by patriarchal family 
structures upheld by dominant and controlling Arab and Muslim men.
Although DAM can claim that its message is not geared toward Israeli or 
Western audiences, its depictions of honor- related violence and the honor 
crime are nevertheless shaped by and steeped in the colonial context of Israeli 
occupation, where Palestinians are routinely depicted as violent, patriarchal, 
and culturally backwards and thus deserving of the violence enacted upon 
them by the state. The discursive categories reproduced throughout the song 
rest on and borrow from transnationally deployed depictions of Muslims, 
Arabs, and Palestinians that traffic in assumptions of their inherent violence, 
irrationality, and excessive sexual control over women. DAM’s depictions of 
sexual violence in Palestinian society, of course, are not singular. Rather, they 
are the product of a particular historical and political conjuncture where Mus-
lim and/or Arab cultures are routinely stigmatized, targeted, surveilled, and 
violated at both the symbolic and the material levels. In the aftermath of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and the “War on Terror,” and drawing on a longer history of 
Orientalism, anti- Blackness, colonization, and racism, the Arab/Muslim man 
has come to represent an essentially dangerous body whose masculinity sig-
nifies as both patriarchal and terroristic threat. His body thus serves a double 
function: internally, he is responsible for terrorizing women and for enforc-
ing his patriarchal order on them. Externally, he also terrorizes (or threatens 
to terrorize) civilians and endangers the safety and lives of innocents at home 
and abroad, a trope that will be seen again in chapter 3 in representations of 
Zein Isa and the murder of his daughter Tina.
In light of such configurations, it is significant that in DAM’s rendition 
of the honor crime, it is the woman’s brother who kills her, but only after 
local family patriarchs authorize the violence. Although this representation 
serves to show the collective decision- making process that takes place before 
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an honor crime is planned and authorized, the perpetrator of the crime is the 
young Palestinian man who is positioned as a violent authority figure, capable 
of physically hurting and later executing his own sister.44 In the video it is the 
protagonist’s brother who punches his sister, shoves, yells, shackles, and force-
fully pushes her into the car, and who, ultimately, points the gun at her face 
and executes her. This casting of Palestinian men as an undifferentiated, col-
lective, and murderous mass that controls and violates the bodies of Palestin-
ian women refracts a normative lens produced through assumptions of racial, 
national, and cultural differences. This lens showcases Palestinian masculinity 
as inherently threatening and violent, capable of maiming, endangering, and 
even ending the life of women.
Drawing on a broad corpus of affective and material registers of fear and 
terror, this type of representation not only rehashes an all too familiar and 
dominant Orientalist and anti- Muslim script but also, in effect, indigenizes 
it—thus providing local sanction and license for its transnational circula-
tion and uptake. While debate around the song has focused on how it may 
be heard outside of Palestine, it is perhaps equally important to consider 
how it might be heard within Palestine and what ideas it constructs and dis-
seminates to Palestinian society about itself. It is also important to ask how 
its circulation upholds an exceptionalized understanding of gender violence 
that separates it from the structural conditions and contexts that both create 
and sustain it.
In making this argument, I do not minimize the immensity of gender 
violence or absolve Palestinian men who commit violence against women 
and who utilize honor as an excuse and sanction for their violent behav-
iors. Certainly, there are fathers, brothers, uncles, husbands, and sometimes 
mothers who kill. I am not suggesting that, in the interest of saving face, we 
must exonerate such murderous acts or shroud them in secrecy and silence. 
Rather, I am invested in showing how representations of the honor crime 
are always mired in global and political struggles over meaning that extend 
rather than resolve, interrupt, or end interconnected and multiple forms of 
gender violence. As DAM’s musical intervention and its reception makes 
clear, the honor crime is situated within a field of ungovernable signifiers 
that reinscribe binaries, reproduce polarizations, and enact reductionisms. 
When DAM circulates messages about Palestinian society that have the effect 
of rendering gender violence a culturally endemic problem, they lend credi-
bility and legitimacy to dominant and normative representations of the honor 
crime. They do this by separating violence against women from the historical 
context in which it occurs, a context that the song’s makers deeply understand 
and viscerally experience and one which the song, by design or by accident, 
repeatedly occludes.
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It is this vanished context that Palestinian feminists Nadera Shalhoub- 
Kevorkian, Sarah Ihmoud, and Suhad Daher- Nashif brought to view after the 
fallout over DAM’s song. In a 2014 article on the relationship between gender 
violence and Israeli settler colonialism published on Jadaliyya, the authors 
carefully demonstrate the historical links between the formation of the state 
of Israel and targeted attacks against Palestinian women’s bodies. Weaving 
historical events with personal accounts from survivors of gender violence, 
the authors show the necessity of a feminist analysis that reads the “target-
ing of Palestinian women’s bodies and sexuality” as “structural to the Israeli 
settler colonial project’s racialized logic of elimination.” Using a comparative 
settler colonial studies framework, the authors make clear that “our struggle 
for indigenous sovereignty within anti- colonial activism as feminists is nec-
essarily situated in the protection of Palestinian women’s bodily safety and 
sexuality, family, and communal right to life.”
The ideas presented in this article expand upon Shalhoub- Kevorkian and 
Daher- Nashif ’s (2012) intervention in the immediate aftermath of the debate 
surrounding DAM’s song. Writing from their position as “therapists, activists, 
and scholars who have worked with abused women, and conducted social 
anthropological studies on the killing of women in Palestinian society,” both 
authors shift the terms of the debate to focus on the relationship between 
killing of women, or “qatl al- nisa,” and “the realm of the political.” Their 
work emphasizes the need to think about the act of naming and representing 
violence against Palestinian women and its intersections with the intertwined 
domains of politics, morality, and ethics. Inspired by a desire to provide a view 
from within Palestine regarding the debate, the authors state their respect for 
DAM’s and for Abu- Lughod and Mikdashi’s important “clear interventions 
in addressing the criminalization and politicization of Palestinian women by 
their family members.” The intervention by the Palestinian feminists, while 
also privileging the politics of location, shifted the terms of the debate to the 
question of responsibility. While acknowledging the occurrence of femicide 
in Palestinian society in historically specific ways, the authors invite readers 
to ask the following questions: Who benefits from violence against women? 
Who benefits from femicide? These questions shine a spotlight on the role of 
the Israeli colonial and criminal systems in bolstering the killing of women 
in Palestinian society, thus recalibrating the terms of the debate beyond its 
discursive fault lines and back to the issue of gender violence in Palestinian 
society.
As a sign of the strength of the honor killing discourse in which the song 
is invariably mired, it is important to remember that the song never directly 
uses the term honor crime to describe the act of violence that the woman 
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experiences, nor does it actually invoke Palestinian society by name in its lyr-
ics or in the video itself.45 Instead, it is listeners and viewers and the concomi-
tant activist/scholarly debates surrounding this song that come to define it as 
a work about honor crimes and their occurrence within Palestinian society. 
This reading makes apparent the power of the very discourses and imagery 
that DAM refutes or claims not to engage or centralize in their response to 
Abu- Lughod and Mikdashi. Even when DAM does not use the exceptional-
ized language of honor- based violence within the work itself, the song never-
theless remains connected in the minds of its listeners to this crime because of 
the various “paratexts” or messages that exist outside the song itself that help 
shape how it is received, consumed, and understood as a work against honor- 
related violence (Genette 1997). Among these are the song’s association with a 
UN- funded project to mobilize Arab youth to combat violence against women 
in general and the honor crime in particular. This association is celebrated 
through UN Women’s launch of the song on their website before its worldwide 
release. As the UN Women (2012) news release announcing the song states:
Across the world, the United Nations estimates that 5,000 women and girls 
are murdered and abused every year by male relatives as punishment for a 
range of behaviors judged to have damaged the family reputation. Between 
2007 and 2010, 29 women in the West Bank were reported murdered in the 
name of honour and at least nine cases have already been reported since the 
beginning of 2012.
Repeating the claim that 5,000 are murdered in honor crimes each year, this 
collaboration between DAM and UN Women structures the type of discursive 
and political intervention and analysis that DAM makes about gender violence 
in the video itself and elsewhere in the band’s interviews about the work. What 
is at stake is not the collaboration itself but rather the ways in which such col-
laborations ultimately become fitted within the confines of UN discourse and 
strategies for ending violence against women.46 This type of focus neatly aligns 
with what Jutta M. Joachim labels the UN’s “criminal justice framework” that 
seeks to achieve the two interconnected goals of making family violence sig-
nify as a crime and prosecuting perpetrators of violence against women so 
“society communicated that violence was unacceptable and made the offender 
personally responsible for his actions” (2007, 119). Both goals are central to the 
song’s message, which, while highlighting the collective nature of this gender 
violence, also emphasizes the need for broad societal disapproval.
As a band composed of young Palestinian men, DAM is positioned as a 
potential leader of a campaign to mobilize Arab youth against gender forms 
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of violence that the UN links to family reputation and honor. The connection 
between the song and the UN- led campaign against honor- related violence is 
further documented in the final scene in DAM’s video, which lists the names 
of the songs’ funders and in which the song’s creators remind their Arabic- 
speaking audiences that “there is no relationship between the killing of women 
and honor—Murder is a crime. Say no. Unite to end violence against women” 
(my translation). The English version of the text, which appears under the 
Arabic version, states: “Say NO—UNite to end violence against women.” The 
capitalization of UN in the word unite draws attention to the role of the orga-
nization in funding this work. The slight differences between the Arabic and 
English version of the texts are significant. While the Arabic version calls 
on Arabic- speaking audiences to oppose honor- related violence and to con-
front such murders as crimes that violate the lives of women, the English ver-
sion calls on audiences to confront violence against women in a general and 
broader sense. Without a doubt, these liminal messages, which exist in the 
very margins of the text of the song but which nevertheless structure how it is 
heard, received, and understood, help cement the link between the work and 
the laden discourse of the honor crime in which DAM’s song is enmeshed.
“If I Could Go Back in Time” is not a documentary or a scholarly study 
about gender violence. It is an artistic and activist engagement with social 
issues, a work that contests gender violence against women and that seeks to 
produce outrage and to solicit action on behalf of victims and survivors of 
gender violence in and across colonial and contexts. The song’s creators see 
themselves as active participants and members of the Palestinian community 
who are engaged in local and important conversations and domestic forms 
of activism against the phenomenon of gender violence within Palestinian 
society. Situated within the settler colonial context of Palestine, they position 
themselves as authentic agents, activists, and artists who have the right to 
define and speak on issues they deem significant to their own communities 
on their own terms, but their contributions cannot be dissociated from the 
broader political and discursive texts and contexts that are used to portray and 
enact gender violence within Palestinian communities.
THE ACTIVIST, THE CRITIC, AND THE DISAPPEARING TEXT
The debate over DAM’s song has emblematized a widening gulf between the 
work of academics and activists, one that continues to demarcate the theoreti-
cal and political fault lines around a range of issues such as the honor crime, 
female genital cutting, queer subjectivities, and queer rights.47 In dominant 
narratives about these issues, activists and academics are positioned as polar 
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opposites: one has the privilege to write and study and reflect upon social 
realities and problems; the other lives them, often at a heavy and personal 
cost. While academics accrue value and accolades and secure their livelihoods 
in Western academic institutions through their production of studies about 
such issues, activists continuously face physical, political, and socioeconomic 
risks for doing and embodying the work that academics produce and dissemi-
nate knowledge about. Transnational academics located in US contexts travel 
between spaces of academia and activism, often usurping knowledge from 
activist interlocutors and taking up space in conversations about difficult and 
challenging social issues and political realities. The relationship between the 
two is thus uneven, structured by global socioeconomic realities that position 
Western- based academics as privileged in relation to activists located in third- 
world contexts where their basic rights to freedom, security, and dignity are 
frequently abrogated. If academics produce theories and texts, activists engage 
in praxis and do work, and the two are constantly cleaved from one another. 
Where one is performative, disengaged, and produced in the ivory towers of 
academe, the other is immediate, authentic, and informed by material hard-
ship and struggle.
Feminists have long inquired into the possibility of overturning these 
unequal power structures. As Melissa W. Wright explains, “Reckoning with 
the power dynamics inherent to the production of knowledge continues to 
represent a challenge for feminist theorists and activists as they negotiate 
over whose knowledge counts as ‘official’ knowledge, in whose language is 
this knowledge formed, and who is able to represent this knowledge, have 
access to it, and reap the rewards of its circulation” (2008, 380). More than 
anything, the debate over DAM’s song reveals that such reckonings remain 
ongoing and unresolved. Lurking in them is an implicit but never quite stated 
question about who has the right to speak on gender violence in Palestine, 
under what terms, and from what locations. Rather than contest the power 
structures that impose and reproduce these divisions and distinctions, debates 
over DAM’s song, and the larger conversations around gender violence they 
animate and map, have tended to reify the line between subjects and objects of 
knowledge. They have worked to widen or foreclose, instead of bridge or open 
up, the possibility of engagements that bring together activist and academic 
contributions to ending the phenomenon of gender violence. In constraining 
the terms of the debate to individual actors and questions of positionality and 
authenticity, the shrinking political space for confronting gender violence is 
even further limited.
In an article on the broader feminist politics animating the debate over 
DAM’s song, Rochelle Terman inquires into how “particular characteriza-
tions, modes of argumentation, omissions, and framings work to discursively 
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normalize a paradigm of legitimate or illegitimate positions on the issue of 
gendered violence in Muslim contexts” (2010, 3). Terman lays bare a feminist 
analytic field of inquiry structured by a “double bind” between anti- imperialist 
and postsecular modes of critique. Where one camp (the “anti- imperialists”) 
curtails analyses of gender violence because of fear of how it might be used 
to service Islamophobic and imperial goals, the other (the “postsecularists”) 
focuses on confronting such issues despite the risks associated with these con-
testations. Terman seeks a “multidimensional analysis of the main lines of 
domination facing women in Muslim contexts, including anti- imperialist cri-
tique of those political formations that can escape scrutiny precisely because 
they present themselves as anti- imperial movements” (23). While I am drawn 
to Terman’s invitation to analysis that weaves together anti- imperialist and 
antiviolence positions, it ends up inadvertently reasserting the binary of 
activists versus academics by assigning activists a more privileged position 
of critique due to the politics of location rather than the substance of their 
interventions.
What is emphasized in here and in defenses of DAM’s right to produce 
work that intervenes in the social problem of gender violence is that mem-
bers of DAM, like other activists and artists who confront gender violence 
from within their communities, actually do live in Palestine. Certainly, this 
fact provides DAM and local Palestinian activists immediate experiences and 
crucial insights into the dual context of colonial and patriarchal violence and 
the strategies for confronting this violence from within Palestine in indig-
enous and localized ways. Missing from Terman’s analysis, however, is the 
content of these strategies or the vanished text of DAM’s musical interven-
tion, which is the very subject of the debate between the anti- imperialist and 
postsecular, activist, and academic camps she identifies. To rethink the terms 
of the debate, then, we would need to consider not only where DAM is located 
but also what strategies and interventions they reproduce and make possi-
ble in their work about the honor crime and how these strategies fit within 
broader strategies of confronting gender violence.
The controversy over DAM’s video invites us to carefully reflect on and 
challenge the boundaries of knowledge production between activists and aca-
demics on issues like gender violence. It calls on us to think with, through, 
and beyond the politics of location in ways that bring into view a multiplicity 
of actors, strategies, and analytics for contestations of gender violence. Accu-
sations of complicity, like claims to authenticity, work to foreclose possibilities 
of collaboration and engagement across real and imagined borders of loca-
tion, subjectivity, and positionality. By pitting the academic against the activist 
other, they eclipse the substance of both the activist interventions and their 
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academic critics. More importantly, they disappear from view the complexi-
ties in which protracted social problems such as gender violence in settler 
colonial contexts are undoubtedly mired and in which discussion of honor- 
related violence must be placed. These discursive and political fault lines ren-
der impossible future collaborations that have the potential to open up spaces 
“where academic agendas and frameworks can be interrogated and recast, and 
where we can generate new transformative possibilities in the fissures, gaps, 
absences, and fallibilities of our critical frameworks whose cutting- edge status 
we may have taken for granted” (Nagar 2014, 110). While Nagar’s invitation 
is offered to feminist academics located primarily in Western contexts, what 
would such collaborations look like if taken up by both activists and academ-
ics working together to wrestle with the complexities of the phenomenon of 
gender violence which are disappeared in the liminal, binary, and noxious 
spaces of the debate? And how might they help us get through the impasses 
that such debates ultimately leave in their wake?
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C H A P T E R  3
Against Exceptionalism
Historicizing US Discourse on  
Gender Violence and Racial Terror
ON JANUARY 27,  2017,  a few days into his presidency, Donald J. Trump issued 
Executive Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry 
into the United States.” Known by its critics as the “Muslim ban,” the order 
ushered into law a number of rulings that effectively overhauled the US immi-
gration system. The ban stopped refugee admissions for 120 days while sub-
jecting the US immigration system to review and indefinitely suspending the 
Syrian refugee admission program and preventing from entry to the US citi-
zens of five Muslim- majority states.1 In addition to its subjection of visa appli-
cants to “extreme vetting,” the first version of the executive order specifically 
stopped from entry to the US anyone who would “engage in acts of bigotry 
or hatred (including ‘honor’ killings, other forms of violence against women, 
or the persecution of those who practice religions different from their own) or 
those who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orienta-
tion.”2 In putting this language into the words of the order, President Trump 
drew power from the text of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
which gives the president the power to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any 
class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of 
aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate” if their entry is deemed 
detrimental to US interests.3 Claiming to protect both the interests of the US 
state and those of American citizens in danger of potential forms of sexual, 
racial, and gender violence from foreign- born terrorists, section 10(ii) of the 
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order mandated that government agencies such as the Department of Home-
land Security collect, track, and publicize information about “foreign nation-
als in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United 
States and engaged in terrorism- related acts.” In the name of “transparency 
and data collection,” section 10(ii) also required state agencies to report on 
major crimes and to collect “information regarding the number and types of 
acts of gender- based violence against women, including honor killings,” com-
mitted by foreign nationals.
In its sweeping language of border control, the ban sought to implement 
policies that would strengthen US immigration law and further regulate entry 
of foreign nationals into the country. Its supporters argued that such a step 
was necessary because of the existence of legal loopholes in the immigration 
system that allowed false refugee claimants to abuse US law and endanger 
the country and its citizens. This position was echoed by former Homeland 
Security Secretary John Kelly, who argued, “The fact remains that we are not 
immune to terrorist threats and that our enemies often use our own freedoms 
and generosity against us . . . We cannot risk the prospect of malevolent actors 
using our immigration system to take American lives” (qtd in de Vogue et al. 
2017). At the time of its issuance, American public opinion on the ban was 
split along party lines. A poll conducted by CNN in 2017 found that 53 per-
cent of Americans opposed the order, that 47 percent were in favor, and that at 
least three of ten people interviewed wanted to see it expanded (Sparks 2018).
The differing opinions on the ban reveal the convergence of US immigra-
tion and notions of safety and securitization that were further reinforced in a 
post- 9/11 and “War- on-Terror” world order.4 Reactions against the ban ranged 
from legal battles in courtrooms across the country to airport protests in US 
cities against the detention of migrants to marches on the US Capitol.5 This 
activism helped open up spaces for the questioning of the US immigration 
system and its transnational practices and reach; they called into focus the 
logics of racial discrimination and difference that undergird the operations of 
the US national security and settler colonial state.6 Critics of Executive Order 
13769 (EO1) and its revised version 13780 (EO2 and EO3) have highlighted 
the devastating impact of Trump’s policy on migration and refugee and asy-
lum policies and practices in the US. They have shown the order’s materially 
adverse effects on refugee communities, both those inside US borders and 
those with hopes of resettlement and reunification with families fleeing per-
secution or war. Many have demonstrated the problematic and differential 
notions of citizenship and belonging that the ban enshrines while also lament-
ing the atmosphere of racial and religious tension, suspicion, and animosity 
that the ban provokes and licenses at the national and transnational levels.
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In legal contestations of the ban’s validity, critics have argued that the ban 
is unconstitutional because it “reveals an invidious anti- Muslim intent” and 
thus breaches the Establishment clause of the First Amendment that pro-
hibits the making of laws targeting specific religious groups (Anderson et al. 
2017). Although discussions of the Muslim ban have focused on the issue of its 
inherent—if not stated—bias against Muslims, others have also noted its invo-
cation of honor crimes as cause for feminist alarm and concern. As feminist 
and Middle East studies scholars have convincingly argued, the invocation of 
honor violence is a “dog whistle,” intended to malign and further target Mus-
lim communities and to further link Muslim cultures and peoples to specific 
forms of gender and sexual violence in order to fuel anti- Muslim and antimi-
grant sentiments and ideologies (Gökariksel 2017). In her response to the ban, 
legal feminist scholar Leti Volpp (2017) highlights the irony of a Muslim ban 
from a party that attacks same- sex marriage, opposes adoption by gay parents, 
and invokes states’ rights to deny bathroom facilities to transgender people 
while claiming to protect the nation from Muslim migrants and refugees who 
are banned “both as putative terrorists and as a purported threat to gender 
equality and sexual liberty.”
Beyond the anti- Muslim fervor driving this ban, what is at work in its 
reference to honor crimes? And how did the honor crime become part of 
Trump’s migration agenda? To answer these questions, I trace iterations of the 
honor crime in US political discourses. While various feminist scholars have 
written convincingly on the problems associated with the executive order and 
its relationship to anti- Muslim sentiments expressed directly and indirectly by 
the Trump administration, there has been less focus on the longer genealogies 
of this discourse in US politics and its racial underpinnings. As we will see, 
analytic frameworks that read Trump’s policy initiatives as the most recent 
and recurrent expression of colonial feminism that usurp contestations of 
gender violence for antimigrant agendas and policies do not fully capture the 
historical imaginaries that inform the rise of such discourses and the histori-
cal specificities of their development, circulation, and uptake. In this chapter, 
I read Trump’s ban, and its invocation of the honor crime, against the logic of 
exception in which it has often been mired. Following Puar’s lead in shifting 
analysis from the temporalities of emergency to the “temporality of regularity” 
(2007, 81), this chapter places the crime within a historical context attuned to 
the imbrications between gender violence and terrorism in American legal, 
political, and social discourses long before the issuance of the order. As I 
show, representations of honor- related crime as a racialized and culturalized 
form of violence do not emerge suddenly at the time of Trump’s ban. Their 
nascent appearance marks the intertwined and interwoven contours of gen-
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der violence, racial terror, and terrorism through which the honor crime has 
long been understood. By unraveling the links between constructions of the 
racialized crimes of terrorism and the honor crime, this chapter explores how 
certain forms of violence work to define not only who is allowed to belong 
in the US but also what forms of gender violence are socially contested and 
under what legal and juridical conditions they come to be so. My aim is to 
show how the appearance of honor killings in Trump’s executive order is an 
extension of, rather than an aberration from, a US global agenda on gender 
violence that is tied to domestic governance and foreign policy. An exclusive 
focus on the Muslim ban that does not attend to such genealogies ignores how 
the more recent appearance of the honor crime in Trump’s executive order is 
tied to longer histories of criminalizing Arabs and Muslims through the lens 
of culturalized gender violence.
GENDER VIOLENCE AND “INTIMATE TERRORISM”
On November 6, 1989, in St. Louis, Missouri, Tina (short for Palestina) Isa 
was confronted by her father and mother for alleged illicit social and sex-
ual behaviors. Upon her arrival, Tina was told by her father that that night 
would be her last and that she was going to be killed. Tina physically struggled 
against her mother and father who stabbed her to death. In a seven- minute 
audio recording captured by an FBI intelligence device placed in the Isa home, 
the incident is documented and later reproduced in various American media 
outlets (State v. Isa 1993).7 The recording, which was used in court in the trial 
against both Zein and Maria Isa, helped convict Tina’s parents of the charge 
of first- degree murder, for which the jury requested capital punishment for 
both parties.8 Tina Isa was the daughter of a Palestinian American father and 
a Brazilian American mother. Her father had immigrated to the US after he 
and his family had lived, briefly, in Puerto Rico, Brazil, and the West Bank. I 
begin with the story of Tina Isa’s murder because I am interested in tracking 
narrations of honor crimes in American media and because this particular 
crime shows how certain forms of domestic violence, patriarchal power, and 
racial difference are scripted as terroristic acts. Reading the story of Tina Isa’s 
murder and its subsequent uptake in two US courts shows how the seeds for 
the interlacing of terrorism and domestic violence and honor killings were 
planted in the US almost three decades before the issuance of Trump’s execu-
tive order. In rereading Tina Isa’s murder case and linking it to the executive 
order, I rely on Leti Volpp’s (2010, 2011) groundbreaking work and careful col-
lection and representation of details of the case that helped challenge domi-
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nant representations of the murder. I reread Tina Isa’s case alongside Volpp’s 
analysis because it carries with it signposts of the contemporary inscription 
and co- option of the fight against gender violence for the revival of racial and 
cultural fears, the stoking of immigration debates, and the ongoing US fight 
against terrorism.
In media coverage of her life and death, Tina is described by her friends 
as a fun- loving, happy American teenager who wanted normal things, such as 
a part- time job, a boyfriend, and a late curfew. Her parents are portrayed as 
struggling with her desire for freedom and autonomy, and Zein Isa is repre-
sented as having a violent temper toward his youngest daughter. An article in 
People magazine explains Tina’s murder as a crime that “defies understand-
ing, reflecting as it does cultural and generational conflicts that are alien to 
most Americans” (Treen 2002). To explain this crime, the author argues that 
neither Tina’s father nor Tina’s mother assimilated into American culture, and 
that their failure to do so had made them suspicious of their American daugh-
ter, who was, as her friends would later testify, also very free- spirited. Tina’s 
parents disapproved of her extracurricular activities at school, including her 
joining of the soccer team, the tennis team, and the cheerleading squad, and 
of her having a Black boyfriend.9 This behavior, as media reports demon-
strate, threatened Zein Isa’s sense of honor and his desire to have his daugh-
ter remain a virgin who would, soon after graduating from high school, be 
married to a Palestinian man in Beiteen, where she would ultimately live and 
settle (Krajicek 2013).
At the parents’ trial, expert defense witness Nicolas Gavrielides, a State 
University of New York anthropology professor who was born and raised in 
Jerusalem, testified that Tina’s way of life had offended her traditional father’s 
sense of honor. In court, he claimed that “everyone growing up in the Middle 
East knows being killed is a possible consequence of dishonouring the family” 
(qtd in Treen 2002). This trope of honor and its possible infractions domi-
nated the story of Tina’s murder in American newspapers at that time and was 
later emphasized in court when the parents tried to utilize culture as ratio-
nale for their murder of their daughter (Volpp 2011).10 Predictably, the story 
was understood as a clash of civilization, a narrative that reveals the struggles 
of first- generation immigrants whose children wish to live an American life 
and hope to integrate into the social fabric of the US but whose choices are 
repeatedly undercut by parents who cling to traditional conceptions of culture 
and honor. Such discourse is echoed in representations of the murder of Aqsa 
Parvez discussed in chapter 1.
In 2013, writing for New York Daily News, David K. Krajicek captured the 
murder thus:
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Like many teenagers, Tina Isa didn’t listen to her parents.
They lived in different worlds, in effect.
Her father, Zein Isa, was a Palestinian Muslim with Old World ideas 
about how his child should and should not behave. His wife, Maria, a Brazil-
ian Catholic, was more a martinet than a mother.
But Tina was a headstrong modern girl growing up in big- city St. Louis, 
not some medieval village.
By and large, public framings of Tina Isa’s murder clung closely to readily 
recognizable political and discursive frames: they positioned Tina Isa and the 
fatal violence that she experienced within spaces of “alterity” that reproduce 
the charge of otherness attached to both the crime and its perpetrators (Tick-
tin 2008, 865). While the narrations of Tina Isa’s murder generally adhered 
to this familiar script, they also exceeded them in an important way through 
their linking of Tina Isa’s murder to another crime of difference and alterity; 
the crime of terrorism.
As court records reveal, the murder of Tina Isa by her parents was cap-
tured on tape by the FBI (State vs. Isa 1993). The FBI’s monitoring of the Isa 
home had spanned more than two years, during which the state agency sought 
to collect evidence of terrorism against her Palestinian father, Zein Isa, for his 
alleged involvement with a US- based branch of the Abu Nidal Organization 
(ANO).11 In 1997 ANO was designated by the US State Department a for-
eign terrorist organization in accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996.12 The organization was accused of carrying out ter-
rorist attacks in twenty countries and killing or injuring at least 900 people.13 
Its members were thought to operate mostly internationally, but some were 
believed to be located within the US. Based on the State Department’s sus-
picion that Zein Isa was a local and US- based operative of ANO who was 
actively plotting against US interests, his home was subject to FBI surveil-
lance, including wiretapping.14 During the trial for the murder of their daugh-
ter, the FBI evidence would play a key role against Tina’s parents, who were 
described in a report from the Associated Press (1991) as “fundamentalist Mus-
lims,” helping to convict Isa and his wife of murder, a crime for which they 
both received a death penalty sentence. While on death row, however, Zein Isa 
and three fellow Palestinian co- conspirators who were naturalized citizens of 
the US were also indicted by a federal grand jury in St. Louis for planning to 
bomb the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC, and for their involvement with 
ANO (Ostrow 1993).15
At that time of Tina’s murder images of terror from the Middle East had 
dominated US news media since the Iran hostage crisis of 1979– 81. In the 
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1990s the US became involved in the Gulf War amid rising fears of terror-
ist threats against US national and international interests, including worries 
about home- grown terrorist attacks which were realized in the first World 
Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 
(Semati 2010). These events, as various scholars have shown, helped reify a 
link between Islam and terrorism and served to construct the figure of the 
Muslim suspect turned terrorist essential to the operations of the “War on 
Terror” (Puar 2007; Stampnitzky 2013). As Lisa Stampnitzky argues in her 
work on the invention of terrorism, the linking of Muslims and terrorism 
began to take place in US public discourse as early as the 1970s, but it was in 
the 1990s and with the bombing of the World Trade Center that “advocates of 
the ‘Islamist terror’ threat mobilized current events as proof of this new form 
of terrorism that was irrational, that broke from predictable routines, and that 
held the potential for mass violence” (143). Terrorism thus became a problem 
associated with irrationality and public violence, a phenomenon that needed 
government intervention in order to be managed and curbed.
Under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) statutes, the four men were indicted for “obtaining illegal weapons, 
such as a rocket- propelled grenade launcher; procuring and using bogus 
passports; illegally transferring money overseas; and conspiring to murder 
Tina Isa” (Worthington 1993). In addition to these charges, the four men 
were accused of conspiring to murder Tina because she posed “a threat to the 
secret existence and continuity of the enterprise” (Jehl 1993). During the ter-
rorism trial, Tina’s murder was believed to be the result of her discovery of her 
father’s involvement with ANO and his fears that she might cooperate with 
US authorities against him and his co- conspirators, further demonstrating the 
link between the two interrelated crimes (Volpp 2011).
The suspicion that Tina had knowledge of her father’s terroristic activities 
was later repeated by special agent James C. Van Rhein in an affidavit submit-
ted to the Missouri court:16
The tape evidence demonstrated that before the killing, Tina had over the 
years (at least between 1986 and 1989) become aware of all the defendants’ 
membership in the ANO. Tina also had general knowledge of the ANO 
activities of all the defendants. The tape evidence also demonstrates that, 
before the killing, Tina Isa had rebelled against and rejected her father’s 
criminal association with the ANO. Tina Isa had also rejected her Palestin-
ian heritage. Tina Isa simply wanted to be an American teenager. (United 
States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, 5)
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The three men whom Zein Isa was associated with pleaded guilty and served 
two years in prison, but charges against Tina’s father were dropped because 
he was already serving a life sentence and was on death row for his daugh-
ter’s murder.17 Importantly, the intelligence information collected from the 
Isa home and used in the federal trial against Zein and Maria Isa thus inad-
vertently reframed the murder from a cultural crime about safeguarding a 
father’s honor to one about eliminating a potential and familial threat to the 
suspected terroristic and political activities in which he engaged. Tina Isa is 
transformed from a daughter murdered by her father over cultural differ-
ences to someone murdered in an altercation over politics. Rather than being 
a victim of domestic violence, Tina Isa becomes an American patriot willing 
to risk her life to expose her father’s engagement in illegal activities against 
the US state. The state’s reliance on the information collected from spying on 
the Isa home for the father’s suspected terrorist activities, in effect, collapsed 
the distinction between gender violence and terrorism. Not only was infor-
mation about terroristic activities and gender violence shared between the 
two separate courts, the crimes of domestic violence and terrorism became 
inseparably intertwined. In Zein Isa’s case, evidence from one court shored 
up the legal charges brought against him in another. The disappearance of the 
distinction between these two crimes was thus legally secured through the 
suturing together of gender violence and terrorism, an act that is similarly 
reproduced in the text of the executive order.
In her work on Tina Isa’s murder and gender violence and their represen-
tation in US courts and media, Leti Volpp (2011) has effectively shown how 
certain violence has been framed in popular and academic discourse as cul-
turalized violence. Volpp demonstrates how such representations reproduce 
notions about otherness rooted in Orientalist and anti- Muslim associations 
between Arab and Palestinian culture, on the one hand, and violence toward 
women, on the other.18 In discussing representations of Tina’s murder, Volpp 
critiques academic work that reproduces these narratives, showing how this 
scholarship forecloses the potential for uncertainty about “the web of factors 
that shape incidents of gendered violence” (95). Volpp goes further to show 
how Zein Isa’s identity as a Palestinian American involved with a designated 
terrorist organization evacuated him from the category of citizenship itself 
and the associated privileges that it bestows on (some of) those who carry it.19 
In other words, it is by coupling Zein Isa’s murder of his daughter with acts 
that are threatening to the US state that Zein Isa comes to occupy the new 
identity of “noncitizen other,” someone whose involvement in terroristic activ-
ities helps provide an explanatory framework for his violence toward women 
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and vice versa (96). By analyzing the multiple dimensions of the crime against 
Tina Isa, Volpp explores the possibility that her murder was about not only 
the tensions between modernity and tradition, as popular framings repeatedly 
suggest, but also “the relationships between cultural difference and the U.S. 
state, terrorism, surveillance, and immigrant communities—relationships only 
made more complicated after 9/11” (96).
With the trying of Tina Isa’s murder in two separate courts, and the link-
ing of a case of gender violence to the crime of terrorism, Tina Isa’s case does 
what feminist geographer Cynthia S. Gorman describes as “jump[ing] scales,” 
wherein a case of domestic violence becomes situated in a broader legal ter-
rain where contestations over citizenship rights and practices of belonging 
loom large (2018). Gorman’s analysis offers an important entry for reading 
Tina Isa’s case and its discursive and political significance decades after the 
crime’s occurrence. By re- examining this crime, we can begin to see how the 
legal, political, and rhetorical differences between perpetrators of culturalized 
violence against women (namely, honor crimes) and the racialized crime of 
terrorism are effectively disappeared (3).20 As a foreign- born US citizen, Zein 
Isa is found guilty of two crimes attached to registers of racial and sexual dif-
ference in US political and social imaginaries. Both crimes are tied to bodies 
configured as outsiders to the US dominant publics or as internally threaten-
ing to its power.
Similarly, the honor crime is a racialized crime insofar as its occurrence 
is associated with certain groups and peoples who are configured as cultur-
ally and racially inferior to dominant white publics and whose violent acts 
exist outside a framework of domestic violence, a framing that is again opera-
tionalized in the executive order. When these crimes occur within Western 
nation- states, they are viewed as importations, problems that are linked to 
othered bodies that now exist within the borders of the US and thus constitute 
a threat to its social order, a connection that was similarly made in relation to 
the murder of Aqsa Parvez in the Canadian context. A Palestinian man who 
migrated to the US as an adult, Zein Isa is an outsider citizen, an other to US 
society long before he murders his daughter. Because of his racial identity and 
the Arabic language he speaks at home, Zein Isa is a body that draws suspicion 
from the US security state and that therefore invites its surveillance and track-
ing.21 Zein Isa’s connections to the Middle East, his engagement in a form of 
organizing and politics linked to transnational circuits and networks of terror, 
and his religious and cultural identity as a patriarchal and violent Arab man 
coalesce to shape how the crime becomes popularly known and remembered 
and how it plays out in the domain of the legal. His actions aid in the figu-
rative and, later, the legal conjoining of gender violence and terrorism in an 
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explicit way and thus set the stage for what seems to be a more recent political 
order associated with the Trump era that uses these co- linked crimes to shore 
up border control policies and procedures.
This link between gender violence and terrorism has been established in a 
number of popular and scholarly works in order to draw attention to the idea 
that domestic violence and terrorism share similar lineages and characteristics 
and that investigating or establishing a correlation between the two can curb 
their occurrence. In one of the first works to address these links, Isabel Marcus 
argues that “there are strong and striking parallels and similarities between 
terrorism as a strategy used to destabilize a community or society consisting 
of men and women, and the abuse and violence perpetrated against women 
in intimate or partnering situations” (1994, 32). Marcus likens experiences 
of political terrorism to those of domestic violence, as both are “designed to 
maintain domination and control, to enhance or reinforce advantages, and to 
defend privileges” (32). Enacting gender violence on others is here uncritically 
accepted and normalized as a precursor of terrorist activities, an act that sig-
nals the propensity of an individual to harm and showcases a desire to control 
and impose particular rules and orders on them.
In noting similarities between the acts of terrorism and intimate violence, 
Rachel Pain (2014) provides the explanatory framework of “intimate terror-
ism” to explain the links between social and political forms of terror. As the 
evidence shows, domestic terrorism is often initiated by men who have his-
tories of violence and who need to assert traditional notions of masculinity 
and power through the exertion of force against women and other vulnerable 
subjects with whom they have close contact. The home is also the space where 
heterosexual norms and practices are defined and imposed and where claims 
to dominant and hegemonic forms of masculinity are often expressed. In this 
research, the distinctions between the spaces of the domestic or the private 
and the spaces of the public are disappeared. In other words, the domestic 
space becomes a realm where terrorists enact their violence on intimate part-
ners (including women and children) as practice for the enactments of future 
violence outside the home on civilian targets. As a private space that is often 
shielded from public scrutiny, the home is seen as a site of danger, where the 
right to personal and physical safety is constantly challenged for victims and 
survivors of domestic abuse and intimate violence by perpetrators of gender 
violence who are predominantly, but not exclusively, men.22
Proponents of these theories suggest that recognizing the links between 
gender violence and terrorism helps draw attention to the significance of the 
phenomenon of violence against women, here reframed from a private and 
individual threat to an issue of mass and public concern. Arguing for the 
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importance of recognizing the continuities and disjunctions between domes-
tic violence and terrorism, Rachel Pain notes that the reframing of domestic 
violence “muddies the boundaries between forms of violence that are usually 
framed as public, political and spectacular, and forms that are usually framed 
as private, apolitical and mundane” (2014, 534). Pain’s work calls on feminist 
geographers and the field of geography at large to question the singular focus 
on terrorism that leads researchers to ignore the ubiquitous phenomenon of 
gender violence, which is not only connected to political and global terror 
but also informed by it. Pain acknowledges how race, class, and gender shape 
understandings and confrontations of these forms of violence, insisting on 
the development of policies and provisions that incorporate structural analy-
ses, and that demonstrate how “terroristic intimate violence is a specific and 
common pattern of abusive behavior which cuts across class, ethnicity and 
sexual orientation” (534). With the rise of international and domestic terror-
ism in the US and elsewhere, including the UK and Europe, such theories 
have gained traction because of their ability to link public and geopolitical 
forms of violence with “their presence in the intimate” sphere (Pain and Stae-
heli 2014, 345). 
While Pain’s work offers a grounded analysis of intimate violence and 
its relationship to global scales of violence, the linking of domestic violence 
and terrorism poses a number of challenges to transnational and critical race 
feminist investigations of these crimes. Prime among these is their tendency 
to universalize patriarchy, to flatten out differences between intimate vio-
lence that is directed toward nonqueer and queer subjects, and to reaffirm 
the connections between terrorism and racialized (primarily brown and Mus-
lim) people. The tying of domestic violence to terrorism in a uniform way 
disappears from view more complex frames of political and social analyses. 
In such discursive usage, the term terrorism is emptied of historical signifi-
cance, bound as is it to individual actors who align themselves with ideol-
ogies deemed terroristic in accordance with state definitions of terror and 
terrorism. As Lisa Stampnitzky shows, this type of work relies on an “anti- 
knowledge” about terrorism that operationalizes the two tropes of evil and 
irrationality (2013, 189). The connection of gender violence with terror serves 
to mire this crime in discourses of evil and irrationality that can be used to 
obfuscate either or both of these acts of violence in ways that facilitate their 
rescripting.
The linking of terrorism and domestic violence is a powerful theoretical 
and political move because it is able to elude historical specificity, to appear 
to maneuver out of discursive constraints. As the Tina Isa case demonstrates, 
this coupling occurred in US courts long before the release of Trump’s order. 
By centering Tina’s case in readings of Trump’s executive order, it becomes 
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apparent that the collapsing of the distinction between domestic violence and 
terrorism is a politically useful and expedient act. Its operationalization works 
to amplify racial difference and associate with it culturalized acts of domestic 
violence. Theories that enable such uncritical linkages without attending to 
their potential misuse and or deployment can help lay the ground work for 
dangerous and racist policies and procedures enacted in the name of protect-
ing the national safety and security of all.
GENDER- BASED VIOLENCE AND THE  
US NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA
In order to understand the operations of the honor crime and violence against 
women in Trump’s executive order and refuse to exceptionalize their appear-
ance in state records, we must first ask where and how violence against women 
became a problem that warrants state attention. How did particular forms of 
violence against women come into the purview of the state, and under what 
conditions? To answer these questions, we can trace the contemporary fold-
ing of gender violence back into the US global agenda during the Obama 
regime. In 2017 President Obama issued The United States Strategy to Pre-
vent and Respond to Gender- Based Violence Globally.23 The strategy outlined 
the fight against gender- based violence as a cornerstone of Obama’s adminis-
trative commitments to the “three pillars of U.S. foreign policy—diplomacy, 
development, and defense” (5). The US policy strategy was informed by Pres-
ident Obama’s Executive Order 13623, “Preventing and Responding to Vio-
lence Against Women and Girls Globally,” in which the president charged the 
government with implementing the US strategy and creating an interagency 
working group that would address gender- based violence and report on strat-
egies and information pertaining to its prevention.24 The working group was 
to be co- chaired by the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for Development (USAID).25 In his executive order, President 
Obama made a link between violence against girls and women and economic, 
political, and social prosperity and growth. Obama’s order also described vio-
lence against women as a “public health challenge,” one further exacerbated in 
areas and times of conflict, unrest, and emergency. In response to this order, 
the government developed a multipronged, multiyear strategy for preventing 
gender- based violence, building on the legislation promoted in the Interna-
tional Violence Against Women Act (I- VAWA), which was adopted in 2007 
and which helped assert for the US a global leadership role in the fight against 
gender- based violence and reassert the value of the US State Department in 
fulfilling this work (Treuthart 2016).26
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The battle against gender violence became central to the operations of the 
US state as early as the 1990s. As Sara L. McKinnon shows, US interest in pro-
moting an antiviolence agenda was woven into the fabric of the security state 
through the marking of some forms of gender- based violence as an exceptional 
“construct that is deployed ideologically and rhetorically in the service of the 
U.S. state” (2016a, 415). McKinnon focuses in her work on how female genital 
cutting and female genital mutilation were made central to the US agenda 
against gender- based violence, arguing that US rhetoric worked at times to 
offshore their occurrence to the African continent and African nation- states. 
This narrative is employed in the US strategy document that articulates the US 
Congress’s commitment to fighting gender- based violence in this way:
The U.S. Congress has long championed efforts to prevent and respond to 
gender- based violence, including in the context of child, early, and forced 
marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, sexual violence, human traffick-
ing, and region- specific gender- based violence, from Latin America and the 
Caribbean to the Middle East and Sub- Saharan Africa. (6)
In this discursive formulation, the US Congress is lauded for its efforts to 
confront and end gender- based violence occurring outside US borders. In 
addition to fighting “female genital mutilation/cutting,” the strategy identi-
fies forced marriages, sexual violence, and human trafficking as specific and 
interconnected forms of gender violence that the US battled. While naming is 
an important step toward identifying different forms of violence that people 
experience, the strategy also ties their occurrence to broad and externalized 
geographies of otherness such as those of Latin America, the Caribbean, the 
Middle East, and Sub- Saharan Africa. The strategy, then, imagines gender- 
based violence as a problem that happens over there, one that the writers of 
the strategy would have us believe, as McKinnon rightly suggests, “that the 
end of gender violence in the United States is fait accompli” (2016b, 128).
Although the opening pages of the strategy focus on the occurrence of 
gender violence elsewhere, the strategy document adopts a broad definition of 
gender- based violence that emphasizes the global magnitude of the problem 
of violence against women:
GBV is a global problem: it occurs in every country and society. It hap-
pens in public and private settings, including but not limited to digital and 
online spaces, educational settings and schools, the home, workplaces and 
in transit. Types of GBV include, but are not limited to: child, early, and 
forced marriage; female genital mutilation/cutting; so- called “honor”- based 
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violence and killings, and other harmful practices; acid violence; dating vio-
lence; domestic violence; female infanticide; femicide or gender- related kill-
ing of women and girls; all forms of human trafficking; intimate partner 
violence; sexual harassment; stalking; all forms of sexual violence, includ-
ing reproductive and sexual coercion, and rape, including marital rape, 
so- called “corrective” rape, and rape as a tactic of conflict. Other types of 
violence that are sometimes gender- based include, but are not limited to: 
abandonment; neglect; bullying; child abuse; corporal punishment; and 
elder abuse. (6)
The definition of gender- based violence used in this document insists on its 
occurrence in every country but never specifically names the US as a site 
where this violence may be present or from which such violence may ema-
nate. Instead, the strategy upends the binary between private and public forms 
of violence, refusing to privatize gender- based violence or to place it beyond 
public purview and intervention. Adopting a notion of gender- based violence 
that acknowledges its occurrence in virtual space as well as work and educa-
tional spaces, the strategy explicitly focuses on the sexual aspect of this form 
of violence. As such, its names sexual harassment, sexual violence, and repro-
ductive and sexual coercion as forms of gender- based violence. Unlike Trump’s 
executive order, which focuses on the broad term violence against women and 
selectively chooses to single out the honor crime, the strategy uses the broader 
term gender- based violence.
This usage signals its authors’ understanding that gender violence can 
impact people of all genders even though girls and women are dispropor-
tionately more likely to be targeted by this violence than men. In addition, 
the definition names early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation 
(FGM), acid violence, and honor- based violence and killings among a variety 
of forms of gender- based violence potentially experienced in all countries, 
disappearing the distance between violence occurring outside the US and 
violence occurring within it. This definition acknowledges the magnitude of 
gender violence as a global phenomenon, an acknowledgment that is absent 
in Trump’s executive order. While the document includes honor killings as an 
example of gender- based violence, its authors appear aware of the politics of 
language surrounding this term, placing the word honor in quotation marks 
and adding the word so- called in reference to the fact that perpetrators often 
use the language of honor to exonerate their own actions. The wide- ranging 
and inclusive approach reflected in the definition of gender- based violence 
section offered in the strategy pays tribute to the complexities associated with 
efforts to define the term. Rather than foreclose the parameters of the defi-
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nition of gender- based violence that it offers and thus narrow the types of 
violence that the state regulates and opposes, the strategy widens it, referenc-
ing “other” forms of violence which include but are not limited to “abandon-
ment; neglect; bullying; child abuse; corporal punishment; and elder abuse.” 
This encompassing rhetoric helps stake for the US state a very broad and far- 
reaching mandate through which to confront gender- based violence on the 
local and global stage in the service of state interests, a discursive setup that is 
later employed—if indirectly referenced—in Trump’s executive order.
Known for its championing of women’s rights, the Obama administra-
tion’s strategy for confronting gender- based violence linked violence against 
women with the instability of nation- states and the urgent and growing threat 
of terrorism. During his tenure, President Obama spearheaded an agenda that 
made violence against women central to US government policies.27 Among 
the recorded achievements of his administration in the fight against gender- 
based violence are the appointing of the first White House Advisor on Vio-
lence Against Women, the signing of the third reauthorization of the Violence 
Against Women Act in 2013, and the prioritizing of federal funding and pro-
gramming in support of efforts to end gender- based violence.28 On the global 
front, the Obama administration addressed violence against girls and women 
as a “foreign policy priority,” one that was backed by the dedication of at least 
$150 million in support of projects responding to or preventing gender- based 
violence around the globe.
Noting the elevation of gender- based violence to national security agen-
das, Corinne L. Mason (2013) argues that gender- based violence and women’s 
rights in general were “genderwashed” and “used to communicate the changes 
in US foreign relations and to bolster national security at home” (63). This his-
torical shift, Mason suggests, helped enact the emerging US policy on violence 
against women, one spearheaded by then secretary of state Hillary Clinton 
(2009– 13). Described as the “Hillary Doctrine,” the doctrine viewed ending 
gender- based violence as both a political and an economic issue for the US. 
In a much- cited TEDWomen talk in 2010 that the subjugation of women con-
stitutes a threat to national security for the US and the world.29 This speech 
built on previous remarks that Clinton had made at the Beijing Conference in 
1995, when she argued that “women’s rights were human rights.” Although the 
Hillary Doctrine and the IVAWA agendas unfolded separately, they are politi-
cally and rhetorically connected, as “both define violence against women as 
a national security issue and generate a sense of urgency around the issue by 
using already circulating discourse of safety and security in a post- 9/11 world” 
(Mason 2017, 34).
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The Hillary Doctrine placed the protection and empowerment of women 
at the heart of US national security concerns, suggesting that the promulga-
tion of the former can further US interests in curbing the rising tide of ter-
rorism globally. The connection between women’s disempowerment and the 
antiterror agenda of the state and the government’s stated political commit-
ment to successfully fighting both rests on a biologically essentialist belief that 
terrorism is reduced in societies where women have equal rights and where 
they have opportunities to act as deterrents to men’s radicalization by mak-
ing their opposition to violence known within their families, communities, 
and states. The validity of this hypothesis, which is premised on the idea that 
women tend to be more inclined toward peace, has been empirically tested 
by Nilay Saiya, Tasneem Zaihra, and Joshua Fidler (2017), who argue that the 
denial of women’s political, economic, and social rights forecloses women’s 
ability to disrupt terrorism. The authors thus understand the Hillary Doctrine 
with its emphasis on women’s empowerment to be a vital moral and political 
issue and one that represents “an important but underused counterterrorism 
tool” (429). In addition to weaponizing the fight against gender- based vio-
lence in the service of the “War on Terrorism,” the Hillary Doctrine tied its 
prevention to commonsense fiscal and economic concerns for women’s devel-
opment and prosperity.
In an op- ed published in the Guardian in 2011 on the devastating impacts 
of violence against women on communities throughout the world, Clinton 
argued that “gender- based violence is an intolerable violation of human dig-
nity” that has both unquantifiable physical and emotional costs for its sur-
vivors and quantifiable economic costs for the communities in which they 
belong. As her op- ed states:
No one can quantify the personal pain and anguish of any form of abuse. But 
medical bills and legal costs, lost wages and lower productivity, health costs 
including an increased risk of HIV—these are things on which we can put a 
price. And when we do, we see—in dollars and cents—how much violence 
against women and girls truly costs everyone in a society.
Clinton’s speech adopts a neoliberal approach to ending violence against 
women that centers the costly economics of lost wages and declining produc-
tivities in a capitalist setting. Her agenda, as stated in this work, delineates the 
end of violence as a development issue separate from the structural conditions 
that lead to women’s economic and political disempowerment globally. Instead 
of an approach that would offer a recognition of the ways in which capitalism 
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and the ideas of wages and productivity mourned as losses in Clinton’s speech 
have exacerbated gender- based violence nationally and globally, Clinton pro-
motes an ideology of ending violence against women that urges their recu-
peration and salvaging.30 Uniting her analysis of the violence against women 
with an emphasis on economic progress and development, Clinton declares 
the fight against gender- based violence “an issue of international human rights 
and national security.” This converging of the fight against gender- based vio-
lence with the neoliberal discourses of development and the US national secu-
rity agenda heralds a US state that tactically deploys interest in both to amass 
US power on the global stage.
Toward the end of his second term, in 2015, President Obama traveled to 
Kenya, where he delivered a powerful and popular speech in which he empha-
sized the connection between development, stability, and women’s progress. 
In this speech, Obama delineated the three pillars necessary for the progress 
of Kenyan society as “strong democratic governance; development that pro-
vides opportunity for all people and not just some; a sense of national identity 
that rejects conflict for a future of peace and reconciliation.” Obama drew on 
his own personal story and struggles and success to remind Kenyan youth 
in the audience of the importance of hard work and resilience in the face 
of difficult life conditions. He also spoke about the unique challenges facing 
Kenyan society by comparing the different struggles faced by countries across 
the world. In his speech, Obama addressed how the continuation of gender- 
based violence in Kenyan society prevents development, growth, and success. 
In a speech that embraced teleological narratives of progress, Obama called on 
Kenyans to let go of harmful practices that are upheld in the name of main-
taining “tradition.” Likening the continuation of violence against women in 
Kenya to the tradition of raising Confederate flags in the US, Obama stated:
Well, so around the world, there is a tradition of repressing women and 
treating them differently, and not giving them the same opportunities, and 
husbands beating their wives, and children not being sent to school. Those 
are traditions. Treating women and girls as second- class citizens, those are 
bad traditions. They need to change. (Applause.) They’re holding you back.
Treating women as second- class citizens is a bad tradition. It holds you 
back. (Applause.) There’s no excuse for sexual assault or domestic violence. 
There’s no reason that young girls should suffer genital mutilation. There’s no 
place in civilized society for the early or forced marriage of children. These 
traditions may date back centuries; they have no place in the 21st century. 
(Applause.)
These are issues of right and wrong—in any culture. But they’re also 
issues of success and failure. Any nation that fails to educate its girls or 
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employ its women and allowing them to maximize their potential is doomed 
to fall behind in a global economy. (Applause.) (The White House 2015)
President Obama’s speech offers insights into the US strategy for fighting 
gender- based violence and its attaching of an antiviolence agenda to civili-
zational discourses. Posing as a sympathetic and resolute father who wishes 
to see his Kenyan compatriots embrace national success and development, 
Obama urged Kenyans to let go of “bad” cultural practices such as sexual 
assault, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation. He then tied gender- 
based violence to the failure to educate girls and women and the inhibiting 
of their potentials to contribute to society. The success of any nation, Obama 
suggested, is dependent on the contributions of all members of its commu-
nity. Obama’s investment in ending gender- based violence and female genital 
mutilation in Kenya echoed remarks he had made in the US at the US–Africa 
Leaders Summit held in Washington, DC in 2014 when his opposition to this 
tradition was clearly stated: “Female genital mutilation—I’m sorry, I don’t 
consider that a tradition worth hanging on to. I think that’s a tradition that is 
barbaric and should be eliminated” (qtd in Dukureh 2015). In both remarks, 
the former president placed acts of violence such as female genital mutilation 
and cutting within the frame of “harmful traditional practices, such as early 
and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and “‘honor’ killings” 
(The White House 2012). 
In 2016 President Obama issued a statement to mark “The International 
Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting” in which he 
asserted his administration’s commitment to combatting this phenomenon 
both in the US and globally:
Thirteen years ago tomorrow, four first ladies in Africa came together and 
declared an International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Muti-
lation/Cutting (FGM/C). They knew that by targeting and holding back 
girls, this practice harms and holds back entire communities. Since then, 
countless others—from the Middle East to South Asia to here in the United 
States—have joined these women to say that FGM/C has no place in any 
community and undermines our efforts to celebrate and empower women 
and girls. (The White House 2016)
In this statement, President Obama joined world efforts to combat female 
genital mutilation and cutting, an effort that received global support when 
the UN General Assembly adopted a 2014 resolution that called on states to 
implement laws that target and eliminate FGM.31 Obama also restated his 
opposition to traditional practices that are harmful to girls and women, a 
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position that was also echoed by then secretary of state Hillary Clinton, who 
stated, “We cannot excuse this as a cultural tradition. There are many cultural 
traditions that used to exist in many parts of the world that are no longer 
acceptable. We cannot excuse it as a private matter because it has very broad 
public implications. It has no medical benefits. It is, plain and simply, a human 
rights violation” (qtd in UNFPA 2012).
Recognizing that the problem continues to exist within US borders, the 
statement articulated the president’s commitment to fighting this phenom-
enon by outlawing the transport of American girls outside of the US for such 
surgeries:
In the United States, we have criminalized the transport of girls to undergo 
FGM/C, worked with religious leaders and community- based organizations 
to raise awareness—especially in some immigrant communities, where the 
pressures to engage in this practice remain—and provided grant opportuni-
ties for domestic NGOs implementing innovative prevention strategies. (The 
White House 2016)
Obama’s reference to the criminalization of the transportation of girls or the 
banning of “vacation cutting” recalls an amendment to the Federal Prohibition 
of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1995. In its original form, the policy stated 
that anyone circumcising “the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia 
minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”32 
The policy also directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to com-
pile information about the procedure, identify communities that practice 
it, and develop educational recommendations for students in medicine and 
osteopathic medicine about “female genital mutilation and complications.”
During Obama’s presidency, the policy was amended twice, first by the 
introduction in 2011 of the “Girls Protection Act,” and later through a 2013 
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act which altered the 
existing policy to include a directive against anyone who takes part in the 
transportation of a minor for the undergoing of this procedure.33 As the new 
directive in the “Transport for Female Genital Mutilation” act states:
(d) Whoever knowingly transports from the United States and its terri-
tories a person in foreign commerce for the purpose of conduct with 
regard to that person that would be a violation of subsection (a) if the 
conduct occurred within the United States, or attempts to do so, shall 
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be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
(US Code, Title 18, § 116, 2013)
The tightening of state regulations around female genital mutilation and cut-
ting in the US coincides with the increase in the number of migrants to the 
US from countries where female genital mutilation and cutting is practiced 
(Mather and Feldman- Jacobs 2016). In 2016 the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) published a study which estimated that “approximately 
513,000 women and girls in the United States were at risk for FGM/C or its 
consequences in 2012, which was more than three times higher than the ear-
lier estimate, based on 1990 data” (Goldberg et al. 2016, 340). The study also 
noted that the increased risk of FGM in the US has continued “despite the 
fact that FGM/C prevalence has not increased in practicing countries (and 
has seemingly fallen in many countries). Rather, the increase resulted from 
the fact that the U.S. population originating from FGM/C countries has risen 
sharply in recent decades” (343).
In response to reports about the increased rates and risks associated with 
this phenomenon, the US government has issued a “Fact Sheet on Female 
Genital Mutilation/Cutting” which is distributed on the US visa section of 
the US Department of State’s website and also featured in targeted US con-
sulates globally.34 In it, the government recounts its commitment to end-
ing female genital mutilating and cutting and states its prohibition of this 
act. The fact sheet provides a definition of the procedure that emphasizes 
its nonmedical nature, specifying the criminalization of this act under both 
US criminal and immigration law. Under a section on the immigration con-
sequences of violating laws against female genital mutilation, the fact sheet 
states the following:
Violating the laws against FGM/C—even without a criminal conviction—
may have significant immigration consequences, including making one 
inadmissible to or removable from the United States, as well as ineligible for 
some immigration benefits. (U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Consular 
Affairs)
As this statement makes clear, engaging in FGM/C constitutes a violation of 
both US federal and immigration law. As such, it would render someone inad-
missible or removable from the US. The fact sheet asserts that, in the case of 
migrants to the US, a violation of the laws against FGM/C can be established 
“even without a criminal trial.” In other words, a migrant can be removed 
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from or considered inadmissible to the US for being suspected of violating 
laws around FGM/C. The fact sheet also distinguishes between those who vio-
late US laws surrounding FGM/C and the girls and women who have expe-
rienced FGM/C, who are not considered to have violated any US laws. For 
anyone who has undergone the procedure or believes to be at risk of it, the 
US State Department provides a free 1- 800 tip line and an email address that 
is associated with both the Department of Homeland Security and the Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement agency, showing how the gender violence 
agenda is central to the nexus of immigration, security, and law enforcement 
that structures social and political life in the US.
In summer 2017 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
launched Operation Limelight at major US airports such as Dulles Interna-
tional and JFK. Operation Limelight is designed to raise awareness of the 
practice of female genital cutting and to prevent its occurrence. The opera-
tion brings together trained investigators from the Department of Homeland 
Security and the FBI to discuss with families who are about to board interna-
tional flights and who are “bound for connecting hubs or destinations with 
high prevalence rates of FGM” the dangers of female genital cutting and its 
criminalization under US law (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
2018). As a press release about the program issued by ICE (US Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement 2017) states, the Department of Homeland Security
is in a unique position to engage with the traveling public at U.S. borders and 
ports of entry, where the local enforcement operations focus on the preven-
tion of “vacation cutting,” or sending children out of the United States for the 
purpose of FGM. As part of Operation Limelight USA, special agents who 
complete FGM- related training speak to passengers flying to or from high- 
risk countries, offering informational brochures and identifying potential 
victims and violators of FGM. These discussions both educate passengers 
on the consequences of involvement in FGM and provide passengers with a 
means by which to refer cases or receive victim assistance.
As an organization well known for its role in implementing the most egre-
gious aspects of US immigration policies, including immigration raids, 
forced removal and deportation of migrants, and the incarceration of 
migrant children, ICE’s seemingly benign and benevolent expansion into this 
area of governance is stunning. In this press release, ICE claims that its role 
in monitoring migrants departing from US airports is confined to speaking 
to passengers who are here reconfigured as “traveling publics” and offering 
them information on the dangers of the practice. Drawing on the work of 
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Michel Foucault, Patricia Clough and Craig Willse note that the word publics 
engenders a politics of government and management, one that pulls together 
populations based on “groupings of characteristics, features, or parts” (2010, 
51). Publics, the authors argue, “are engaged at the level of affect and sen-
sation, being drawn into images and commentary that are full of passions 
and prejudices in order that affective states might take on a facticity without 
employing a logic of evidence” (51). The traveling publics invoked in ICE’s 
release are thus a racialized entity, a population that is both imagined and 
constructed as simultaneously responsible for FGM and in need of educa-
tion and protection from its dangers. It is therefore constituted as a popula-
tion that ought to be brought under the authority of US legal regulations. 
As educators on FGM, special agents from ICE utilize borders and ports of 
entry by targeting specific populations either deemed to be responsible for 
violating FGM/C policies or constituted as victims (or would- be victims) of 
the practice. The role of ICE is here confined to that of being a seemingly 
neutral informant, working in the interests of potential victims in need of 
ICE assistance and care.
Modeled after a British program that carries the same name, the US ver-
sion of Operation Limelight targets airports where communities associated 
with female genital mutilation are believed to currently reside. Describing 
how the program works at US airports, Brett B. Dryer, assistant special agent 
in charge of Homeland Security Investigations in Newark, states:
We are here to look at travelers, screen travelers, and identify potential vic-
tims and girls at risk, and possibly the violators that would be encouraging 
or performing these procedures in girls .  .  . We will be interviewing them, 
educating people about the law, and notifying them it’s against the law and 
it’s something the federal government is looking at. (qtd in Alvarado 2018)
Dryer’s words appear to develop the role played by ICE officials beyond offi-
cial rhetoric surrounding the practice. Here Dryer renders apparent that ICE 
officials engage in acts of screening and labeling that help them identify both 
potential victims and possible violators. Invoking the threat of federal law, 
Dryer makes clear that ICE officials not only educate people on the prac-
tice but also conduct interviews with them and utilize US law to instill fear 
around the dangers of its potential violations. As emissaries of an organization 
founded on an immigration system that “has institutionalized a set of values 
that dehumanize, demonize, and criminalize immigrants of color,” ICE’s foray 
into this domain of gender- based violence advances an investment in antimi-
grant carceral politics and practices (Hing 2009, 3).
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The increased attention to female genital mutilation has led at least twenty- 
seven states to issue strict policies against these crimes (Wamsley 2017). In 
2017 Michigan passed an anti- FGM law that made those who engage in per-
forming the procedure or transporting any girl for it a felony punishable for 
up to fifteen years in prison.35 In 2018 federal legislation surrounding FGM 
took center stage when a Michigan court judge ruled the 1996 federal ban 
against the procedure unconstitutional (Forliti 2018). The judge’s ruling was 
issued in relation to the case against Jumaina Nagarwala, a doctor accused of 
performing procedures on at least nine girls from Michigan, Illinois, and Min-
nesota (McVeigh 2018). In his historic decision, the judge dismissed the case 
against the defendant and argued that the federal government did not have 
purview to legislate against what is essentially a criminal activity (Thoet 2018). 
The decision has been criticized by anti- FGM organizations, with some argu-
ing that the judge’s decision provided “legislative blessing” for this procedure 
(qtd in McVeigh). While the debate surrounding legislation against FGM con-
tinues, US government reports emphasize the importance of increased federal 
legislation, and bipartisan state efforts to target and raise awareness about this 
crime are on the rise.36 The various legislations issued around the practice of 
FGM, and the increased and continuing visibility of this crime in public and 
state- sponsored discourses, signals the importance of gender- based violence 
to the agendas of the state.
In her study of US political discourses surrounding FGM, Sara McKin-
non notes the elevation of this issue within the realm of “U.S. international 
defense, security, and development policy” (2016a, 422). McKinnon’s inci-
sive analysis demonstrates how US efforts against FGM range from overseas 
interventions through USAID to local interventions that are played out in US 
courts. Drawing on this work, we can view US state investment in curtail-
ing FGM, an aspect that forms an essential part of the US global agenda to 
end gender- based violence, as emerging from the same discursive and legis-
lative body that targets particular acts of violence for management. In both 
cases, exceptionalized forms of gender violence act as a constitutive link, fus-
ing together the disparate parts of the antiviolence agenda of the US state 
and its immigration control mechanisms with its national and foreign policy 
goals. The recognition of these crimes as particularly egregious forms of gen-
der violence that must be managed, regulated, and ended not only animates 
iterations of colonial state feminism but also emboldens the constitutive prac-
tices of the anti- immigrant state and its targeting of brown, Black, Arab, and 
Muslim people. Despite the distinctions in the approaches between Obama’s 
policies and Trump’s executive order highlighted here, both mobilize gender- 
based violence in the service of nationalist configurations, tying gender- based 
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violence to iterations of terror. A focus on the US global agenda on fighting 
gender- based violence, and in particular its more recent campaigns against 
female genital mutilation and cutting, reminds us that “securitized approaches 
to gender justice have been able to ascend to the highest platforms of US and 
global politics” (Bernstein 2018, 162). A relational examination of this agenda 
as a crucial precedent that lays the legal and political groundwork for Trump’s 
Executive Order 13679 helps shed light on the convergences, overlaps, and 
imbrications between and among them.
READING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13769
Less than one hundred days into his presidency, Donald. J. Trump had signed 
thirty- two executive orders, a number that exceeded not only that of his pre-
decessor, President Barack Obama, but also all US presidents since World War 
II (Reene 2017). Trump was a vocal critic of what he perceived as Obama’s 
reliance on executive orders during his presidency, constantly calling out his 
inability to negotiate with Congress on important issues such as immigra-
tion and health care, a point Trump repeatedly made on the campaign trail 
and on his Twitter account (Hayes 2019). While many of President Trump’s 
orders have been issued to media fanfare geared toward public ceremony and 
pomp, some have had a broad impact on large numbers of US and non- US 
citizens. This includes his determination to oppose the Affordable Care Act, 
to restructure the immigration system, and to declare a national emergency 
at the border which primarily targets Mexican migrants and asylum seekers 
(Bierman 2019). Trump’s most controversial decisions have been challenged in 
US courts and in Congress, and the latest battle has been around the Trump 
administration’s quest to add a citizenship question to the 2020 US census, a 
request that has been overruled by the US Supreme Court (Thomsen 2019). 
Trump’s use of executive orders has not gone unchallenged, as was amply 
demonstrated after President Trump’s issuance of Executive Order 13769 
(EO1).
Shortly after its release, EO1 was mired in a number of legal battles and 
contestations that challenged its validity.37 On February 3, 2017, two weeks 
after its issuance, Judge James Robart issued a nationwide Temporary Relief 
Order (TRO) that, in effect, blocked the application of the order (Stern 2017). 
Arguing against the executive order, Washington State Attorney General Rob-
ert W. Ferguson stated in the original complaint that the order was “motivated 
by discriminatory animus and bears no relationship to its purported ends” 
(Washington v. Donald Trump).38 Ferguson’s complaint also noted that, while 
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homeland security and protecting the country from terrorist attacks was an 
important goal, the order did not further that purpose. In his historic deci-
sion siding with the State of Washington, Judge Robart argued that providing 
a TRO was appropriate since “the Executive Order adversely effects the States’ 
residents in areas of employment, education, business, family relations, and 
freedom to travel” (qtd in Barrett and Frosch 2017).39 In court, Judge Robart 
side- stepped the issue of the constitutionality of the order and focused instead 
on the topic of national security, whose proponents have argued is the pri-
mary motivation behind the ban’s issuance (Ford 2017). In this section, I pro-
vide a close reading of Trump’s executive order that demonstrates how the 
appearance of the honor crime became a political prop or tool that, as Nadine 
Naber and Junaid Rana (2019) demonstrate, “institutionalizes the racializing 
of Muslims as a religious group and continues the legal history of racialized 
exclusion in the United States.”
Although they are named only once throughout the document to con-
demn attacks on Americans of all genders, races, and sexualities, race and 
religion played a significant role in shaping Executive Order 13769. In its first 
iteration, the order asserted the authority and power of the US presidential 
office to “protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nation-
als admitted to the United States” (Exec. Order No. 13,769 [2017]). The invoca-
tion of terror in the first paragraph of the order is intentional, bringing into 
focus real and imagined national security threats to the US founded on racial-
ized discourses of otherness and immediately linked to Muslims. In an effort 
to distance itself from the charge of racial bias and racism, the order does 
not attach the terroristic activities it seeks to ban to any particular bodies but 
makes a political and discursive correlation between terror and the “foreign” 
Muslim- majority states it targets for inclusion in its directive. The order goes 
further and states in the purpose section that proper screening for visa issu-
ance in US consular offices is central to the protection of US citizens (Volpp 
2019). In rationalizing the need for the order, its authors remind readers that 
the terrorists responsible for 9/11 had been foreign nationals who received 
visas in US consular offices, insinuating that the visa screening process that 
facilitated their entry into the US was somehow lackluster or improper. Con-
trary to popular assumptions about the extreme nature of this request, visa 
vetting is a mechanism that has been used since the founding of the country 
and can be traced back to 1645, when the Massachusetts Bay Company pre-
vented from entry into the US “poor or indigent persons” (Borjas 2016). Bor-
jas argues that “immigrant vetting, and even extreme immigrant vetting, has 
a very long tradition in American history. Since before the founding even, US 
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policies about whom the country chooses to welcome and reject have changed 
in response to changing conditions.”
The call for more extreme visa vetting was a core campaign issue for 
Trump but one that has a historical precedent in a number of US policies, 
including President Obama’s 2016 “Visa Waiver Program Improvement and 
Terrorist Travel Protection.”40 In a major speech that foreshadows the issu-
ance of the executive order given shortly before his ascension to power, Trump 
focused on terrorist attacks committed in the US and elsewhere to call for 
policies that would inhibit past or would- be members of terrorist groups (and 
their sympathizers) from entering the US:
In addition to screening out all members or sympathizers of terrorist groups, 
we must also screen out any who have hostile attitudes towards our country 
or its principles—or who believe that Sharia law should supplant American 
law.
Those who do not believe in our Constitution, or who support bigotry 
and hatred, will not be admitted for immigration into the country.
Only those who we expect to flourish in our country—and to embrace 
a tolerant American society—should be issued visas.
To put these new procedures in place, we will have to temporarily sus-
pend immigration from some of the most dangerous and volatile regions of 
the world that have a history of exporting terrorism. (qtd in Politico Staff 
2016)
Juxtapositions of migrants who oppose the Constitution and engage in terror-
ist attacks with those who wish to prosper in and become part of a “tolerant 
American society” ripple throughout Trump’s speech, reflecting a common 
belief that imposing a stricter immigration screening process would safeguard 
US interests and protect its citizens from hostile migrants who, among other 
things, wish to “supplant” US law with Sharia law.
Trump’s investment in stricter visa screening processes was developed 
further in Executive Order 13679 and elevated to the level of national pol-
icy. In the first version of the order, Trump called for vigilance and proper 
visa screening procedures that would guard the US against similar or future 
attacks:
In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those 
admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its found-
ing principles. The United States cannot, and should not, admit those who 
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do not support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies 
over American law. In addition, the United States should not admit those 
who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including “honor” killings, other 
forms of violence against women, or the persecution of those who practice 
religions different from their own) or those who would oppress Americans 
of any race, gender, or sexual orientation. (Exec. Order No. 13,769 [2017])
Echoing the language of his speech, this section asserts that entry into the 
US necessitates ideological pledges of allegiance to the Constitution and to 
the founding principles of the state. In the name of safeguarding US citi-
zens, the order makes admittance for foreign- born nationals contingent on 
implicit agreement with both, reasserting the power of the US nation- state to 
determine which foreign- born nationals are worthy of entrance to the coun-
try and which ones must be kept out. Although the “Purpose” section does 
not state how personal disagreement with or allegiance to the Constitution 
from foreign- born nationals can be determined, it nevertheless makes a link 
between those who oppose the Constitution and those who “would place vio-
lent ideologies” above US law. Here it is important to note that the executive 
order, in the interest of guarding its writers from the charge of anti- Muslim 
bias, removed mention of Sharia law or references to religious affiliation. The 
order bars foreign- born nationals who may have ideological or political dis-
agreements with the US Constitution and its founding ideologies, linking 
opposition to both with the likelihood of engagement “in acts of bigotry or 
hatred” targeting Americans of all races, genders, and sexual orientations. In 
a clarifying subtext placed in parentheses, the order specifies certain acts of 
hatred, singling out “‘honor’ killings,” violence against women, and religious 
persecution as exemplars of bigoted acts that the US state opposes. Although 
they are placed in quotation marks and confined to parenthetical subtext, the 
naming of these crimes in the purpose section of the order is central, bringing 
into view a rationale about who the document seeks to forbid from entry into 
the US and why.
On first glance, the inclusion of “‘honor’ killings” in an order that seeks 
to protect the US state from foreign- born terrorists and domestic terrorism 
appears curious. What links the seemingly distinct crimes of terror and gen-
der violence that this act opposes? The order’s specific naming of honor kill-
ings as a form of violence is significant for a number of reasons. First, the 
placing of the word honor in quotation marks appears to trouble the inclusion 
and singling out of the crime or at least point to some disagreement or uncer-
tainty regarding its rhetorical meanings and deployments, a tension that will 
be played out in the revised versions of the text and the subtle changes used 
in the naming of the crime which the revised order undergoes (Volpp 2019).41 
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Second, the order of appearance of the honor killing in the parenthetical text 
is also noteworthy. In the earliest version of the executive order, honor killings 
are placed before and apart from “other forms of violence against women.” 
This position is not accidental but serves to simultaneously separate the honor 
crime from a broader spectrum of violence against women and to specify it as 
a more extreme variation of it. It is also significant that the order rhetorically 
ties gender violence to racial terror through a reliance on an implicit, rather 
than an explicit, coded script about the nature of the violence itself and the 
assumed racial background of its perpetrators. Although the order neither 
defines what constitutes an honor killing nor gives examples of the varieties of 
violence against women it seeks to guard Americans against, both are figura-
tively and discursively connected to the bodies of foreign- born terrorists who 
oppose the founding principles of the US and who are thus likely to enact vio-
lence against its citizens due to religious, racial, gender, or sexual differences.
In her detailed legal analysis of this order, Leti Volpp states that “while the 
surface of the text of EO- 1’s ‘Purpose’ section suggests that the administra-
tion is concerned about gender violence, discrimination, and inequality, we 
can understand the rationale of these passages as reinforcing the presumption 
that Muslims must be kept out of the United States, as particularly engaged in 
these forms of abhorrent behavior” (2019, 143). In addition to attaching abhor-
rent crimes to the foreign- born migrants from primarily Muslim countries, 
perhaps the most significant aspect of the purpose section of the order is the 
absence of specific temporal and geographic referents to the violent acts com-
mitted by those seeking entry to the US which the order seeks to regulate. In 
the text, it is not clear whether the state should not admit to the US people 
who have committed past violent and bigoted acts in their home countries or 
whether it should withhold entry from those who are likely to do so in the 
US in the future. On its surface, the order appears to protect from criminal 
acts such as violence against women both US- born citizens and noncitizens. 
Through its capacious language, the order expands the state’s authority to both 
morally condemn and legislate on past, present, and future forms of violence 
against women in general and the honor killing in particular, whether com-
mitted in the US or transnationally. In other words, the US state is able to 
usurp for itself a “pastoral” and protective role on both the domestic and the 
global fronts, a role that has been annexed in the service of military projects 
that are premised on the welfare and rescue of women (McKinnon 2016b, 33).
The honor crime makes a second appearance in section 10, “Transparency 
and Data Collection,” of the first version of the order, which directs the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to provide the American 
public with information about crimes committed by foreign- born nationals, 
including
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 (i) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United 
States who have been charged with terrorism- related offenses while in 
the United States; convicted of terrorism- related offenses while in the 
United States; or removed from the United States based on terrorism- 
related activity, affiliation, or material support to a terrorism- related 
organization, or any other national security reasons since the date of 
this order or the last reporting period, whichever is later;
 (ii) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United 
States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and 
engaged in terrorism- related acts, or who have provided material sup-
port to terrorism- related organizations in countries that pose a threat 
to the United States, since the date of this order or the last reporting 
period, whichever is later; and
 (iii) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender- based 
violence against women, including honor killings, in the United States 
by foreign nationals, since the date of this order or the last reporting 
period, whichever is later; and
 (iv) any other information relevant to public safety and security as deter-
mined by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, 
including information on the immigration status of foreign nationals 
charged with major offenses. (Exec. Order No. 13,769 [2017])
In this section of the order, President Trump charges two government agen-
cies central to the operations of the “War on Terror” with the role of inform-
ing US publics of the dangers that foreign nationals seeking entry to the US 
may pose to their safety and security. The Department of Homeland Security, 
founded under the auspices of President George W. Bush in the aftermath 
of 9/11, has the official mandate of “protecting the American people from 
terrorist threats” and promoting “a secure and resilient nation that effec-
tively prevents terrorism in ways that preserve our freedom and prosperity.”42 
The US Attorney General represents the US government in all legal mat-
ters and has, in certain instances, executive power to enforce US laws. The 
order requires both bodies to collect and report information on terrorism- 
related offenses and the number of people who have been radicalized since 
entry into the country. These two tasks operationalize a claim made by a 
government- issued fact sheet about the executive order which states that “the 
United States has the world’s most generous immigration system, yet it has 
been repeatedly exploited by terrorists and other malicious actors who seek 
to do us harm.”43
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Deploying moral panic about would- be terrorists who have taken advan-
tage of an overly generous immigration system, the order enlists the power of 
these two government agencies to produce and disseminate information about 
a problem that does not exist on the scale that the order’s writers would have 
audiences believe (Volpp 2019). As Michael Welch convincingly shows in his 
review of human rights violations in the “War on Terror,” “moral panic and 
pseudo- disasters commonly precipitate new laws placing additional restric-
tions on existing freedoms, liberties, and due process” (2004, 4). But the 
order also goes further than spreading and trafficking in by- now common 
associations of migrants with terror and terrorism, bringing into its purview 
information on both “the number and types of acts of gender- based violence 
against women, including honor killings” committed by foreign- born nation-
als in the US. In this version of the order, the honor killing is a concern sec-
ondary to gender- based violence against women, but it is, nevertheless, a bona 
fide crime that no longer exists in tentative quotation marks as the previous 
textual appearance suggests. If the purpose section was unclear about the lim-
its of the geographies of violence that the order sought to govern, this section 
makes obvious its investment in collecting information on crimes that occur 
within the US (Volpp 2019).44
The requirement that the government track and report on gender- based 
violence committed by migrants, a directive now in place due to the Supreme 
Court’s upholding of the revised executive order, serves to exceptionalize this 
form of violence and to separate it from a large order of crimes that target 
women and violate their bodies in the US. In her critique of the order, Leila 
Milani (2017) makes the same point, stating that “there are multitudes of 
crimes that would fall under the category of violence against women—such 
as domestic violence, rape, human trafficking, and female genital mutilation/
cutting—which far outnumber the cases of ‘honor killings’ in the U.S.” The 
order’s singling out of honor killings also perpetuates the notion that migrants 
commit gender- based violence in disproportionately higher numbers than US 
citizens, a point that again betrays an interest in the opportunistic use of vio-
lence against women to manage targeted populations rather than address or 
curb the phenomenon itself.
In their brief on honor killings and the executive order, the group Muslim 
Advocates provides a clear and succinct genealogy of the appearance of honor 
crimes in the US popular discourse, arguing the following:
Given the absence of any information suggesting that “honor killings” are a 
distinctive problem in the U.S.—or one that is in any way related to national 
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security or to the populations of the countries identified in the Orders—
President Trump’s decision to track and publish figures of these crimes in 
the U.S. reveals an interest in stigmatizing Muslims and the nationals of the 
Muslim Ban’s targeted countries, rather than in actually combating violence 
against women. (September 2017, 4)
In this account, the authors challenge the “common sense” (Volpp 2019, 169) 
idea that ties Islam and Muslims to violence against women, revealing the 
politically based and insidious motivations beyond the government’s focus 
on such crimes. The authors effectively trouble the association between gen-
der violence and terrorism that appears in the text of the order as a natural-
ized extension of the government’s stated concern with protecting US publics 
from instances of terror in which both crimes remain largely and conveniently 
undefined.
Legal contestations of the executive order have sought to expose the 
political motives behind the president’s declared interest in fighting violence 
against women, revealing the anti- Muslim animus undergirding the order’s 
exclusive focus on honor- related violence. As Nadine Naber writes in her 
analysis of the Muslim ban, “The orientalist privileging of societal and cul-
tural forms of gendered and sexualized violence obscures gendered and sexu-
alized US state violence enacted on bodies perceived to be Muslim” (2019). 
In two amicus briefs, opponents of the executive order relied on testimony 
provided by experts on the honor crime to help establish how it configures in 
today’s political landscape as a form of violence that is both exceptionalized 
and routinely linked to Islam and to Muslim male perpetrators. In her dec-
laration in support of the brief submitted in the case Universal Muslim Asso-
ciation of America INC., et al., vs. Donald J. Trump et al., Lila Abu- Lughod 
explained the appearance of “honor killings” and its corollary the “honor 
crime” in the text of the order:
My research has demonstrated that the term “honor killing,” or “honor 
crime,” has become a means of signaling a class of violence purportedly 
linked to Islam and committed by Muslim men. I have also demonstrated 
that invocation of “honor crimes” has become a way of stigmatizing and 
demeaning Islam as a faith and Muslim men as a group as uncivilized and 
dangerous. In this way, rhetoric about “honor killing” or “honor crime” is a 
means of implicitly but powerfully conjuring negative and misleading ste-
reotypes about Islam and Muslims. (3)
Abu- Lughod’s statement shows how rhetoric surrounding the honor crime 
rests on harmful assumptions about Islam and Muslims that peddle in ideas 
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of their danger and incivility.45 Abu- Lughod’s words bring into focus the rac-
ist underpinnings of an order whose proponents have adamantly denied their 
targeting of any particular group of persons or religious belief system and who 
have worked hard to remove from the records such evidence.
In a detailed and follow- up amicus brief focused on the inclusion of 
honor killings in the second version of the executive order submitted to the 
US Supreme Court, leading social scientists at American universities (includ-
ing Abu- Lughod) carefully demonstrated the anti- Muslim animus of the text 
of the order in three central ways. First, they sought to dissociate honor kill-
ings from the crime of terrorism. They argued that the reprehensible acts of 
violence against women such as the honor killing remain statistically rare in 
their occurrence in the US and are not “harbingers or proxies for terrorism, 
and the government does not contend otherwise” (Anderson et al. 2017, 16). 
The authors contest the link between the countries that the ban targets and the 
honor crime, arguing that no credible links are to be found between national 
security, terrorism, and the honor killing even in government- issued docu-
ments on terrorism in the countries targeted by the ban, including in the US 
State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2015. The authors also return 
to the text of the first version, showing that the revised version extends the 
same “hold over” rhetoric from the first one, revealing that the inclusion of 
the honor crime in the revised order is “an invocation of anti- Muslim animus” 
(18).46 By focusing on the anti- Muslim bias of the text, the brief strikes at the 
exclusionary ban while exposing the rhetorical fallacies used as impetus for its 
issuance. As Gerald Neuman (2017) argues, the inclusion of honor killing in 
the text of the order offers the most obvious and compelling evidence that this 
“directive has no conceivable relation to the alleged national security purpose of 
the travel ban, and it continues to reveal the true underlying purpose of both 
orders” (emphasis in original).
A review of the language of Executive Order 13679 and its revised iterations 
helps demonstrate how the honor killing puts into use a “coded” language that 
traffics in racial associations between certain forms of gender- based violence 
and terror (Volpp 2019, 36). By lacing the two together, the order denotes 
particular forms of violence against women as violence that is attached to the 
marked bodies of foreign- born nationals who must be kept out of US bor-
ders, and if they are already in as legal residents, then their activities must be 
regulated, tracked, and reported on. The act of embedding honor killings in 
the rhetoric of terrorism rests on the elasticity of the concept of terror and the 
lack of definitional consensus about what constitutes terror and who engages 
in it. This definitional dilemma can be understood to reflect “the changing 
nature of terrorism, sloppy use of the term, and most importantly, the pejo-
rative and subjective nature of the term terrorism” (Perry 2004, 254). What 
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concerns me about the term terrorism and its linking to gender- based violence 
is not necessarily the quest for an agreed- upon definition (there is none) but 
rather the opposite: namely, how the lack of a definition helps buttress the 
concept’s capacity to incorporate within it all (or even any) forms of violence, 
including gender- based violence, that it seeks to morally and legally condemn 
when convenient for its authors to do so. The power of this discourse rests 
less in its specificity and more in its rhetorical and political capacity to fold 
racialized acts of violence against women into the ever- expanding, antiterror 
security agenda of the state, an agenda in which gender- based violence has 
featured more prominently than previously imagined.
BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM
In an astute letter submitted to President Donald Trump contesting the Mus-
lim ban, members of fifty- five advocacy groups and organizations noted 
their disagreement with the order and its exceptionalized approach to vio-
lence against women. As groups specifically concerned with ending violence 
against women, they state that the order “not only promotes and inflames 
Islamophobia, but it further feeds into the false narrative that violence against 
women is specific to non- Western cultures” (CARE USA et al. 2017). They 
urge the president to recognize how the ban, by shutting out refugee com-
munities from the six banned nation- states from the possibility of asylum and 
resettlement, works to further risk the lives of girls and women and renders 
them more vulnerable to violence, assault, exploitation, and sexual harassment 
at every stage of their journeys to safety. It reminds him that the women the 
order shuts out may themselves be fleeing experiences of gender and sexual 
violence in addition to their war- ravaged countries and communities. The let-
ter works to instruct the president on the imbrications of gender violence and 
migration policy, delivering what is, in essence, an intersectional reading of 
violence against girls and women that refuses to spectacularize or exceptional-
ize violence, even in times of crises and war.
In this chapter, I showcased how exceptionalized and racialized forms of 
gender violence were interlinked with terror in the US context. My goal in 
reading these texts alongside one another and relationally is to show how 
this discourse, in its various historical manifestations and despite its subtle 
differences, has worked to target specific forms of gender- based violence, 
such as FGM and the honor crime, and to attach them to state agendas in 
historically and geographically specific ways. This reading is nonexceptional, 
bringing into view an analysis of the executive order that places it in a much 
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longer history of anti- Muslim sentiment, policies, and practices and US state 
discourse that have regulated how gender violence is understood and con-
fronted on both local and global scales. Without history, the Muslim ban’s 
invocation of the honor crime appears to be an anomaly, a legislative piece 
that emerges out of nowhere. Instead, this chapter links the recent twinning 
of the honor crime with the crime of terrorism in the US and the political 
events unfolding in this country almost three decades before the issuance of 
Trump’s order. In rereading Tina Isa’s murder and its trying in two separate 
but interconnected courts, we see that Trump’s executive order neither cre-
ates an unfamiliar worldview nor breaks juridical grounds for the linking of 
domestic violence with terror. Rather, when placed within a longer genealogy 
of gender violence as terror, it becomes clear that Trump’s order formalizes 
the adoption of such rhetoric into the letter of the law and operationalizes 
an understanding of gender violence that has often attached these crimes to 
culturalized and racialized others existing within the US and those routinely 
and systematically kept outside of it.
Reading this order nonexceptionally attends to how it revives in new ways 
old and ongoing forms of surveillance, policing, and monitoring of racial-
ized communities and racialized crimes that have been in force in the US 
before its issuance. This includes linking Trump’s Executive Order 13679 to 
policies that have targeted Muslim, Black, and people of color communities 
in the US under more “liberal” forms of governance that laid the ground-
work for the selective legal targeting and state management of exceptionalized 
forms of gender- based violence. In these policies and practices, Muslims and 
migrants and their bodies are tied to domestic and foreign terror in a way that 
legitimizes their banning and the invading of their privacy by “activating the 
invading, terrorist other narrative” (Al Samman 2017, 483). Reading Trump’s 
executive order and its focus on gender violence in this way helps shed light 
on how certain forms of violence have been used to construct links between 
gender violence and racial terror in the service of US state interests. For femi-
nist scholars concerned with the further racialization of this honor crime and 
its tying to border policing and control programs, a critical lens attuned to a 
historical, transnational, and multileveled analysis of both gender violence 
and terror that extend before and beyond the Trump presidency can help push 
against understandings of the honor crime’s resurfacing that are constrained 
by the logic of exception.
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C H A P T E R  4
At the Limits of Legal Justice
Women’s Organizing and  
Juridical Activism in Jordan
ON MAR CH 16,  2017,  the Jordanian government approved recommendations 
made by the Royal Committee for Reforming the Judiciary and Enhancing the 
Rule of Law. Formed under the auspices of King Abdullah II, the committee 
was empowered to amend old laws and to propose new legislation to entrench 
the rule of law in the kingdom.1 In its 285- page report, the royal commit-
tee made specific recommendations that targeted legislative codes believed to 
provide legal sanction for violence against women, including article 308 and 
article 98 of the Jordanian Penal Code.2 Commonly referred to as the “marry 
your rapist law,” article 308 permits the pardoning of rape perpetrators who 
marry their victims and remain married to them for a minimum period of at 
least three years. Article 98, often referred to as the “honor killing” law, pro-
vides penalty reductions to killers who commit an act of murder in a “fit of 
fury” caused by “an unlawful and dangerous act” by a victim.3 The committee’s 
recommendations to amend these laws come after decades of lobbying and 
campaigning by Jordanian women’s rights activists, who have long highlighted 
the discriminatory and harmful nature of such laws while positing national 
legal codes as significant sites for social struggle and political change.
Jordanian women rights activists were rewarded for their efforts on July 27, 
2017, when the Jordanian Parliament voted to repeal article 308 of the penal 
code (Husseini 2017c). The intense debate surrounding the repeal of article 308 
and other legal amendments divided the Jordanian Parliament (and along with 
AT T H E L I M I T S  O F L E G A L J U S T I C E •  119
it, Jordanian society) between those who argued that the existence of such 
laws was harmful to women’s right to security and freedom and those who 
believed that their repeal posed a threat to Jordan’s traditions and would, ulti-
mately, lead to the undoing of the country’s cultural codes and moral edicts. 
The parliamentary debates reflected wider divisions in Jordanian society itself, 
ones that spilled over to social media, on television programs, and in the local 
newspapers, where the two sides vigorously discussed the merits and follies of 
the proposed changes. While both parties repeatedly confirmed their loyalty 
to the crown, at stake in such debates are troubling binaries that depict strug-
gles over the penal code as an ongoing battle between progressives and tradi-
tionalists, secularism and religion, culture and law. Despite these divisions that 
continue to mark the troubled terrain of rights in Jordan, the repeal of article 
308 is a historic event in its own right. It reflects the conjoining of efforts 
by civil society organizations to amend or repeal laws they deem harmful to 
women with the desires of the kingdom’s monarch to project the country as a 
modern and progressive Arab state in which both Jordanian men and women 
are granted equal rights and protections. These two constituencies posit the 
law as an effective tool in efforts to combat gender violence against women.
As is well known in feminist literature on the law in the Arab world, legal 
loopholes that exonerate men who commit acts of violence against women—
such as article 308 and article 98 of the Jordanian Penal Code—are not 
unique to Jordan.4 Efforts to confront these laws reflect a rising awareness of 
the importance of the law for the attainment of the equal rights of men and 
women. Contrary to popular depictions of such work, this wave of activism 
is neither new nor exceptional but is part and parcel of past and ongoing 
mobilizations of women’s rights activists to reform the Personal Status Laws 
that began in Jordan as early as 1989 (Clark and Young 2008). Undoubtedly, 
calls for legal reform have been re- energized by the Arab uprisings and the 
various political upheavals that have swept the region. Across the Arab world 
in countries like Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan, campaigns to repeal laws 
that discriminate against women have increased, and their success has been 
lauded at the local, regional, and transnational levels. They reflect, as a New 
York Times article argues, “a steady expansion of women’s education in the 
region and a new kind of public activism spurred by social media” (Sengupta 
2017). Celebratory accounts of these legal victories abound in media, power-
fully wielded by state and nonstate actors to reflect the capacity of Arab gov-
ernments to respond to citizen demands and to implement important legal 
changes that are framed in local terms (Merry 2006). They showcase, in other 
words, the growing will of the people to suture social problems through the 
apparatuses of the state itself, such as the law. Regardless of their immediate 
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and long- term outcomes, however, such legal battles and women’s juridical 
activism demand serious scholarly attention that neither exceptionalizes their 
occurrence nor overplays their significance but rather investigates the discur-
sive practices and material politics that underpin them. While a study of the 
applications of the law by state apparatuses in actual legal cases is crucial, this 
chapter focuses primarily on activist calls for judicial reform.5 In other words, 
it provides a discursive analysis of the texts of the law and the various argu-
ments animating calls for its amendment or removal, recognizing a distinction 
between the law as text and the law as practice.6
In what follows, I attempt to provide what Cynthia S. Gorman (2019) 
describes as “legal archeology,” a process of digging up the work of the law in 
shaping not only the juridical realm but also the social world. As she states, 
“Such an examination involves exploring how laws are constituted through 
contested socio- spatial ideas, but also the dynamic ways in which discourse is 
constituted through interactions within the legal process that are always spa-
tially and territorially embedded” (1054). In tracing contemporary legal battles 
and contestations in Jordan, this chapter concerns itself with the mooring of 
antiviolence work to the law in Jordan. In this work, I map Jordanian women’s 
efforts to end gender violence, and in particular crimes related to honor- based 
violence, showing how women’s rights activists have negotiated a tricky politi-
cal terrain that demands loyalty to the state while attempting to wrest power 
from it. I look at the discursive contexts in which recent legal mobilization 
efforts have taken place and the different positions adopted by opponents and 
proponents of the repeal of article 308. Through analyzing public discourses, 
I show how the article’s removal from the Jordanian Penal Code reflects a 
culmination of the work of various actors and stakeholders, and I analyze the 
careful considerations, negotiations, and compromises that yield legal change 
invested in juridical forms of feminism. My aim is to explore how women 
rights activists in Jordan work to alter national legal frameworks about moral-
ity, justice, and honor. Drawing on the important work of Catherine Warrick 
(2009) on law and legitimacy in the Jordanian context, this chapter investi-
gates the contemporary, multiple, and competing discourses that shape legal 
changes and challenges to the Jordanian Penal Code. My goal is to examine 
what women’s organizing around juridical reform and activism can tell us 
about state- backed efforts to end gender violence in Jordan.7
MAPPING JORDANIAN WOMEN’S ACTIVISM
Although there is a long history of women’s activism in Jordan, scholarship 
on the topic often takes the year 1989 as a starting point for the emergence 
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of civil society organizations and political movements in the kingdom. This 
period is discussed in relation to democratizing and liberalizing trends initi-
ated under the auspices of King Hussein that continued with the succession 
to power in 1999 of his son, King Abdullah II. This ten- year period is marked 
by the suspension of martial law, the drafting and issuance of the National 
Charter in 1991, the legalization of political parties, and the resumption of 
three rounds of parliamentary elections in 1989, 1993, and 1997 (Lucas 2008). 
Together, these initiatives, which are also characterized by a period of intense 
regional and global change, helped project Jordan as a state committed to a 
form of controlled democratization or restricted liberalization (Brand 1999; 
Nanes 2003; Robinson 1998). In this environment, civil society actors, includ-
ing women’s groups and organizations, often organized within the shadow of 
the state. They thus emerged, lobbied, and functioned in relation to the state’s 
regulatory liberalizing aims and efforts and worked in tandem with its policed 
democratizing projects.
Significantly, calls for social and legal reforms were carefully calibrated in 
relation to the ability of the state to realize them while satisfying the desires 
of its various tribal and religious constituencies and guaranteeing the regime’s 
own survival (Wiktorowicz 2000). Civil society groups therefore worked 
within an environment that ceded some ground to their demands while 
restricting their power to engage issues of a political nature through impos-
ing restrictions on the press and civil liberties (Nanes 2003). As Peter Fergu-
son notes, “Civil society evolved in direct response to institutionalized state 
practices that granted calculated political freedoms, rather than emerging as 
a distinct and opposing actor” (2017, 60). These organizations continued to 
urge for reforms that the state actively or tacitly either encouraged, mitigated, 
or condemned.
Highly attuned to the political reality of limited reform that structures 
political and social change in Jordan, the women’s movement has undergone 
significant developments in the past few decades. Writing on this history, 
Ibtesam Al- Atiyat (2012), a member of the National Committee for Jordanian 
Women’s Affairs, divides women’s activism in the kingdom into three over-
lapping historical and political phases: “the emergence phase” (1944–48), “the 
equality phase” (1954–70s), and the “‘renaissance phase’” (1970s onwards). In 
her account, Al- Atiyat argues that the first phase of women’s activism in Jor-
dan was led by elite and upper- class women. In its early state- building phase, 
university- educated women from the middle and upper classes, who enjoyed 
important positions in the kingdom through their kin and marital relation-
ships, advanced a “charity- oriented” approach to women’s rights (135). This 
included the promotion of women’s right to literacy and education, a goal 
that was achieved through providing literacy training to women from poorer 
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socioeconomic backgrounds. As Nicola Pratt (2015), in her account of Jorda-
nian women’s activism, notes, “Women’s involvement in charitable and welfare 
activities has been a socially- acceptable way for women to enter the public 
sphere, which historically has been reserved for men only.” 
Women’s slow but steady entry into the public sphere and its inscription 
as a space that included women in sometimes reluctant and nominal ways 
ushered in the second phase of women’s activism. In describing the tension 
between nominal inclusion and full participation and equal rights, Joseph 
Massad describes this history thus:
On the one hand, political ideology seems to have led to and informed the 
codification of women’s status as inferior in the private sphere with mini-
mal state intervention, and a steady expansion of women’s presence in the 
public sphere as nominally equal citizen- nationals with state protection. On 
the other hand, juridical rights (foremost among which are constitutional 
rights and personal status laws) inform an ideology of legal equality and 
expansion of rights, which many feminists and their state backers adhere 
to, and an ideology of traditionalization calling for circumscribing women’s 
rights and their presence in the public sphere and keeping the state out of 
the home, which secular and Islamist antifeminists and their state backers 
adhere to. (2001, 98)
Jordanian women activists therefore situated their efforts to attain equal rights 
within a national framework that was, at times, attuned to the Palestinian 
liberation struggle and the spirit of Arab nationalism. While they were some-
times constrained by this nationalist agenda, women still lobbied for the right 
to vote and to run for public office. And although some of these demands 
were fulfilled in limited ways, such as the preliminary granting of the right to 
vote only to literate and educated women, activist campaigns sought to extend 
equal citizenship rights and privileges to both men and women regardless of 
education level in 1955 (Al- Atiyat 2012).
Building on two these preliminary stages that were marked also by vari-
ous internal and external difficulties, Al- Atiyat shows how the third phase of 
women’s activism in Jordan “witnessed a ‘renaissance phase’” that was charac-
terized by a significant growth in women’s activism in more visible, sustained, 
and encompassing ways (2012, 138). In 1974 women officially gained the right 
to vote, a right they would not be able to practice until 1989 with the end of 
martial law and the resumption of parliamentary elections (Massad 2001; Pratt 
2015). The founding of the Arab Women’s Union (AWU) in 1954 was also an 
important milestone in this period of women’s activism, with the union bring-
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ing together women from all over the kingdom to collectively call for their 
rights. Women’s groups sought funding and recognition from the state while 
also forming connections with the global community through attendance at 
international conferences. In an attempt to limit the influence and reach of the 
women’s union, the state set up the General Federation of Jordanian Women 
in 1981 to both coordinate and set the women’s agenda during this period in 
ways that cast the kingdom in a positive and modern light. The regime thus 
aimed to monopolize women’s issues and discussions surrounding them. The 
success of this effort was limited because of the structure of the organization 
and its inability to attract membership, as Al- Atiyat demonstrates. However, 
this move shows the desire of the state to “channel women’s activism” away 
from civil society organizations and its grasp of the significance of women’s 
rights issues for its own survival (Brand 2003, 165).
An important feature that also characterized this period (and that contin-
ues to shape women’s politics in Jordan today) is the royal family’s support 
of particular women’s issues. This includes leading women’s organizations, 
as in the case of Princess Basma Bint Talal (the late King Hussein’s sister), 
who has served with a number of women’s organizations in Jordan, including 
as chairperson of the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW), 
as president of the Jordanian National Forum for Women (JNFW), and as 
honorary president of the General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW).8 
Similarly, Queen Rania plays a visible role in a select set of women’s issues, 
including a focus on education for girls and teacher training. In an effort to 
promote women’s right to work, the queen has set up organizations that train 
professional women as teachers and as craft makers. She has also focused on 
issues of family health, domestic violence, and children.9 The queen’s agenda 
often oscillates between a neoliberal and developmental focus on women’s 
empowerment and discourses of political and economic inclusion and spo-
radic efforts to create change in areas that provoke debate and contestation 
in the country, such as reforms to the Personal Status Law and the National-
ity Law.10 The involvement of royal family members in the women’s move-
ment in Jordan can be understood as a form of “embryonic Hashemite state 
feminism” and as an extension of the regime’s efforts to take a leading part in 
simultaneously defining, setting, and limiting the agenda for women’s activ-
ism in the country (Brand 2003, 165). They are also, often, staged spectacles 
that demand recognition of Jordan’s efforts to comply with international law 
and displays of Jordan’s commitment to modern and yet traditional values 
that align with Islamic teachings. Importantly, women’s organizations have 
sometimes actively sought royal support in order to guarantee the state’s back-
ing of their agendas and to minimize its intervention in their affairs. In a 
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state like Jordan, where the dividing line between the regime and the crown 
is thin, royal support ensures a form of legitimation for women’s issues that 
are deemed divisive or sensitive.
Despite the difficult political terrain around women’s rights, royal fam-
ily members have made public stances against gender violence and crimes 
that are known as honor crimes. In 2000 Prince Ali (the half- brother of King 
Abdullah) and Prince Ghazi (the king’s cousin) led 5,000 demonstrators in a 
protest against honor killing laws. Prior to this protest, Rana Husseini reports 
that the late King Hussein and his wife Queen Noor had voiced their opposi-
tion to this crime, arguing that it is “foreign to Islam” (2000, 20). Queen Rania 
and King Abdullah have also spoken against the honor crime publicly. In an 
interview with the Daily Telegraph, where she was explicitly asked about her 
position, the queen stated, “Honour killings are a terrible and totally unac-
ceptable and unjustifiable practice. We still see cases every year in Jordan, 
and it is an issue we take extremely seriously” (qtd in James 2016). The queen’s 
stated opposition against the honor crime in international media comes at a 
time when international attention has uncritically attributed this form of vio-
lence to the “traditional” or “Bedouin” character of Jordanian society. While 
internationally the queen has used her fame and power to articulate her clear 
opposition to the crime, she and the royal family at large have carefully nego-
tiated their positions at home for fear of angering conservative members of 
Jordanian society who reject such state- led interventions, including tribal and 
religious sectors of society that the monarchy has relied on for support. Writ-
ing on the women’s movement in Jordan and Palestine, Frances Hasso notes 
that “the regime also legally and discursively reinforced a form of patriarchal 
social organization that subordinated men to women in their socioeconomic 
and religious groups because its stability partly relied on alliance with conser-
vative tribal and religious forces” (2005, 18).
This truncated account of women’s activism in Jordan demonstrates that, 
from its inception, the women’s movement sought to define an agenda that 
advocated for social change by securing citizenship rights for Jordanian 
women and men. Women who organized in Jordan came from different class 
backgrounds, but the movement has also been dominated by women from 
privileged socioeconomic backgrounds who have pushed for social changes 
that have sometimes alienated segments of the Jordanian population.11 Never 
completely homogenous, the women’s movement sought to alter the status of 
women by working in collaborative and creative ways with the state. It thus 
set its agendas around certain legal, social, and political benchmarks that it 
sought to reach incrementally. Caught between attaining state- backed reforms 
and the risk of alienating conservative elements within Jordanian society, 
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women’s activism in Jordan has operated in an environment where negotia-
tions with the state are a constant part of everyday politics and where state 
feminist projects are the norm and not the exception.12
Historical records of women’s activism explore these imbrications, show-
ing how women’s organizations have worked together with the state to gain 
particular rights and privileges that include, for example, the establishment of 
a parliamentary woman quota, the gaining of the right to divorce (or khulu’), 
and the right to be informed of a husband’s decision to remarry or to take a 
second wife.13 In addition to these gains, in 2003 the state raised the marriage 
age from fifteen for girls and sixteen for boys to eighteen for both sexes, a deci-
sion it would reverse in 2017 at the same time that article 308 was repealed.14 
Through long- term investments in the education sector, the state was able to 
halve illiteracy rates of girls and women throughout the kingdom, an achieve-
ment that is often assumed to indicate Jordanian women’s true integration 
into the labor force and achievement of economic access and equality (Adely 
2009). Occurring in a short two- decade period, these local reforms were also 
backed at the international level in Jordan’s signing of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 
1992. Like many other Arab states, however, Jordan placed a number of res-
ervations on some articles of the convention, including ones pertaining to 
equal rights on nationality, movement, and marriage decisions (El Muhtaseb, 
Brown, and Kayyali 2016). The state’s delayed publication of the convention 
in the Official Gazette until 2007 gestured toward the complex terrain that the 
issue of women’s rights occupies in Jordan and the government’s desire to bal-
ance competing local claims of authenticity and tradition with global calls for 
human rights and women’s equality.
As state- backed reforms, these changes were (and continue to be) of 
immense importance to Jordanian society, having contributed to the reshap-
ing of the state’s policies and practices and the day- to- day lives of its citizenry. 
Undoubtedly, many of the achievements of the women’s movements such as 
the right to work and the right to vote impacted both Jordanian men and 
women and the workings of the Jordanian state, and yet their adoption did 
not automatically translate into calculable or immediate gains for Jordanian 
women from all socioeconomic backgrounds. While the women’s movement 
in Jordan has succeeded at fulfilling aspects of its agenda that align well with 
the Jordanian state’s national efforts, these changes have not cured the vari-
ous social, cultural, and legal problems that Jordanian women—and Jordanian 
society at large—continue to face. My aim in listing these reforms is not to 
romanticize their occurrence or to overstate their significance in reconstitut-
ing or transforming the position of Jordanian women as subjects of the Jorda-
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nian state. Rather, I wish to show how legal reforms and celebratory accounts 
of rights- based and juridical gains underpin the structuring logics of women’s 
activism in Jordan. They are the benchmarks against which women’s activism 
in Jordan measures both its successes and failures and through which it both 
defines and calibrates its relationship with the state.
THE TRANSNATIONAL TERRAIN OF RIGHTS 
AND LEGAL CONTESTATIONS
Women’s rights and legal contestations are central features of women’s orga-
nizing and activism in Jordan. While it is true that the women’s movement 
in Jordan was never “counterhegemonic” to the state, the movement has 
grappled with the legal status of Jordanian women since its inception (War-
rick 2009, 31). Women from all over the world have struggled to attain equal-
ity before the law, and legal contestations have marked feminist struggles to 
secure a variety of personal, national, and political rights, including the right 
to vote, the right to work, the right to citizenship, the right to movement, and 
the right to marry. Advancements in human rights in general and women’s 
rights in particular have long been used as instruments that record and mea-
sure the commitment of developing nation- states to the projects of modernity, 
liberalization, democracy, and equality. As indexes of modernization, women’s 
rights function within a transnational regime of governance that enables the 
regulatory functions of the nation- state.
Scholars such as Inderpal Grewal (2005) have explored the ways in which 
human rights discourses have been deployed in a number of struggles. Gre-
wal traces the genealogies of these struggles, reading the uptake of human 
rights and women’s rights discourses across transnational geographies of state 
power. Grewal demonstrates how “human rights instruments when applied to 
women’s issues could break down the distinction made by patriarchal states 
between public and private domains and thus address the violence and sub-
ordination of women within the private sphere” (127). In other words, wom-
en’s rights become viewed as mechanisms with the capacity to undo the rigid 
binaries of the private and the public on which the patriarchal nation- state 
relies and in which violence against women is often enacted. Laws that protect 
women from violence are thus expressed through the discourse of women’s 
rights to life, liberty, and safety in both the public and the private spheres. In 
the (trans)national rush for rights, the efficacy of the law and the discourse of 
rights as instruments of change, along with their ability to seed cultural and 
social transformations, are often overemphasized. More dangerously still, the 
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ability of states to both absorb and imbibe rights discourses in their modern-
ization bids, while restricting more radical forms of change at the structural 
levels, is also underplayed in celebratory rights accounts and discourses.
In a counterpart to exultant accounts of rights, Mervat Hatem shows how 
the Arab state has utilized women’s citizenship rights in ways that reified its 
power and served broader national and international interests. Significantly, 
Hatem’s rich analysis demonstrates how women’s bid for citizenship rights did 
not automatically translate into political gains but rather allowed Arab states 
to extend their control over women whose “status as dependent citizens of the 
state” were confirmed through appeals to rights (2005, 26). Women’s engage-
ment with the state, and their efforts to expand citizenship rights in this con-
text, “was a potential double- edged sword” that reified the status of women 
as state subjects whose rights- based victories would not “challenge the state’s 
class and gender interests” (27). 
The writing and publication of the Arab Human Development Report 2005: 
Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World is an example of a work that 
measures women’s progress in a number of arenas, including the domain of 
legal rights. The 335- page report, published with the backing and funding of 
the United Nations Development Programme (2006), provides an extensive 
overview of the status of women in the Arab countries. It focuses on Arab 
women’s achievements and struggles in cultural, social, educational, and legal 
sites. The work offers an in- depth analysis of the various challenges and suc-
cesses that women have experienced in the region while providing a sober 
view of impediments that continue to prevent women from attaining equality 
in Arab states. Rife with legal explanations for the lagging status of equality of 
women in Arab states, the report identifies a number of discriminatory “pro-
visions and practices that reveal the bias of the Arab legislator against women” 
(17). The report also states that juridical equality flounders “on the reserva-
tions of Arab judiciaries, a resistance fueled by the growth of fundamentalist 
trends and their increasing impact on the legal consciousness of Arab judges” 
(19). Although the report makes the important distinction between the exis-
tence of laws on paper and in national and international conventions and their 
applications, it readily ties Arab women’s advancement to the realms of rights, 
laws, and legality.
The focus of the report on reforms to the Personal Status Law, Arab Fam-
ily Law, and the Nationality Law highlight its authors’ support of legal change. 
The report identifies key areas in which discriminatory laws impact the lives 
of Arab women while hailing the Tunisian Personal Status Code as a “model 
for promoting the principle of equality in marital relations in law” (193). In 
their effort to identify discriminatory legal codes in Arab contexts, the report’s 
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authors repeatedly state their commitment to “sustainable and wide reforms in 
the law” that require the development of a civil- society- based “culture favour-
able to gender equality” (200). Elsewhere, Lila Abu- Lughod has critiqued the 
report for the “political dialect it deploys” (2009, 91). Abu- Lughod rightly 
identifies “the liberal language of human development and the neoliberal 
discourses of structural adjustment and global markets” that structure pos-
sibilities and limits of the horizon of change in the Arab world as envisioned 
through this report (91).
While Abu- Lughod focuses on the liberal underpinnings of political 
reform that the report calls for, I also find it interesting that the report valo-
rizes the law as a crucial site for change and for the protection of women. 
Nowhere is this discourse more apparent than in the report’s discussion of 
gender violence in the Arab world. In the section pertaining to forms of vio-
lence against women, the report specifically names honor crimes, domestic 
violence, and female circumcision as forms of violence that Arab women 
experience. The report attributes the occurrence of gender violence to both 
tribal customs and the presence of laws that sanction the killing of women by 
offering reduced sentences to men who kill. The report faults both the judges 
who exonerate these men and the state that allows certain forms of violence to 
be practiced in its “full view” (117). What goes missing from such an account 
are the structural and systematic conditions that give rise to violence against 
women, such as the socioeconomic conditions that cannot be altered through 
a focus on the law alone.
In itineraries of women’s rights, progress is often measured in relation to 
women’s ability to gain rights that do not already exist, to alter laws that are 
discriminatory toward women, or to introduce new legislation believed to 
have a potentially positive effect on women’s lives. Legal progress is thus cal-
culated linearly: if women gain particular rights, they move closer to gender 
equality. If they lose said rights or are unable to achieve them, they move fur-
ther away from succeeding in creating parity. When the quest to attain legal 
victories falters, the women’s rights movement is assumed to be stalled or at 
a standstill. As a New York Times article lamenting the state of women’s rights 
in Jordan in the Arab revolution period states, “Women’s rights have played 
only a limited role in demonstrations. Some female demonstrators have called 
for children they have had with non- Jordanian husbands to gain citizenship. 
While some women have been active in street protests, they have mostly 
focused on calls for broader economic and political changes” (Sweis 2012). In 
this account, calls for citizenship rights for women and children are seen as 
evidence of the continuing existence of women’s activism. Here we see how 
activism that seeks women’s full citizenship rights is imagined to be at odds 
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with women’s efforts for broad and systemic political and economic change. 
In such accounts, women, as a legal category, become essentialized and their 
needs become uniform, coalescing around preconceived notions of equality 
and reform that are restricted to the realm of the law. Their struggles for equal 
citizenship become divorced from various sites of struggle in which citizen-
ship difference is deployed and enacted and in which it becomes meaningful.15
Thus, women’s encounters with legal violence and their differential struc-
tural relationships with both citizenship and the juridical system that manages 
it are also homogenized (Razack 1998). Through this logic, the law appears 
progressive and violence- free. Gains made through the law are thus sanc-
tioned and legitimized whereas failures to secure rights are constituted as 
major setbacks. Read against this critical backdrop, how might the Jordanian 
women’s movement push for rights, legal recognitions, and legal adjustments 
be understood? And how has the law functioned as both a goal itself and 
a limit point for women’s rights activism in relation to gender violence in 
Jordan? To address these questions, I turn to women activists’ most recent 
encounters with article 98 and article 308 of the Jordanian Penal Code.
JURIDICAL ACTIVISM AND THE POLITICS 
OF MANAGED CHANGE
On October 16, 2016, King Abdullah II released his “Sixth Discussion Paper: 
Rule of Law and Civil State.”16 The document outlines the king’s vision for 
political reform in the country. In this paper, the king made a connection 
between development, modernization, and the law, urging for the adoption 
and strengthening of the rule of law in the country. Shortly after the publi-
cation of this paper, he called for the forming of the Royal Committee for 
Developing the Judiciary and Enhancing the Rule of Law. Tasked with the 
role of reforming the judiciary and enhancing the rule of law in Jordan, the 
committee was headed by former prime minister Zaid Al Rifa’i and thirteen 
members- at- large selected by the king. Their main role, according to the king’s 
appointment letter, was to devise “a comprehensive strategy to address chal-
lenges and continue efforts of development and modernisation to elevate the 
performance of the judiciary” (qtd in Jordan Times 2016). Four months after 
its royal formation, the committee submitted to the king its 282- page report, 
which included forty- nine specific recommendations intended to improve the 
judiciary and the criminal justice system, changes to thirteen laws, and four 
new draft laws and regulations (Human Rights Watch 2017a). In response to 
the report, the king vowed a swift follow- up and implementation of the sub-
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mitted recommendations, claiming the judiciary to be a “‘red line’” (Petra 
News Agency 2017).17 Among the recommendations made by the commit-
tee regarding the Jordanian Penal Code are the repeal of article 308 and the 
amendment of article 98 (Report of the Royal Committee 2017). Some of the 
recommendations put forth by the committee were “key demands by advo-
cacy groups and activists for decades” (Jordan Times 2017a).
Both article 98 and article 308 of the Jordanian Penal Code have long been 
subject to calls for reform from Jordanian women activists and central sites for 
active civil society and women- led efforts for legal change.18 They are also the 
concern of a large body of scholarly inquiry that investigates the relationship 
between gender violence and the law.19 While article 308 concerns itself with 
the crime of rape, article 98 focuses on extenuating and mitigating circum-
stances in a crime. Both laws have their origin in colonial French and British 
legal codes and have also been transplanted across the Arab world through 
the Egyptian Penal Code.20 Because of the central place that these two legal 
statutes occupy in reifying notions about social order, honor, and morality in 
Jordan, they have often been lumped together in discussions of discriminatory 
laws and legal loopholes in the Jordanian Constitution. 
Women’s relationship to the law in Jordan is complicated by the fact that 
Jordan uses two legal systems: one drawn from European legal codes and the 
other from Islamic law.21 Thus, the civil and criminal codes exist apart from 
Personal Status Law or codes that regulate the affairs of women in issues such 
as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. This distinction does not mean that the 
two codes operate separately from one another but that legal challenges must 
contend with the different sources of the law and the state’s complex relation-
ship to them. The Jordanian dual legal system, like its counterpart in other 
Arab nation- states, brings together “modern” law and Islamic law or Sharia.22 
As Catherine Warrick demonstrates, the state’s implementation of these two 
systems is purposive, enabling it “to meet particular political ends” (2009, 
44). Thus, the adoption of certain laws and their abrogation are never purely 
legal or political matters; rather, the law—and its inscriptions—is an ongoing 
process of negotiation that reflects past and ongoing struggles over social, 
cultural, and religious meanings and values. In Jordan, these struggles are not 
only the purview of civil society actors and their activist- led agendas. They 
are, at times, also the domain of the state and the site through which the state 
legitimates itself and expresses its sovereignty (Warrick 2009).
Article 98 of the Jordanian Penal Code occupies an important role in con-
versations about honor- related violence and is believed to be part of a trifecta 
of laws that include articles 340a and 340b of the penal code that collectively 
work to sanction the murder of women in Jordan (Sonbol 2003, 190). Article 
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98 of the Jordanian Penal Code states: “He who commits a crime in a fit of 
fury caused by the unrightful and dangerous act on the part of the victim 
benefits from a reduction of penalty” (No. 16, 1960). There are two important 
aspects to this article that are relevant to discussions of gender violence and 
are useful for understanding how it has been used to sanction murder in the 
name of honor: (1) the article provides a generalized state of anger and fury as 
legitimate rationale and extenuating circumstance for crime, and (2) the arti-
cle employs a reversed logic of crime. Rather than placing the responsibility 
for the act on the person who has committed the crime, the article places the 
motivation of the crime on the victim for committing an undefined but nev-
ertheless “unrightful and dangerous act.” As Catherine Warrick explains, “The 
murder victim is essentially redefined by this law as a guilty party herself ” 
(2009, 85). The article’s vagueness around the issues of time lapse between the 
fit of fury and the crime’s occurrence, the nature of the victim’s unlawful act, 
and the article’s gendered language have all contributed to its frequent appli-
cation over more specific legal statutes such as article 340, which requires that 
a man catch a woman in an unlawful bed or in flagrante delicto in order to 
be eligible for a reduced sentence, a standard that is exceptionally difficult to 
achieve (Warrick 2009). In her work on honor crime laws, legal scholar Lama 
Abu Odeh argues that, because of its more general nature, article 98 has been 
applied to honor killings since 1964 and that it has “[paved] the way to a body 
of decisions that have since then come to define the parameters of the crime 
of honor until our present day” (2010, 925). While article 98 does not single 
out those who commit honor crimes to be beneficiaries of reduced sentences, 
it has been used to exonerate men who murder women. 
In her influential writing on the honor crime in Jordan, Abu Odeh (2011) 
argues that the locus of the honor crime in the Jordanian Penal Code exists in 
article 340. Abu Odeh provides a genealogy of this code, tracing its roots to 
both the Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 and the French Penal Code of 1810. Abu 
Odeh shows how this article works to provide a “legal intervention” on the 
part of national legislators to regulate the “private violence of honor killings” 
(17). As Abu Odeh demonstrates, the mitigating excuse in article 340 provides 
a husband who surprises his wife or a close female relative in an “unlawful 
bed” with another person, and kills, injures, or harms either or both of them a 
reduced sentence for the specific reason of adultery. Abu Odeh notes the spec-
ificity of the mitigating circumstance delineated in the article and likens the 
killing of a woman in flagrante delicto to a crime of passion. She then shows 
how Jordanian legislators ignored this article in favor of article 98, which pro-
vides a “general provision” to men who commit what are known as crimes of 
honor (22). Under this provision, reduced sentences are provided to men who 
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harm or murder women “in a fit of fury caused by an unrightful and danger-
ous act on the part of the victim” (qtd in Abu Odeh 2011, 19). This switch from 
the specific legal provision against the crime of passion to the general legal 
provision of the crime of honor is historicized in careful ways in Abu Odeh’s 
work. Her argument favors the return to the specific legal provision of article 
340, writing that “if indeed the demand to completely abolish crimes of honor 
by severely punishing their perpetrators is unrealistic, this article argues that 
these crimes, in so far as their legal sanction is concerned, should be reduced 
to those of passion” (2011, 3).
Challenges to article 98 have a long history in the country and are part 
and parcel of decades- long efforts to end gender violence and crimes of honor 
in Jordan. Stefanie Eileen Nanes (2003) traces political activity against honor 
violence in Jordan back to the 1980s. She commends the work of journalist 
Rana Husseini in the Jordan Times for bravely and diligently reporting on 
honor- related crimes in the country since 1994, work that she continues to do 
today.23 In her article, Nanes shows how both state and nonstate actors collab-
orated to confront these crimes, demonstrating how the king, as early as 1998, 
had instructed his then prime minister ‘Abd al- Ra’uf Rawabdeh to amend any 
law “that discriminates against women and inflicts injustice on them” (qtd in 
Nanes 2003, 119). This led the government, with the help of women’s organi-
zations such as the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW), to 
embark on a campaign that calls for the cancellation of article 340.24
At the same time that state- backed efforts to end violence against women 
were proceeding, the women- led Campaign to Eliminate So- Called Crimes 
of Honor was formed and began to collect signatures of Jordanians who 
endorsed the call to cancel article 340. The campaign managed to collect 
15,000 signatures by November 1999, while the state, at the urging of the king, 
formed a legal committee that examined article 340 and proposed amend-
ments to it that allow wives who catch and kill adulterous husbands to benefit 
from similar mitigating circumstances. In other words, rather than altogether 
abrogating the law, the committee embraced a “gender- equal” reformulation 
that expanded the license to kill those who commit sexual acts outside the 
bounds of marriage to both men and women. While the cabinet endorsed the 
suggested amendments to the article, the lower house of Parliament rejected 
them twice by 2000 (Clark 2006). Opponents of the amendments to article 
340 believed that calls to amend the Jordanian Penal Code were a result of 
Western- backed efforts to control the woman’s agenda in Jordan, efforts that 
would eventually lead to the dissolution of the Jordanian family and its honor- 
based culture. As Abdul Latif Arabiyat, then secretary general of the Islamic 
Action Front Party, would state: “We feel that whoever is leading all these 
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campaigns to change is aimed at demoralizing our society, and the women’s 
issue has been used by the West against the Arabs and the Muslims to push 
Arab women to abandon their honor and values and start acting like animals” 
(qtd in Nanes 2003, 125).
Echoes of this discourse would again be repeated in 2016, when women- 
led organizations, emboldened by the king’s royal support, began calling for 
the repeal of article 308, which appears as part of a chapter titled “Offences 
Against Public Ethics and Morality.” Article 308 of the Jordanian Penal Code 
consists of two clauses that state the following:
 1. If a valid marriage is concluded between the perpetrator of one of the 
crimes provided in this Chapter and the victim, the prosecution shall be 
discontinued, and the execution of any sentence rendered against the 
perpetrator shall be stayed.
 2. If the marriage ends with the divorce of the woman without a legitimate 
reason, the Prosecutor General may, before the lapse of three (3) years 
starting on the date of the commission of a misdemeanour, or five (5) 
years starting on the date of the commission of a crime, resume the pros-
ecution of a case, and the execution of a sentence. (No. 16 of 1961)
This article sanctions legal exoneration of men who marry (and stay married 
to for a specific period) women they have sexually assaulted and/or raped. 
Purportedly intended to protect women who have been assaulted or raped, the 
time limit imposed by the law ends up further harming them by compelling 
them to remain married to the perpetrator- turned- husband for a minimum 
of three years from the date of the assault. The problem with this law is that it 
puts female survivors of assault and rape in a difficult place: they are pushed, 
by the very existence of this law, to accede to marriage proposals from men 
who have harmed them—often with disastrous results, as the tragic case of 
suicide by Amina Filali, a Moroccan teen who was forced to marry her rapist 
under a similar article in Moroccan law, clearly demonstrates (Hayoun 2013). 
On its surface, the law presents itself as protective of girls and women who are 
harmed or violated. In reality, the law protects the perpetrators who are now, 
through marriage, turned from rapists to husbands (Warrick 2009). Thus, the 
social problem of rape and sexual violence is concealed by the cloak of timed 
(and timely) marriage unions.
In 2015 the Sisterhood Is Global Institute (SIGI) conducted a study that 
found that 70 percent of Jordanians opposed the existence of article 308 (Hus-
seini 2015). The study’s findings helped back the growing momentum of civil 
society and women’s rights activists to call for the law’s repeal. In 2017, fifty- 
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two women’s and civil society organizations banded together to support the 
repeal of the law. Arguments favoring the repeal of the article centered on its 
blight on Jordanian women’s rights and its tarnishing of Jordan’s reputation 
as a modern nation- state. Support for activism against honor- based violence 
was inspired, in part, by the publication of a quantitative study measuring 
the attitudes of Jordanian adolescents toward honor killings in 2013. Con-
ducting their study in a number of schools, researchers Manuel Eisner and 
Lana Ghuneim reviewed responses from 856 adolescent boys and girls study-
ing in private and public schools in the capital Amman and measured their 
views on the topic. The researchers asked respondents to assess whether it 
was “OK for a man to kill his sister, his daughter, or his wife in the name of 
honor, and whether they believe that killing for honor is OK” (2013, 409). 
The responses they received revealed that 33.4 percent of respondents strongly 
agreed, showing a supportive attitude toward honor- based violence among 
adolescent male populations. Reproducing a troubling assumption that readily 
associates higher rates of violence with tradition and lesser privileged socio-
economic contexts, the study also found that boys were more likely to support 
the practice than girls and “that support for honor killings is more widespread 
amongst adolescents from poorer and more traditional family backgrounds” 
(413). The study’s findings were reported in various international media out-
lets, casting a negative light on the country and adding further international 
pressure on Jordan to confront gender- based violence and oppose the tradi-
tional ideologies that reportedly sanction its occurrence.
In explaining his support for the repeal of the law, Member of Parlia-
ment Saleh Armouti argued that the law “contradicts the dignity of women 
and their humanity in our society” (qtd in Husseini 2017b). Presenting an 
argument in favor of the law’s cancellation, Mustafa Khasawneh, Member of 
Parliament and Head of the House’s Legal Committee, stated that “the Legal 
Committee supports the annulment of Article 308, because we believe there 
has been so much injustice caused and because we know that many criminals 
have been secured undeserved freedom because of it” (qtd in Al Tahat 2017). 
Significantly, efforts to repeal these laws received support from the govern-
ment when the Jordanian General Iftaa’ Department, the state branch that 
oversees religious issues, issued a fatwa, or religious opinion, against honor- 
based violence. The government- sanctioned statement not only declared such 
crimes contradictory to religious law but also went so far as to support the 
campaign to remove laws that offer perpetrators of the crime reduced sen-
tences. As the document states, “Anyone who kills his relative claiming that he 
wants to cleanse the [family] honour is committing an act against Sharia and 
should be held accountable” (qtd in Maayeh 2016). The fatwa also emphasized 
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the importance of the law in adjudicating such crimes, language that echoes 
the king’s stance by insisting that “there should be no reduced sentences for a 
relative [who commits the crime] or if he based his actions on suspicions . . . 
because the judiciary is the only authority that is entitled to issue verdicts and 
enact them” (qtd in Maayeh 2016).
Beyond official and state- sponsored support for the cancellation of the arti-
cle, it is important to note that its proponents worked collaboratively together 
to create the Civil Coalition to Abolish Law Article 308, which included both 
SIGI and the Jordanian National Commission for Women and another 100 
civil society organizations from across Jordan (Al- Atiyat 2019). This coalition 
was buttressed by a growing movement of young, urban, and well- educated 
Jordanian girls and women who also endorsed this legal move. These activ-
ists and protesters form the backbone of a new and cross- sectional women’s 
movement committed to challenging cultural conceptions of the body, honor, 
and morality in Jordanian society (see figure 4).
Activists protesting article 308 held signs declaring their bodies a red 
line, and their honors as theirs alone. They also called for legal changes that 
refused to appeal to notions of culture. Those who called out against the 
law’s cancellation accused the law’s opponents of representing the interests 
of middle- class, urbanite, and educated women divorced from the socioeco-
nomic struggles and social pressures that victims of assault from poorer class 
backgrounds experience. In an argument in favor of keeping the law to pro-
Fig 4
FIGURE 4. Jordanian activists protesting in Amman and calling for 
the abolishment of article 308. Photo provided by Samar Dudin.
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tect underage victims of assault, Reem Abu Hassan, former minister of social 
development, argued that “‘repealing the article altogether would cause a risk 
to the lives of women between the ages of 15 and 18 and would result in chil-
dren being born without fathers in the cases of pregnancy’” (qtd in Husseini 
2017c).
Echoing such concerns, Ibtesam Al- Atiyat argues that the Jordanian 
women activists’ focus on the article’s removal ignored how the existence of 
the law helped “couples who engage in premarital sex escape social stigma 
and legal persecution” (2019, 101). Al- Atiyat’s position is informed by a rec-
ognition that the existence of the article had helped couples who engaged in 
consensual premarital sex and who wished to be married but who did not 
have their guardians’ approval to use the law to make such marriages pos-
sible. Al- Atiyat argues that the existence of the law allowed women to compel 
men who impregnate them (and later on refuse to marry them) to marry 
them and thus guaranteed their children a legitimate future, a patriarchal 
lineage, and a personal status identification number in accordance with Jor-
danian law. Because the Jordanian Personal Status laws recognize only chil-
dren born in wedlock and provides them their father’s last name, lineage, and 
citizenship, rights foreclosed to women and their offspring, article 308 was a 
venue through which women could “exercise a degree of autonomy in regard 
to paternal authority and to marry their chosen partner, resolved children’s 
legitimacy problems, and above all to avoid the threat of honor killing” (108). 
Al- Atiyat’s position centers the socioeconomic context in which the existence 
and the removal of the law become hotly contested issues.
Here it is important to state that the efforts to repeal article 308 were 
mounted in tandem with a multipronged campaign that brought to the fore a 
discussion of gender violence and compelled a discursive and educational shift 
in societal views around these issues. Multiyear calls for legal change in Jor-
danian society could not be compelled without a broad and strong campaign 
that unfolded on a variety of educational platforms and that brought public 
attention to the potential harms of such laws and their abrogation of women’s 
rights. For example, in Room 308, an educational short film supporting the 
cancellation of article 308, developed by SIGI and funded, in part, by USAID, 
societal understanding of issues of honor, reputation, and consent are exam-
ined in bold and potentially transformative ways.25 In the short film, a young 
girl attending high school finds herself in a dilemma when a rejected neighbor-
hood admirer attempts to force himself into her family’s house in the absence 
of parental guardians. In the process, the girl prevents the man from physi-
cally entering her home, but, in an effort to compel a conversation between 
them, he rips her school dress. Alerted to the commotion caused by the 
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encounter, an elderly neighbor and some young women rush to investigate 
the incident. Repeatedly asserting that nothing had happened and that the 
girl had simply misunderstood him, the man is taken aside and beaten by men 
in the neighborhood while the girl is dragged to the hospital against her will 
by the concerned neighbors. There, the elderly woman neighbor insists that 
she be examined by a doctor to confirm whether a sexual encounter had taken 
place between the girl and her assailant and whether the girl had retained her 
virginity. This is done in spite of the girl’s repeated pleas against the exami-
nation and her insistence that she was a virgin. In the hospital, while the 
girl undergoes the physical virginity examination, the girl’s uncle and a law-
yer representing the man’s family meet to discuss a possible resolution to the 
problem; the lawyer reminds the girl’s uncle, who is seeking his “right as stated 
by law,” that article 308 states that the “girl gets wed and the man gets out of 
jail.” The lawyer uses the language of sutr instead of marriage when speaking 
about the girl’s impending nuptials, implying that her honor and reputation 
would be restored through the act of marriage. The deal is sealed between the 
lawyer and the girl’s uncle, who agrees on a mahr amount of 25,000 Jordanian 
Dinars in order to “disarm the whole situation.”26
While the girl’s virginity is corroborated by her mother and the examining 
physician, she is nevertheless compelled to marry her rejected suitor in order 
to preserve her family’s honor and thus her own. The film ends in a scene that 
takes place a year after the incident, where the girl, lying on a bed and visibly 
pregnant and alone, daydreams about her former life as a schoolgirl while 
her aimless husband continues to chase women on the street. The short film, 
which was shared online and viewed by over 11,000 people on YouTube, rep-
resents the unfairness of such laws and their impact on girls and women from 
impoverished social backgrounds; it demonstrates, through an example drawn 
from real life, how the law can work to pressure girls into matrimony against 
their wills and best interests. The film thus visually represents a central slogan 
in the campaign launched by SIGI against article 308, which states, “Article 
308 does not protect honor; it protects the perpetrator” (see figure 5).
While I am unable to assess audience reaction to the film or its broad 
impact on societal views on such topics, what its creation makes clear is the 
breakdown of certain social taboos: the film boldly represents the young girl 
as a victim of a rejected suitor who is also cast as an indolent youth, a young 
man who has no goals except the chasing of girls and women and their pur-
suit and sexual harassment. This casting helps establish the girl as an innocent 
victim of both social circumstance and the law. The girl’s uncle, who violently 
slaps her, and makes a financial profit from the situation, and compels her 
to marry the man she has refused, is also presented in a negative light. In 
Fig 5
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showcasing how the law can be used to compel an undesirable future for the 
young women, the film’s creators highlight the law’s capacity to cause social 
harm and ill. These facets index a conversational shift that, without directly 
confronting the various patriarchal logics that curtail a woman’s freedoms and 
subject her to social and physical harm, takes aim at such resolutions and their 
buttressing through the site of the law. In that way, the film offers a social 
critique that brings to the fore the dangerous entanglements of the legal and 
social domains, especially in relation to sex and sexuality. Although the film 
skirts the issue of consensual sex versus rape, the filmmakers nevertheless 
emphasize the law’s removal as a potential remedy to the social problem it 
presents.
Despite the film’s support of efforts to revoke the law, it is important to 
remember that the debate surrounding the law’s removal has reinforced what 
Lamis El Muhtaseb, Nathan J. Brown, and Abdul- Wahab Kayyali describe as a 
sharp “polarization of politics in many Arab societies, on full and even violent 
display since the uprisings of 2011” (2016, 721). As the authors demonstrate, 
these divisions are most visible around issues surrounding women’s rights, 
where, they argue, two camps exist. On one side of the debate are those who 
“anchor their arguments in Islamic legal thought” and, on the other, are “those 
FIGURE 5. Banner from Abolish 308 Campaign. Image courtesy 
of the Jordanian National Commission for Women.
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who turn instead to liberal conceptions of rights, sometimes relying on inter-
national human rights instruments” (721). Although I agree with the authors 
on their characterization of the polarized discourse that exists in Jordan in 
relation to gender issues, I want to suggest that the debates surrounding article 
308 do not simply create neat divisions between Islamic law and international 
law that position their respective champions and adherents into two distinct 
and separate camps. Rather, these debates reassert the centrality of the law as 
an arbiter of Jordanian women’s rights and guarantor of their safety for mem-
bers on both sides of the political aisle whose difference in opinion, while 
strong, is sutured through their attachment to the law as a source of justice. 
In other words, these debates stake for the law (and thus the state) an unparal-
leled power to determine the course of women’s political, social, and cultural 
struggles against gender violence in Jordan. How does this turn to the law re- 
empower and reify the state’s significance in everyday life? In what ways does 
the regulation of gender violence become yet another domain in which the 
Jordanian state gets to remake itself as modern, enlightened, and prowomen?
JURIDICAL REFORM AND STATE- CENTRIC ACTIVISM 
In their efforts to combat honor- related violence, women’s rights groups have 
repeatedly called for the removal of article 98 from the Jordanian Penal Code 
(Faqir 2001). Adopting a tough- on- crime approach, women’s groups have 
linked the frequent rates of occurrence of honor- based violence to the leni-
ency of Jordanian penal codes used to prosecute these crimes. In particular, 
women’s rights activists have maintained that legal codes that offer reduced 
sentences to perpetrators of such crimes (such as articles 340 and 98) effec-
tively embolden men to harm or kill women and are thus to blame for the 
rising rates of violence against women in Jordanian society. To address the 
problem of gender violence, activists have thus focused their efforts on target-
ing state legislations to put an end to violence against women.27 In Jordan, this 
view is often represented by leaders in women’s rights organizations. Com-
menting on the frequent occurrence of honor- based violence in Jordan, Aseel 
Abu Albandora, a project coordinator at the Jordanian Women’s Union, states 
that ending honor- based violence is “a matter of changing the law. If ‘honour’ 
crimes are clearly illegal then it will raise awareness and people will know they 
can’t get away with it” (qtd in Cuthbert 2017). Here, ending violence against 
women is attached to the site of the law, which is configured as the marker of 
both what is legal or illegal and what is socially right or wrong. Legal changes 
are assumed to automatically signal to would- be perpetrators that the crimes 
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would be dealt with severely in the courts and that fear of legal consequences 
would thus inhibit men from committing violence against women. Absent 
from such consideration is the social context in which these crimes occur and 
are sanctioned.
In 2017, in a landmark ruling against two brothers who had poisoned their 
sister and then claimed she had committed suicide, the Jordanian Cassation 
Court effectively doubled their jail sentences, increasing them from seven and 
ten years to fifteen and twenty years. In explaining his decision, Judge Moham-
mad Tarawneh stated, “We want to send a strong message to the people that 
killing women in the name of family honor will no longer be tolerated by 
our court and we chose Mother’s Day to send this message” (qtd in Husseini 
2017a). In response to the verdict, SIGI said that “it was a victory for women 
who are victims of violence and murder” (Husseini 2017a). The legal changes 
introduced have also authorized the adoption of tougher sentences for repeat 
offenders. Celebrations of legal reforms that focus on increasing the length 
and severity of punishment demonstrates the limits of a feminist framework 
that aligns itself with what Bernstein has named a “carceral worldview” that 
seeks juridical and punitive remedies to social problems (2012, 237).28
In an interview focused on the meaning of the repeal of article 308 and the 
revisions to article 98, Member of Parliament Wafa Bani Mustafa celebrated 
these accomplishments, commending their ability to deny “legal cover to per-
petrators” and to send a strong message to Jordanian society:
I think that changing the legislation is a vital part of changing society . . . The 
message we’re sending to society is a correct one, that builds on the issue of 
equality—that equality is the right of the whole society. If they are not pun-
ished, they will do it again. We have managed to protect women and now it 
is the job of the state to protect and support these women, to provide care 
and empowerment for them and to work on accepting them into society as 
victims and survivors and not as being guilty. (qtd in Tahhan 2017)
Bani Mustafa’s linking of social change to legislative reform advocates for 
tougher- on- crime policies but does so through appeals to the liberal dis-
courses of equality and empowerment which are central to the operations of 
the modern Jordanian state. As Frances Hasso has shown, such an analytic 
framework reflects a longer history of women and women’s rights activism 
that “often invite[s] and appeal[s] to male- dominated states to regulate, inter-
vene, or change the rules in sexual and family life in order to address a range 
of problems and challenges, including lack of economic and other resources, 
political and citizenship exclusions, or intimate violence” (2014, 108). Hasso’s 
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work makes clear that such alliances always come at a certain cost, which 
women and marginalized constituencies from the most underprivileged 
socioeconomic backgrounds ultimately bear.29
Although Jordanian women’s rights organizations celebrated their success 
in altering the law to support women’s rights and promote equality, much 
less critical attention has been paid to the aforementioned changes and their 
role in granting the state further authority and power, including extending 
the ability of the state to fight gender violence through expanding its carceral 
state apparatuses. In a report lauding Jordan’s reforms, Human Rights Watch 
positively described the legal changes, seeing them as a sign that Jordan was 
beginning to fulfill promises to deliver what Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle 
East director at Human Rights Watch, has labeled “real change on impor-
tant issues” (qtd in Human Rights Watch 2017b). Nowhere in this celebratory 
account of legal reform is there a critical nod to the Jordanian state’s use of 
women’s rights to push forward the state’s own political agenda, an agenda 
that fights gender violence through the enshrining of tough on crime legis-
lation that expands police enforcement powers, rewrites the definitions and 
laws around criminality, and emboldens the state’s capacity to curtail rights 
and freedoms. In here and elsewhere, tough on crime legislations secured by 
the state are automatically assumed to guarantee women’s rights and safety 
and are thus used to shift women’s understanding of justice and ability to 
confront gender violence away from community- based activism and other 
justice practices that have the potential to both exceed and potentially chal-
lenge the state.
In October 2017 the UN Human Rights Committee met to discuss Jordan’s 
periodic report and its implementation of the provisions of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2017). Speaking to the committee, Saja 
Majali, the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations Office 
at Geneva, noted her country’s commitment to comprehensive legal reforms 
and its intention to “promote human rights in all fields of life.” While lauding 
the many achievements of the government in areas of human rights, includ-
ing the removal of article 308 from the Penal Code, the committee of experts 
responding to the Jordanian report questioned the efficacy of law enforce-
ment officials in dealing with cases of domestic violence. They also noted 
that the practice of “protective custody” of women “had not ended, leading 
to administrative detention of women threatened with marital or family vio-
lence” (2017). In response to the questioning by experts regarding Jordan’s 
commitment to ending gender- based violence and protecting women who are 
at risk of it, the Jordanian representative noted that “the Government aimed 
to strengthen shelters for women and the provision of legal aid to victims of 
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domestic violence or trafficking. Shelters did not entail any form of adminis-
trative detention” (2017).
The issue of protective custody has been central to discussions of legal 
reforms pertaining to gender violence in Jordan. Protective custody refers to 
the government practice of remanding to indefinite custody in Jordanian jails 
women who are at a risk of or who fear family retaliation in the name of 
honor. Jade Glenister argues that the key features of protective custody
are detention in prison: not in accordance with national law; following the 
determination of a non- judicial state authority that a woman is at risk of 
harm; which may be prolonged and is likely to be in definite; and which may 
lead to severe feelings of despair and hopelessness because of the inability to 
be released, the lack of control over the risk of being released to the possibil-
ity of harm and due to the fact of being detained itself. (2016, 20)
Protective custody is a practice that is in contravention of international agree-
ments and one that is applied in accordance with the will of a state- appointed 
employee with unchecked power to interpret and implement the law. In 2004 
Human Rights Watch reported on the practice of protective custody by inter-
viewing police, government officials, and four women held in the Jordanian 
Jweideh Women’s Correctional and Rehabilitation Centre. The report sought 
to shed light on gender violence in Jordan and paid particular attention to 
the period of imminent danger and threat that precedes honor- based vio-
lence or an honor killing and in which women at risk of this violence typi-
cally resort to the state for protection from their male relatives. This period 
has been described by Nadera Shalhoub- Kevorkian as “living on death row, 
always in fear of execution,” a condition that “results in an inability to live and 
is a major part of the death process” (2003, 581). In response to such fears, the 
Jordanian state resorted to the practice of detaining the women who live in 
fear of violence and murder, moving them to spaces of indefinite carcerality 
and imprisonment.
Jordanian officials interviewed about this practice rationalized the move 
to imprison women who fear being harmed or killed rather than detaining 
the men they fear by stating that the government responds to a woman who 
is threatened and that they want to do something to help protect her from the 
threat of potential harm. While they recognize that issuing threats against a 
woman’s life could be considered illegal, they nevertheless maintain that the 
police “cannot arrest a man because of his intentions” (qtd in Human Rights 
Watch 2004, 12). Even if the threats appear credible in the eyes of state offi-
cials, the move to imprison women into safety is rationalized by a concern 
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that imprisonment of a male relative who has threatened to harm a woman 
may increase the likelihood that she will be harmed or killed after his release. 
The state thus uses the fear of retaliation to deny women their right to free-
dom. This situation has led the Jordanian government to place women at risk 
of gender- based violence in prisons, where they are held in periods of indefi-
nite detention that can stretch for as long as thirteen years in one reported 
case (Baker and Søndergaard 2014). In one case, reported in interviews with 
women held in custody, one formerly incarcerated woman stated that she was 
held in custody for twenty- two years after witnessing the murder of her sister 
by members of her family.30
Protective custody has received ample attention in media accounts of gen-
der violence in Jordan. Reports of its occurrence and frequency vary, with 
some suggesting that “an estimated 65 percent of more than 1,700 female 
inmates in Jordan’s prisons” are being held under administrative detention 
(Thompson 2017). Administrative detention is sanctioned under Jordanian 
law by reference to the 1954 Crime Prevention Law. This law allows a state 
representative to initiate legal proceedings against someone who is “about to 
commit a crime or assist in its commission” or someone whose freedom con-
stitutes a danger to the public (Human Rights Watch 2009). In the case of 
detaining women fleeing potential cases of gender- based violence, the law is 
activated in the name of maintaining the woman’s personal safety. This form 
of mandatory protection is administered by a government- appointed official 
(a governor) who has the authority to reprimand and remand women to cus-
tody. When a woman seeks protection from the state, the governor stipulates 
that the woman either agrees to leave the prison or jail in the company of her 
male guardian (usually a father or a brother or an uncle) or, in a less frequent 
scenario, agrees to an arranged marriage to an appropriate male suitor of the 
governor’s choosing (Rimaz Musa 2015).31 The troubling options put before 
women often lead them to choose remaining “voluntarily” in jail over the risk 
of being released into the custody of male guardians who may harm them in 
the future or who have threatened to harm them in the past.
The issue of extensive and unchecked power that the administrative gov-
ernors hold over women’s lives in these cases is explored in an interview con-
ducted by Rimaz Musa from the online Jordanian website 7iber with Hijazi 
Assad, a Jordanian governor.32 In the interview, Musa inquires about the 
mechanisms that the governor uses in determining whether a woman can be 
safely released to male guardians. Before a woman who is held in protective 
custody is released to a male guardian, the governor insists on having the 
guardian sign an agreement that guarantees that he will pay a certain finan-
cial penalty if the girl or woman is harmed after her release. Despite tying a 
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person’s safety to a financial guarantee that is hardly ever recuperated even 
in the event of a woman’s murder, the governor states that when a person is 
determined to harm a woman, such guarantees will not prevent him from 
doing so. The governor explains that he uses his hunch, ferocity, and guidance 
from God to assess whether a person intends to harm a woman or not and 
that he correctly assesses whether to release a woman to her male guardians 
or not about 99 percent of the time. The governor also explains that remov-
ing protective custody will harm society and that ending such practices at the 
urging of international human rights organizations would make it unsafe for 
everyone to leave their homes. In the governor’s language, women who are at 
risk of being violated are themselves reconstituted as a threat to the communi-
ties in which they live. Their removal, therefore, is configured as a guarantee 
of their safety (Musa 2015).
Writing on protective custody in Jordan, Afaf Jabiri notes that “by fail-
ing to protect women from crimes or abuses, the state defines the notion of 
protection according to the normative framework of gender order that favors 
protecting family and kinship relations over women’s interests and protection” 
(2016, 163). Jabiri explains how patriarchal codes work in tandem with state 
interests in maintaining order to produce a concept like “protective custody,” 
a notion that safeguards and enables men’s ability to manage women’s futures 
through the legal domain. In her study on guardianship in Jordan, Jabiri inter-
views both government officials and women held in custody in Jordanian jails 
to better understand this phenomenon. Jabiri finds that the imprisoning of 
women in the name of honor “complicates their release, places them in more 
vulnerable positions, and also draws attention away from the state’s involve-
ment in protecting male authority over women” (166). In an interview con-
ducted with Nadia Shamrouk, the General Director of Jordanian Women’s 
Union, Jabiri learns that “the government is not serious in finding a solution 
for those women because it does not see them as victims but rather criminals 
of the social values” (qtd in Jabiri, 167). Women who fear gender violence are 
stigmatized by the law as criminals who must be separated from an otherwise 
healthy society that, if they are released into, they may harm and infect.
Jordanian women activists have publicly denounced the practice of pro-
tective custody, drawing attention to both its illegality and its inhumane 
consequences for women who are detained. In 2016 Eva Abu Halaweh, the 
executive director of Mizan Law Group, an organization that has spearheaded 
the efforts to end this practice, argued that “administrative governors vio-
late the law when they detain women who are under the threat of murder by 
their families, those who are tortured at home or those who flee their homes” 
(Al Emam 2016).33 In response to growing local and international pressure 
against administrative custody, the Jordanian government established a center 
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to house women who are fleeing gender violence. Speaking on the govern-
ment’s decision, Mohammad Ensour, a representative from the Ministry of 
Justice, stated that “we all know that there are some women whose lives are 
under threat by their families for reasons related to ‘family honour,’ and we are 
committed locally and internationally to finding an alternative and a digni-
fied solution for them” (qtd in Husseini 2016a). At the time of its opening, the 
center housed a maximum of fifty women, and the women who were admit-
ted had to have no prior criminal record. Deploying a securitized discourse, 
Ensour states that the center will “mainly receive new cases, mostly of women 
who are absent from home, and anyone wanting to visit them will need a spe-
cial security permission” (qtd in Husseini 2016c).
In late 2018 the Ministry for Social Development, with the support of 
various local and transnational non- government organizations, opened Dar 
Amneh, the House of Safety, to help women at risk of violence find temporary 
refuge and build new lives. The project has received positive media attention 
and is the result of civil society efforts and government commitment to reform 
laws pertaining to gender- based violence (Luck 2018). Women admitted to 
Dar Amneh are free to leave after being made aware of the risks associated 
with their voluntary departure. At the center, women receive assistance from 
social workers and may also use their time to develop skills they can use after 
their release in order to gain employment and income. Responding to the 
news that the government would open the center, executive director of the 
Sisterhood Is Global Institute (SIGI), Munir Idaibes, stated that “protective 
custody is a method that compounds the suffering of these women” and that 
contributes to “the deprivation of their freedom and their exposure to many 
risks, including intermingling with inmates with different criminal records” 
(qtd in Prieto 2018). At stake in such statements is an investment in a carceral 
logic that distinguishes vulnerable citizens from criminalized ones. As Raghda 
Azzeh, the social worker in charge of the center, stated, “Our aim is to ensure 
a temporary residency for these women and for them to be independent” (qtd 
in Husseini 2018). Such discourse reveals a desire to save good victims of gen-
der violence from bad and criminalized women and to reconstitute the former 
in the service of socioeconomic reform and social development through the 
social apparatuses of the state.
CONCLUSION: JUSTICE AT ITS LEGAL LIMITS
The context of managed legal reform and activism around the site of the law 
discussed above is crucial for understanding the relationship between the 
realms of the law and women’s activism in Jordan. To further demonstrate 
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how struggles over rights that hinge on legal change can sometimes falter in 
attaining justice for women, I return briefly to the latest legal reforms to repeal 
article 308 in the Jordanian Penal Code. As previously discussed, article 308 
exists as part of a chapter that identifies a number of “offences against honor.” 
Together, this chapter defines and limits the meaning of rape to an act against 
“Public Ethics and Morality.” Article 292 in the chapter describes rape in the 
following way: “any person who has forced sexual intercourse with a female, 
other than his wife, shall be sentenced to at least five (5) years of temporary 
hard labour.” As currently written, the law thus exempts forced intercourse 
within marital relationships from the charge of rape.
As a report by the Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development 
(ARDD) argues, the law renders rape occurring outside the bounds of mar-
riage to be a societal crime, “an attack against public ethics and honor rather 
than a violation of the bodily integrity and sexual autonomy of the victim” 
(2017, 2; emphasis in original). The law takes issue with forced sexual inter-
course because it threatens the “honor” of the community at large. Nowhere in 
its current wording does the law discuss the coercive nature of rape, nor does 
the law discuss the right of the survivor herself to a fair or just trial. Instead, 
the law creates a discursive condition that renders rape beyond the pale of the 
socially imaginable by “vanishing” its victim through marriage (Warrick 
2005). Understood this way, it becomes clear that article 308 is an extension 
of a legal system that prizes social order over the rights of women by dis-
appearing “the crucial distinction between rape and sexual intercourse with 
consent” (ARDD 2017, 2). 
While the removal of article 308 certainly ensures that “such crimes can 
undergo proper investigation, prosecution and punishment of perpetra-
tors,” the exact impact of its removal will not be determined quickly or easily 
(ARDD 2017, 2). Its champions’ stated goals to have rape charges be properly 
investigated, prosecuted, and punished are worthwhile and may even lead to 
a broader discussion about the meaning of forced and nonconsensual sex in 
Jordanian society. It could also lead to a rethinking of the meaning of terms 
such as honor, culture, and the body, terms that the law inscribes through its 
various stated and hidden assumptions about sexuality and social order. It is 
important also to recognize that, in addition to exercising the state’s right to 
define rape and sexual assault in ways that are both limiting and limited, the 
law requires its own sets of proof of physical violence. Evidence that, once 
demanded, may place additional burdens on women who have been raped and 
sexually violated, especially those unable to acquire adequate legal representa-
tion or to come forward for fear of community reprisal and public shaming.
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Simply stated, my work contests celebratory accounts of legal victories that 
readily moor women’s struggle against gender violence in juridical change that 
is administered by state officials and that is tied exclusively to the domain of 
the legal. It argues that efforts to end gender violence in Jordan, including rape 
and honor- related violence, cannot only be fueled by activism that begins and 
ends at the site of the law. What happens to victims of gender violence who 
cannot avail themselves of the law, its legal instruments, and its discursive 
practices? What happens to their right to justice outside the domain of the 
legal? While efforts to confront discriminatory laws are significant in shap-
ing the current wave of the women’s movement in Jordan and its ability to 
reform state law, I am reluctant to believe that hinging such struggles on the 
law alone, especially when the law is so carefully administered and managed 
by the state, can bring an end to gender violence against women. This critical 
view of the law seeks neither to admonish its champions nor to diminish the 
significance of their historic successes. Rather, it seeks to bring attention to a 
historical conjuncture in which the fight against gender violence in general, 
and the so- called honor crime in particular in its different manifestations, has 
been annexed in the service of the state.
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Intersectional Feminism and the 
Politics of Hope and Solidarity
THIS BOOK presented a genealogy of honor crime discourse, tracing how it 
emerged and the shifts and turns it has taken in the past few decades. My study 
has sought to show that the honor crime discourse, as a governing rhetoric, 
travels from one place to another in ways that are not controllable and that 
are attached to laden rhetorics and to distinct but overlapping materialities. 
In their travels from one place to another, honor crime discourses construct 
meanings and shape local and transnational debates surrounding a variety of 
issues such as migration, citizenship, and nation- state building. I have focused 
my analysis on the multiple and competing narratives that underpin our con-
ception of this crime, its scale, and its magnitude in order to explore how the 
singular focus on honor- based violence has restructured how we think about 
violence and its various manifestations at the physical, psychological, struc-
tural, and rhetorical/discursive levels. In tracing the workings of this discourse 
in a number of geopolitical contexts, I have shown how its movements con-
tribute to the shaping of our understanding of gender violence, the develop-
ment of antiviolence strategies, and the structuring and delimiting of what can 
and cannot be done to end gender violence.
Gender Violence and the Transnational Politics of the Honor Crime pro-
vides an interdisciplinary approach to the discourses of honor- based violence. 
I have specifically chosen to focus on a number of interconnected geographic 
contexts in order to tell a more complex story about the intricacies of defin-
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ing and contesting gender- based violence. These stories are inherently only 
partial and neither cover the multiplicity of stories that exist within each of 
these specific contexts, nor do they exhaust the range of possible interpreta-
tions. In discussing multiple, intersecting, and even competing approaches 
to gender violence in distinct but interconnected local contexts, this book 
charts how particular forms of violence come into focus in certain histori-
cal conjunctures, how attention to the honor crime rises, shifts, or wanes. In 
attending to the ebbs and flows of this discourse and its circuitries and circu-
lations, I have also explored the various meanings that the honor crime con-
structs to narrate a story about violence that attends to its multiple iterations. 
The book thus examines honor- based violence as a modern form of violence 
that is immersed in particular political and historical contexts, refuting ahis-
torical claims about its occurrence, scope, or frequency. Rather than read the 
honor crime as a set, given, or determined form of violence, I have sought to 
show how it emerges as a legal, social, political, and discursive category whose 
meaning shifts and alters over time and space. In this work, the honor crime is 
read in relation to, and not apart from, other forms of violence, including the 
violence of migration, colonialism, imperialism, and modernity.
In her writing on the politics of sex trafficking, Jennifer Suchland suggests 
that we read the category of “violence against women” in a way that allows us 
“to see the inherent incompleteness of the term in order to contextualize vio-
lence and strike at the multidimensionality of racial, class, sexual, gendered, 
able- bodied, and national hierarchies” (2015, 188). Suchland argues that while 
the category of violence against women does convey particular meanings, “it 
should not convey a set understanding of why that violence happens, how it 
is constituted, what remedies are appropriate, and how to prevent it” (188). 
In tracing the various meanings and genealogies of honor crime discourses, 
I have similarly sought to unsettle the set understandings that have been 
attached to the honor crime discourse and thus to reveal the wide range of 
political, social, and legal work that has been done in its name. I have worked 
to trouble its representations in public and official discourses and to analyze 
the confrontation circuits it has generated and continues to produce. Unset-
tling the dominant stories of honor crime discourses requires (dis)assembling 
and analyzing a multiplicity of texts that help construct and buttress them, to 
trace the many actors who narrate them, and to uncover some of the preset 
assumptions they emphasize or downplay. It also requires recognizing one’s 
own complicity in the discourses that are produced and cohered around this 
form of violence. This is why this work has brought together ideas, represen-
tations, and practices that are not often read relationally and that are seldom 
put in conversation with one another.
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In her discussion of honor- based violence and the dilemmas it poses to 
feminist scholarship and activism, Lila Abu- Lughod argues that “the honor 
crime poses perhaps more starkly than any other contemporary category the 
dilemmas of feminist scholarship and rights activism in a transnational world” 
(2011, 17). My study of honor crime discourses in the four contexts of the US, 
Canada, Palestine, and Jordan reveals precisely why the honor crime’s classifi-
cation as a singular and exceptional form of violence is beset with difficulties 
and how it continues to both inspire and regulate how we can speak on and 
contest gender violence in its various manifestations. Studies on the honor 
crime seldom attend to the transnational circulations of these discourses 
and instead focus on how they operate in singular locations and contexts. 
Thus, we often miss how the singularized discourses surrounding the honor 
crime travel from one place to another and how the arguments they present 
“network to wider contexts such as historical discourses, geopolitics, global 
economics, and cultural expectations” (Dingo 2012, 145). By analyzing the cir-
cuitous travels of these discourses from and in between different sites and the 
various politics to which they become appended, I use a transnational and 
intersectional feminist analytic framework that troubles distinctions between 
what is local and what is global, revealing both the emplaced and the dis-
placed effects of dominant representations of the honor crime.
Because the category of the honor crime is changing and often eludes 
definitional consensus, my work focuses on the varieties of violence that are 
invoked under its name. In this work, I view the category of the honor crime 
as a set of signs and practices that carries multiple referential meanings and 
that, through its deployments, constructs particular material realities that 
travel from one place to another. As Laura Shepherd has observed, “Discursive 
practices maintain, construct, constitute, legitimate, resist and suspend mean-
ing” (2018, 21). Over the past few decades, dominant discourses on the honor 
crime have solidified, treating this violence as a particular kind of violence 
against women and a marker of a unique or excessive form of gender violence. 
This process encodes (and is in turn encoded by) a set of interlocking racial-
ized and classed discourses and assumptions. As a result, the violence of the 
honor crime has been scripted as the violence of the other or as an othered 
violence. The excess of signification underlying dominant honor crime dis-
courses renders it co- optable by a wide variety of political formations, and the 
discourse’s othering function dovetails with demands that bolster the regula-
tory powers of nation- states, as we have seen in the context- specific analysis 
provided in this work. In shifting my focus to a multisited and multitextual 
discursive analysis of the honor crime, I reveal both the obvious, immediate 
effects of these discourses and the hidden, long- term consequences of their 
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circulations. While this analysis helped broaden my understanding of the dif-
fuse and transnational grammars of dominant honor crime discourses, this 
study does not purport to cover all its manifestations or to anticipate the new 
ways in which it will operate in the future. Needless to say, my discussion of 
honor crime discourses in the four separate but interconnected sites that this 
book has examined does not exhaust the ways in which this discourse contin-
ues to circulate within the particular sites of analysis and beyond them and 
how its circulations exceed the mappings provided herein.
Attending to the transnational iterations of hegemonic honor crime dis-
courses requires acknowledging the concept’s constant ability to gain new 
meanings, to reshape how we think about gender violence and how we come 
to envision and enact an end to it. In assessing the multiple uses of the honor 
killing and honor crime discourses, I do not refute the existence of gender 
violence; nor do I contest that certain physical, emotional, and psychic viola-
tions are planned, executed, and invoked under the name of “honor.” Instead, 
I point to the difficulties that the hegemonic honor crime discourses give rise 
to and the ways in which they serve to constrain intersectional analyses of 
gender violence that can attend to its economic, social, political, and racial 
imbrications. At stake in this study is not simply how gender- based violence 
is defined but also how certain definitions, and their embrace and uptake, 
inform what is recognized as violence and how it is contested. If our goal is to 
end gender violence in all its forms, then we may need to envision activism 
against violence that attends to the imbrications of this discourse in different 
and interconnected forms of violence. We may wish to develop an alternative 
language or discourse more capable of attending to the overlapping—and also 
the competing—interests of communities across national and transnational 
divides. This new language must constantly be grounded in what Nadje Al- 
Ali has described as a “historical approach” that acknowledges and troubles 
the politics of positionality and “reveals the complex interplay of inter- and 
transnational, regional, national and local factors in shaping the specific polit-
ical economies and socio- historical contexts in which sexual violence might 
become more widespread” (2018, 23). 
In seeking ways to confront gender violence that do not reproduce the 
troubling limits of dominant honor crime discourses, I turn to a recent and 
contemporary example of activism against gender violence that enacts politi-
cally conscious and radical feminist praxis. In late summer 2019, the story of 
Israa Ghareeb’s murder went global, eliciting wide condemnation from various 
groups and constituencies and calls for the ending of violence against women. 
A twenty- one- year- old Palestinian makeup artist, Israa was beaten to death 
by members of her family. The supposed crime that led to her violent mur-
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der was her sharing of a selfie with her fiancé on social media that affronted 
her family’s “honor.” Outraged by her ostensible social trespass, members of 
Israa’s family beat her, rendering her immobile from a spinal injury that may 
have paralyzed her. While recovering at the hospital, she was again attacked, 
and an audio recording of the incident was captured by a worker there and 
later shared on social media (Hawari 2019). Israa died at her family’s house, 
reportedly from a stroke (Abueish 2019). In response to the media outrage 
over Israa’s murder, her family claimed that her spinal injuries were caused by 
her falling from a building because she was possessed by jinn, or evil spirits, 
or because she struggled with her mental health. The family claimed that her 
death was not caused by any wrongdoing on their part but was the result of 
“natural” causes of voluntarily falling from a building. With mounting pres-
sure on the Palestinian Authority to investigate the crime, its attorney general, 
Akram Al- Khatim, held a news conference on September 12, 2019, to report 
on the reasons for Israa’s death, which he claimed was caused by “respiratory 
failure as a result of serious injuries from domestic violence” (Begum 2019).
The public and broad condemnation of Israa’s murder has rendered appar-
ent a Palestinian refusal to either normalize or exceptionalize such violence 
under the guise of “honor.” By rejecting the family’s claim to innocence and 
their attempt to demonize Israa as a possessed or deranged youth, Palestinian 
society at large interrupted a narrative framework that blames survivors and 
victims of gender violence for their experiences and encounters with patriar-
chal violence (PC 2019). Palestinian society also refused to take for granted 
the findings of the Palestinian Authority regarding Israa’s murder, pointing 
instead to the complicity and imbrication of state apparatuses under colo-
nial rule in exacerbating and enabling violence against Palestinian women. 
In simultaneously denying both Israa family’s and the Palestinian Authority’s 
claims to innocence and by refusing their explanatory frameworks, Palestin-
ian society showed its understanding of the imbricated workings of patriarchy 
at the familial and the national levels. Instead of normalizing these narra-
tives, activists chose to celebrate Israa’s life, her dreams of becoming a famous 
makeup artist, and her resilience in the face of physical beatings and family 
oppression that was either ignored or concealed by authorities. By registering 
their collective and national outrage, Palestinians were united in their oppo-
sition to acts of violence that target the lives of girls and women. This com-
munal stance extended a recognition that gender violence is a social and a 
political problem impacting Palestinian society as a whole, one that cannot 
be silenced, tolerated, or ignored. On social media sites, an image of Israa 
Ghareeb was repeatedly shared within Palestine and transnationally, calling 
for justice for her murder and insisting that “We Are All Israa” and demand-
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ing “Justice for Israa.” Despite the limitations of such claims to the oneness 
of embodied experience or a shared commonality, they nevertheless register 
acknowledgment of the importance of collective confrontations of gender vio-
lence in all its manifestations.
The collective condemnation of the murder of Israa Ghareeb would mobi-
lize thousands of Palestinian women from across Palestinian cities and in 
the diaspora to march against gender and patriarchal violence in occupied 
and colonial contexts. This action took place in response to a call issued by 
Tal3at, a collective of nonpartisan and cross- generational Palestinian femi-
nists from across historic Palestine determined to end gender violence and 
to reclaim public space. The name of the movement can be translated as “ris-
ing up” or “coming out,” implying a refusal to read such violence as primar-
ily private matters, separate from the public sphere, and the centering of an 
intersectional and grounded analytic framework of gender violence. The call 
they issued thus invited Palestinians from all walks of life to march in femi-
nist solidarity under the collective banner “No Free Homeland Without Free 
Women” and against the fragmented archipelago of Palestinian life (Marshood 
and Alsanah 2020).
In their broad calls for mobilization and struggle, the Tal3at collective 
centers an analytical framework that readily places violence against women 
within a historical framework deeply attuned to the structures of patriarchy 
and colonialism and their intersectional imbrications. This approach neither 
separates the national struggle from gender politics nor reproduces a trou-
bling hierarchical order of decolonial priorities. Rather, it foregrounds issues 
of gender violence as intimately linked to liberatory struggles not only in the 
public and the legal spheres but also in the spaces of the intimate and the per-
sonal. As Hala Marshood (2019) rightly notes, Tal3at insists that the murder 
of women and the politics of patriarchy that enable such acts are not “personal 
matters or isolated criminal cases; they are part of a deeply rooted social con-
dition embedded in entire systems of violence and corruption, and in turn, 
they should matter to every Palestinian woman and man.”
At the demonstrations that took place across Palestine, activists from a 
range of political and social backgrounds carried signs denouncing all forms 
of violence directed toward women. Linking Palestinian anticolonial and 
national liberation with the freedom of women, demonstrators called for the 
end of gender violence, carrying signs that celebrate women as revolutionar-
ies and that confront men’s silence in the face of increased attacks on women’s 
bodies (see figure 6). Defiantly reclaiming the public space as a site of radical 
protest where women’s issues are made central to the Palestinian struggle, the 
demonstrators brought to the fore a type of analysis that rejects the siloing 
Fig 6
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of gender struggles and oppressions and their unbinding from the socioeco-
nomic and political national contexts of their occurrence. In this way, the 
movement does not call for superficial or cosmetic legal reforms or policy 
changes. Instead, it seeks a radical rethinking of the antiviolence agenda that 
readily identifies the links between multiple forms of oppression and sepa-
rate but inextricable and interrelated forms of colonial and patriarchal power. 
Writing on what the Tal3at movement means for Palestinian liberation strug-
gles, Soheir Asaad (2019) insists that it is primarily a movement that refuses 
fragmentary politics and analytics; it is a movement about the right to reclaim 
the site of the political by centering people’s lived experiences. As she states, 
“In the dominant and crude conceptualization of national politics, personal 
and private injustices are afterthoughts. However, people’s lived experiences 
are the essence of liberation and should be at the core of any political thought 
and action that is authentic, just, and liberatory. We should transform these 
scattered personal stories into a collective story of oppressive matrices that 
engenders a political analysis to simultaneously understand and fight against 
these systems.” Asaad’s inspiring call to action and accountability from men 
and those who separate the political from the personal reminds us of the 
power of a feminist movement premised on notions of justice that far exceed 
the domains of the legal and that seek, instead, “a new definition of national 
FIGURE 6. Image from Tal3at March in Ramallah on September 
26, 2019. Photo courtesy of Sharif Mosa.
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liberation in Palestine” (2019). Without exonerating Palestinian society of its 
responsibility to oppose gender violence, this activism demands an intersec-
tional and transnational feminist analysis of gender violence informed by an 
attention to the politics of place and space.
I want to end this book with the feminist activist efforts of the Tal3at 
movement because they offer a concrete and hopeful example of how to con-
test iterations of gender violence rooted in social, moral, and cultural patri-
archal codes. In this example, activists present a complex understanding of 
gender and sexual violence that attends to its specificities, that takes collective 
responsibility for its occurrence, and that refuses state co- optations of such 
efforts. This activism helps put into place an antiviolence agenda attuned to 
the violence of discourse and the discourse of violence. It shows how commu-
nities define their own agendas for fighting violence and how they work col-
lectively to develop a politics and an ethics for confronting gender and sexual 
violence in ways that are informed by their own experiences, commitments, 
and encounters. Their work exemplifies how a political approach to ending 
gender violence, including violence that targets women and those whose lives 
exist at the sites of multiple marginalities, can attend to both the intimate and 
the structural conditions that cause it. By centering a politics of feminist soli-
darity in antiviolence agendas and campaigns, such activist efforts remind us 
of the power of collective action and the urgent need for transnational praxis 
that crosses the borders of the nation- state and challenges its assumed central-
ity to gender justice agendas, thus making communities between and among 
people from different and varying experiences, positionalities, and political 
orientations. My hope is that ongoing intersectional contestations of gender 
violence, including violence carried out in the name of honor, becomes identi-
fied as honor- based violence or the honor crime, can similarly hold together 




N O T E S
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
 1. In her 2000 report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Asma Jahangir, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, speaks 
directly about the practice of killing women in the name of honor and specifically men-
tions the role of governments in protecting women from such violence and in ensuring that 
all appropriate measures are taken at the legislative level to end practices that are in viola-
tion of women’s human rights. The report is available here: https://digitallibrary.un.org/ 
record/408173?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header.
 2. The network describes itself as “an international digital resource centre working to advance 
understanding of HBV (honour based violence) and forced marriage through research, 
documentation, information and training for professionals who may encounter women, 
girls and men at risk of these forms of abuse in order to suggest good practise in respond-
ing to their needs.” See http://hbv-awareness.com/about/ for more information about its 
goals. For access to its statistics and data section, see http://hbv-awareness.com/statistics 
-data/. In addition to the UN-based statistic, the organization also states that 1,000 honor 
killings occur in India (no given year), 1,000 honor killings occur in Pakistan (no given 
year), and twelve honor killings occur per year in the United Kingdom. It is not clear 
whether these numbers are in addition to the 5,000 honor killings per year or are part 
of the same estimate. As with the 5,000 UN number, no sources are offered to document 
these figures.
 3. In the past few years, US media and US government officials began to report that twenty-
three to twenty-seven honor killings occur in the country per year. This number, as Volpp’s 
work has shown, is often wrongly attributed to a report that was funded by the Department 
of Justice and thus claimed to accurately reflect the rates of the crime’s occurrence. Volpp 
traces the number to an unpublished study by nine authors under the title “A Comparative 
Approach to Estimating the Annual Number of Honor Killings in the United States among 
People from North African, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian (MANASA) Countries.” 
Volpp (2019) details the abundant methodological issues with the research and its find-
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ings, questioning the validity of the research and uncovering the political workings of its 
numerical evidence. 
 4. Volpp draws on Sherene H. Razack’s configuration of the three allegorical figures that 
“dominate the social landscape of the ‘war on terror’ and its ideological underpinning of a 
clash of civilizations: the dangerous Muslim man, the imperiled Muslim woman, the civi-
lized European, the latter a figure who is seldom explicitly named but who nevertheless 
anchors the first two figures” (Razack 2008, 5).
 5. Various feminist scholars have explored the difficulties of creating a generally accepted 
definition of the honor crime, arguing that the term is now beset with an overdetermined 
discourse that curtails and undermines, rather than enables and supports, the work of 
antiviolence activists and practitioners. 
 6. Because of the linking of Islam with honor-related violence, Muslim associations and 
Muslim clerics have been called upon to denounce this form of violence as un-Islamic. 
Religious and clerical disavowal of honor-related violence is now quite common. In 2016 
the Jordanian General Iftaa’ Department’s Director of Public Relations and Cooperation, 
Hassan Arquoub, issued a fatwa on behalf of the Jordanian government stating that honor 
crimes were against Sharia law and that anyone who kills a female family relative should 
be held accountable for their crime. See Rana Husseini’s “Honour Crimes Anti-Islamic—
Fatwa” (2016b). In 2011, during the highly publicized Shafia murder trials, the Islamic 
Supreme Council of Canada issued a public statement that denounced these crimes. 
Speaking to Canadian press, Imam Syed Soharwardy stated, “Domestic violence is very 
un-Islamic. It’s a crime in the eyes of the law, it’s a crime in the Islamic teaching” (qtd in 
McQuigge 2011). Such disavowals are important for a number of political, rhetorical, and 
symbolic reasons not only because of what messages they send to the Muslims whom these 
organizations represent but also because of what messages they send to general audiences 
in local and host societies. In Canada, response to efforts by leaders of the Muslim com-
munity has been celebratory, with liberal and conservative national media commending 
the steps taken by the Muslim leaders to speak against difficult but crucial issues such 
as honor crimes. The National Post’s Jonathan Kay (2011) described the imam’s efforts as 
“a genuinely useful gesture.” In explaining its significance, Kay writes: “The millions of 
Canadians following the Shafia trial generally need no lectures to instruct them on this 
subject—their revulsion at the details being disclosed in court provides more education on 
the subject than they needed. But many recently arrived Muslim immigrants, or those who 
merely have not yet integrated into Canadian society, do not get their news from main-
stream news outlets like this one. The sermons they hear on Fridays may be one of their 
only regular ways of learning about the outside world.” Here we see how the denunciation 
of the honor crime as an un-Islamic practice becomes an imperative for Muslim communi-
ties seeking belonging and integration in Western national contexts or those desiring to be 
seen as members of modern and progressive religious communities in Arab and Muslim 
nation-states.
 7. In subsequent appearances of the term “honor crime” in my work, and throughout the 
text, I will be problematizing its usage but will not be using quotation marks to indicate 
this.
 8. Two important scholarly works have studied this phenomenon and the politics of its nam-
ing in the European context. Katherine Pratt Ewing’s Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim 
Men in Berlin (Stanford University Press, 2008) explores how honor-based violence is con-
figured in relation to Muslim migration to Germany. Its analysis of stigmatized masculin-
ity, national abjection, and racial injury helps inform my own critique of the deployment 
of honor crime discourses in the multiracial and multicultural states of Canada and the 
US. See also Beverly M. Weber’s Violence and Gender in the “New” Europe (Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2013), where the author deconstructs the essentialized relationship between Islam 
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and gender and cultural violence. Among other social phenomenon of gender violence, 
Weber analyzes how honor crime discourses, as well as hijab controversies, construct 
Muslim women’s place in European nation-states. The author attends to the honor crime 
in relation to European investments in discourses of peace, security, and secularism. This 
work provides important evidence of the weaving of the honor crime into national and 
public life in Germany and resonates with the transnational discussions raised in my work.
 9. See https://clarionproject.org/films/honor-diaries/.
 10. See the “About” section of the organization’s website: https://clarionproject.org/about-us/.
 11. Prominent Muslim American activist Linda Sarsour argued on Twitter that Honor Diaries 
is “#DisHonorDiaries because it’s disingenuous when it’s funded by representatives and 
organizations labeled hate groups.” Similarly, writing for the Canadian Globe and Mail, 
Sheema Khan (2014) argued that ending honor crimes is possible “but not with films by 
anti-Muslim zealots.”
 12. In 2003 Norma Khouri published her memoir titled Honor Lost: Love and Death in Mod-
ern-Day Jordan. The memoir purported to tell the true story of a young Jordanian Muslim 
woman named Dalia who was killed by her brother for the crime of falling in love with a 
Christian man named Michael. Shortly after its publication, Khouri’s memoir was revealed 
to be a hoax and, due to pressures from Jordanian activists Rana Husseini and the former 
secretary general of the Jordanian National Commission for Women, Amal Sabbagh, was 
reclassified by its publisher from memoir to fiction. See Gillian Whitlock’s “Tainted Testi-
mony: The Khouri Affair” for an important discussion of the literary hoax and its ability 
to garner empathy from Western audiences as well as how such texts work and what they 
“can tell us . . . about readers, their communities, and the politics of reading” (2004, 173).
 13. Feminist scholars have long written against the opportunistic uptake of feminist causes in 
general and the violence against women agenda in particular in politically charged times. 
As early as the 1990s, Leila Ahmed wrote about colonial feminism or the support of femi-
nist causes by colonialists who sought to destroy the patriarchal orders of the societies they 
colonized (1992; 2011). After September 11, 2001, and George W. Bush regime’s tying of the 
“War on Terror” to the liberation of women, this body of scholarship served to chart links, 
similarities, and disjunctures between the discourses and practices of colonialist feminists 
both past and new. See Abu-Lughod (2002, 2013), Razack (2008), and Thobani (2007b, 
2015). 
 14. Debate around the pressure to cancel a 2015 screening of Honor Diaries at the University 
of South Dakota closely mirrored these terms. In support of the right to screen the film, 
Miglena Sternadori, a professor of media and gender studies, argued that it is “just the 
wrong thing to do to censor a movie” (qtd in Ellis 2015). The exchange between supporters 
and detractors of the film is framed by Ellis’s article as one about a tension between calls 
for censorship and tolerance. Importantly, the debate around documentaries like Honor 
Diaries is part and parcel of a longer discussion taking place in the US regarding academic 
freedom and freedom of speech on US university campuses. In 2019 President Trump 
signed the “Executive Order on Improving Free Inquiry, Transparency, and Accountability 
at Colleges and Universities,” which required university campuses to engage in free and 
open debate or risk losing federal funding opportunities. The order responds to right-wing 
claims that US university campuses have foreclosed open debate and shut down conserva-
tive viewpoints in academic curricula and university spaces.
 15. See Coomaraswamy’s report “Violence Against Women in the Family,” which was sub-
mitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 55th Session on March 10, 
1999. The full text of the report is available here: https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/E/
CN.4/1999/68>. 
 16. See “Cultural practices in the family that are violent towards women” (E/CN.4/2002/83) 
which was published on January 31, 2002, and is available here: https://undocs.org/en/E/
CN.4/2002/83.
 17. The crime of passion is distinguished from the honor crime primarily because it is under-
stood as a crime that takes place during a temporary loss of sanity or reason and in a 
moment of heated anger towards an act of sexual betrayal by a partner. In “Comparatively 
Speaking: The Honor of the East and the Passion of the West” (1997), Lama Abu Odeh 
notes that “flagrante delicto and that the killing should be immediate” are central charac-
teristics of the classic definition of the passion crime (304). The honor crime is seen as 
premediated act, a crime that is primarily committed by brothers and fathers rather than 
by a husband. I return to this distinction later in this introduction.
 18. See “Third Committee Adopts Two Draft Resolutions on Crimes Against Women— 
Urging Elimination of ‘Honor Crimes’ and of All Forms of Violence.” Full text available 
here: https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20001103.gashc3615.doc.html.
 19. The letter was submitted by the permanent representative of Malaysia to the United 
Nations to the Secretary General of the United Nations on October 3, 2000 (A/C.3/55/4). 
The full text of the letter is available here: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N00/675/31/pdf/N0067531.pdf?OpenElement.
 20. The full text of the fifth-fifth session of the General Assembly (A/55/PV.81) which took 
place on December 4, 2000 is available here: https://undocs.org/A/55/PV.81. 
 21. In discussions surrounding the third draft of the resolution, which took place in December 
2004, Mr. Al Sulaiti, the new Qatari representative to the UN, articulated his country’s sup-
port for the resolution to condemn crimes that are committed in the name of honor. The 
Qatari representative expressed his “regret” that the committee had chosen to include a 
statement on “sexual and reproductive health” in spite of the request made by some states 
to have that removed from the resolution. The Qatari representative registered his coun-
try’s decision to “dissociate” themselves from the resolution (A/59/PV.74, p. 7-8). See for 
full text: https://undocs.org/en/A/59/PV.74. 
 22. The full text of the remarks which were given at the fifty-fifth session of the General 
Assembly (A/55/PV.81) are available here: https://undocs.org/A/55/PV.81. 
 23. Manjoo’s full report was submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2012 
(A/HRC/20/16): https://undocs.org/A/HRC/20/16. 
 24. Kogacioglu acknowledges the difficulties surrounding the term, arguing that “honor 
crimes stand at the intersection of multiple political and social dynamics” and that “the 
debate on honor crimes unfolds in dialogue with debates on other ‘problematic non-
Western practices’ such as female genital mutilation, sati, arranged marriages, and dowry 
murders” (2004, 119).
 25. In their analysis, Sev’er and Yurdakul make distinctions between expressions of honor such 
as izzet, seref, unur, and namus, which they identify as a “type of sexual honor that presup-
poses physical and moral qualities that women ought to have. This type is associated with 
the shame of women and women’s families” (2001, 973).
 26. In their definition of honor-based violence, Dietrich Oberwittler and Julia Kasselt state 
that the honor killing is a “peculiar type of gendered domestic violence rooted in an 
archaic ‘code of honor’ still prevalent in agrarian societies in north Africa and in west and 
central Asia; societies that are characterized, over long historical periods, by scarce natural 
resources, strong collectivist traditions, and the lack of a state monopoly of power” (2014, 
665).
 27. Aasiya Hassan (Zubair) was gruesomely murdered by her husband in 2009 in Buffalo, New 
York. For an analysis of media coverage of Aasiya Hassan’s murder, see Zareena Grewal’s 
“Death by Culture? How Not to Talk about Islam and Domestic Violence” (2009). Also, see 
Hammer’s Peaceful Families: American Muslim Efforts Against Domestic Violence (2019).
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 28. In a recent study on ending honor killing violence, Robert Paul Churchill cites a slightly 
different version of the HRW definition, which states that honor killings are “acts of ven-
geance, usually deaths, committed by male family members against female family mem-
bers who are held to have brought dishonour upon the family” (qtd in Churchill 2018, 4). 
Churchill uses this definition in his analysis of the distinct features of the honor killing 
because he considers it “free of implicit judgement, a factor that could undermine objec-
tivity and defeat efforts to engage in rational, respectful dialogue with persons in areas in 
which the honour killings occur” (5). To make the argument regarding neutrality a viable 
one, Churchill focuses only on the language that is used by HRW and ignores the occasion 
of its utterance at the UN and its transnational circulations.
 29. See “Defining ‘Honour’ Crimes and ‘Honour’ Killings” (2011), available through the UN 
Women’s Virtual Knowledge Centre to End Violence Against Women and Girls: https://
www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/731-defining-honourcrimes-and-honour-killings.html.
 30. The World Health Organization defines intimate partner violence as “any behaviour within 
an intimate relationship that causes physical, psychological or sexual harm to those in the 
relationship.” See “Understanding and Addressing Violence Against Women,” available 
here: https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77432/WHO_RHR_12.36_eng.pdf. 
While the definition is expansive and includes physical, emotional, sexual, and psychologi-
cal forms of violence, emphasis is placed on “male intimate partners or ex-partners.”
 31. See, for example, Uni Wikan (2008) and Phyllis Chesler (2009). See also popular opinion 
pieces on the distinctions between honor-based violence and violence against women such 
as Barbara Kay’s article “Honour Killing Is Not ‘Domestic’ Violence,” from the National 
Post (July 29, 2009). 
 32. In her groundbreaking article on differences and similarities between Western and Eastern 
legal systems in relation to the prosecution of the honor crime, Lama Abu Odeh showcases 
how there exists in these seemingly different legal systems a “tolerance in both places of an 
increasing variety of violence against women” (1997, 290–91). Abu Odeh’s work exposes the 
fallacies of Western legal superiority and the assumption of greater protection of women 
under Western legal codes and stipulations.
 33. A manifestation of the concept of “reward” is at work, for example, in some courts’ admis-
sibility and consideration of the “gay panic defense” in prosecuting the murder of gay 
men. In an article on the importance of battling the gay panic defense in criminal courts, 
Cynthia Lee explains the legal strategy as such: “When a heterosexual man kills a gay man 
and faces a murder charge, a common defense strategy is to use the concept of ‘gay panic’ 
to explain the killing. There is no officially recognized ‘gay panic’ defense but many use the 
term to refer to defense strategies that rely on the notion that a criminal defendant should 
be excused or justified if his violent actions were in response to a (homo)sexual advance” 
(2008, 475). Lee’s article explains why and how this “defense” has currency in US criminal 
courts. 
 34. The Shafia murders took place on June 30, 2009, when the bodies of three sisters, Zainab 
(19), Sahar (17), and Geeti (13), and their stepmother, Rona Amir Mohammed (50), were 
found in the Kingston Mills of the Rideau Canal. It was later discovered that the girls’ 
father and mother, along with a younger brother, had helped in committing the murder, 
and they were all found guilty for their role in this quadruple homicide. The murder 
caused a national frenzy, with many calling for the reform of the Canadian immigration 
system. I have written elsewhere on these murders in “Gendered Violence, Cultural Other-
ness, and Honour Crimes in Canadian National Logics” (2013).
 35. Together with Nahla Abdo, Mojab edited one of the first collections on honor-based vio-
lence. Titled Violence in the Name of Honor: Theoretical and Political Challenges (2004), 
the collection brings together a number of essays from scholars and activists who seek to 
define the honor crime and provide critical analysis of strategies to confront it.
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 36. The binary of racism versus culturalism pervades many of the discussions that relate 
to forms of violence like honor killings. Sherene Razack discusses the conundrums of 
feminist analysis of sexual violence in South Asian communities in her article “A Violent 
Culture or Culturalized Violence? Feminist Narratives of Sexual Violence Against South 
Asian Women” (2003). In her essay, Razack comes to the conclusion that feminists of color 
who speak on gender and sexual violence in their communities cannot avoid the issue of 
culture. As she states, “Since South Asian women run headlong into the orientalist nar-
rative whenever cultural practices such as arranged marriages are discussed, an effective 
strategy might be to aggressively rather than defensively confront it” (102). Razack worries 
that a deculturalized approach to violence “can seldom pack a sufficient enough punch to 
knock out the orientalist fantasy” that often shapes how violence against women in people 
of color communities is narrated (95).
 37. In his work on the rhetorics surrounding child victims of abuse, Joel Best argues that the 
way social problems get framed often impacts how they are confronted and what types of 
responses they evoke. Best writes, “Social problems claims-making is rarely static; claims 
evolve over a problem’s history” (1990, 65). Best uncovers the social, political, and rhetori-
cal processes that help shape not only what forms of violence become recognizable as child 
abuse but also what is reported on and what laws and social policies are crafted to confront 
the phenomenon.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
 1. Articles abound about Aqsa Parvez’s murder in Canadian newspapers, including the 
Toronto Star, the Globe and Mail, and the National Post. The murder was covered across a 
range of liberal and conservative publications. See Allen and Freisen (2010); Humphreys, 
O’Toole, and Wallace (2010); and Mitchell (2010).
 2. The codification of multiculturalism into the realm of law and policy worked to bring 
diversity into the fold of the state. The Canadian government’s adoption of this policy 
allowed the state to manage difference under the guise of benign recognition and toler-
ance. This approach helped Canada present itself as a welcoming state for persons from 
nondominant backgrounds or as a “multicultural mosaic” in which difference is celebrated. 
As scholars have shown, the embrace of Canadian multiculturalism as a national prior-
ity was premised on the obscuring of Canada’s settler colonial past and present and its 
recasting of its immigration system as generous and open. For work on Canadian multi-
culturalism and a critique of how this policy works, see Himani Bannerji’s The Dark Side 
of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism, and Gender (2000). For a focus on 
language and construction of identity, see Eve Haque’s Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual 
Framework: Language, Race, and Belonging in Canada (2012) and Sunera Thobani’s Exalted 
Subjects: Studies in the Making and Race and Nation in Canada (2007).
 3. See Reimers (2007) for the coverage of Fadime Sahindal’s 2002 murder in the Swedish 
press. Reimers offers a discourse analysis of media responses to the murder, arguing that 
“the newspapers represented Fadime Sahindal as a martyr for the Swedish way of living, 
which is signified by equality, modernity, freedom, and enlightenment. This representa-
tion was founded on, and thereby reiterated, cultural racism, sexism, and class prejudice” 
(252). Reimers’s careful analysis of these representations shows the difficulties of utilizing 
the honor killing trope in presenting such murders. Her works serve to “illustrate how 
difficult it is to address violence motivated by conceptions of family honor without con-
firming oppressive and discriminatory social norms and notions” (252). Weber (2013) also 
provides insights into media representations of murders of Muslim women in Germany.
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 4. Mona Eltahawy (2008) argues that Muslim women who integrate too well into Western 
societies are punished by murder and that “knee-jerk defensiveness” prevents Muslims 
from acknowledging the occurrence of these crimes. Sheema Khan (2010) similarly has 
argued that Muslims living in multicultural states like Canada are holding on to customs 
and traditions that are harmful to women.
 5. The Urban Alliance on Race Relations remains active today. Their website is available here: 
https://urbanalliance.ca/.
 6. The debate over the politics of naming honor-based violence as an exceptional form of 
violence undergirded by unique understandings and deployments of patriarchy is long 
and ongoing. Feminist scholars writing on violence have shown why these crimes must be 
understood as distinct and separate from a broader continuum of patriarchal and domestic 
violence because of their nature and because of the legal and cultural sanctioning that such 
crimes receive. This chapter does not engage these debates in detail (see the introduction) 
but focuses instead on the discourses generated about these crimes and how these narra-
tives travel within and through transnational spheres and their co-optations.
 7. When asked about the controversy caused by the publication of her article and whether she 
regretted her use of the term honor killing to describe Aqsa Parvez’s murder, Rogan said the 
following: “No, not at all. I think the story’s critics make a willful and profoundly irrational 
attempt to distinguish the crime from its context. Let me explain it this way: if someone 
is walking down the street and killed in the course of a crime, that’s a terrible thing. But 
if three guys in a pickup truck with a Confederate flag stop a black man, drive him into 
the woods and hang him, we know something very different has happened, and we have 
a word for that. Lynching means something very specific. Similarly, a hate crime is a very 
specific charge. It surprised me that people were so afraid to describe Aqsa’s death as an 
honour killing. It’s irrational to think that we can’t call something what it is because that 
community can’t sustain that kind of criticism. Ultimately, I think that’s very infantilizing. 
If the Muslim community can’t sustain the kind of criticism that other communities go 
through, then there’s no hope for moving forward” (Toronto Life 2010).
 8. Another important effort in contesting the murder of Aqsa Parvez is the launching of the 
Aqsa Zine by a collective of Muslim youth in Toronto. The youth organized a zine that 
includes essays, art, and poetry in remembrance of Aqsa’s life. Their work sought to place 
the murder beyond the dominant honor killing discourse. As the organizers state, “We rec-
ognize her murder as physical form of patriarchal violence, and the response to her murder 
from public institutions as Islamophobic, racist, and patriarchal.” See https://localwiki.org/
toronto/AQSA_Zine and https://zeedesigns.wixsite.com/aqsazineonline. 
 9. As Rita Dhamoon notes, “Even though the concept of culture provides convenience in 
talking about grouped ways of thinking, feeling, and action, it simply does not provide 
an adequate means to contextually explore the processes by which identities and relations 
are constituted and reconstituted” (2010, 359). In other words, culture’s strength rests pre-
cisely in the convenience or the ease with which it is wielded and the multiplicity of uses 
it can elicit. Himani Bannerji reminds us in her critique of Canadian multiculturalism 
that culture is a “reductionism that hides the social relations of domination that continu-
ally create ‘difference’ as inferior and thus signifies continuing relations of antagonism” 
(2000, 97).
 10. The story of the failure of multiculturalism is a recurrent feature in much of the coverage 
of honor-based violence that takes place in Western contexts. See, for example, the work 
of Katherine Pratt Ewing in Stolen Honor (2008). In feminist theory, the issue of multicul-
turalism and its tolerance toward bad “cultural behavior” has been theorized in a number 
of texts. See, for example, Sarah Bracke and Nadia Fadil’s “‘Is the Headscarf Oppressive or 
Emancipatory?’ Field Notes from the Multicultural Debate” (2012).
 11. For an analysis that moves beyond veiling and not veiling as binaristic choices, see Nadia 
Fadil’s “Not-/Unveiling as an Ethical Practice” (2011). Fadil’s article troubles the binary of 
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veiling versus unveiling and maps how Muslim women negotiate different practices in 
relation to the different spaces and roles they occupy in society.
 12. In Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Abu-Lughod explores how certain forms of gender 
violence, including the honor crime in particular, become “objects of earnest and wide-
spread concern” (2013, 140). She demonstrates how these acts become an index for “Mus-
lim women’s rights” and how they circulate across local and global scales to cathect activist 
and reader response, produce moral outrage, and encourage action on behalf of battered, 
abused, or murdered Muslim women. As such, honor crimes become “pawns in political 
battles” that signify well beyond the borders and geographies of one nation-state and that 
are seized upon to draw civilizational lines (139).
 13. Tarek Fatah is a Muslim Canadian journalist. He writes for conservative Canadian journals 
such as the National Post and often pens articles against what he views as the threat of 
encroachment of Islamic fundamentalism in Canada. For an important discussion regard-
ing the role of Muslim experts such as Tarek Fatah in Canada, see Krista Melanie Riley’s 
(2009) analysis of the accumulation of national capital through the reification of catego-
ries of “good” and “bad” Muslims and the articulation of concern for endangered Muslim 
women.
 14. Park 51 was a project proposed by developer Sharif El-Gamal, a Muslim American, who 
was invested in taking over the former Burlington Coat Factory building in lower Man-
hattan. Together with Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, he sought to build a center, similar to 
the YMCA, for Muslim communities. Although the proposed project was intended as a 
community center that included a prayer space, it was often misrepresented as a mosque 
in popular media. The project was stopped when a controversy erupted in summer 2010 
over the suitability of building a mosque in close proximity to the hallowed area known 
as “Ground Zero.” The objection to the center’s construction brought to the fore the levels 
of anti-Muslim discourse routinely normalized in popular discussions. See Derek Ruez’s 
“‘Partitioning the Sensible’ at Park 51: Rancière, Islamophobia, and Common Politics” 
(2012).
 15. In response to the conference, the Arab American Institute scheduled a concurrent event 
titled “Rejecting Islamophobia: A Community Stand Against Hate.” For a discussion of 
the conference and the debates it stirred, see Jonathan Oosting’s “Rejecting Islamophobia: 
Town Hall Counters ‘Jessica Mokdad Human Rights Conference’ in Dearborn” (2012).
 16. For more information on the wall, see https://usa.jnf.org/about-jnf/news/press-releases/ 
2008/pr_jnf-establishes-wall-of.html. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
 1. In Spectacular Rhetorics, Wendy Hesford draws on the work of Ulrich Baer on memory, 
witnessing, and photography to argue that photographs bear a trace of the ungovernable 
in them. This trace is materialized when the picture or image interacts with the various 
narratives that a viewer may project onto it. But the ungovernable part of viewership is 
configured not necessarily as a loss but as a potential that is held within future projections. 
As Hesford states, “There is a trace of the ungovernable in every photograph. Trauma, like 
the past, is an unstable reference; so is the photograph” (2011, 98).
 2. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established after the signing of the Oslo 
agreement in 1994 between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). It 
is also known as the Palestinian Authority or the PA. As the presumptive representative 
of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian Authority operates as a pseudo-government and 
pseudo-state; it is dependent on foreign aid for its existence and survival, and its sover-
eignty is superseded by the occupying authority of the Israeli state.
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 3. The Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) is the designation for the areas of West Bank, 
East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip which have been under Israeli occupation since 1967. 
The OPT is the area that the PA hoped to establish the future Palestinian state, and this 
area excludes Israeli settlements, the Jordan Valley, and the roads that connect Palestinian 
villages within the West Bank.
 4. The National Committee to Combat Violence Against Women was formed in 2008 by the 
Palestinian Council of Ministries and is led by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA). 
Its members include representatives from a number of official state ministries, the General 
Secretariat of the General Union of Palestinian Women, and the NGO Forum to Combat 
Violence Against Women (Al-Muntada Coalition). See the National Strategy for a full 
membership list.
 5. The Palestinian Basic Law functions as the temporary constitution of the Palestinian 
Authority. See http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/basic-law/2003-amended-basic-law.
 6. The Arabic version of the report is available here: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/
book1268.pdf.
 7. See Lena Odgaard’s (2014) analysis of the protests against the rising number of murders.
 8. Various spellings of Aya’s last name proliferate on the internet. I have used “Baradiyah” as 
it is the spelling most commonly used in English-language articles about her.
 9. Many media accounts detail the horrific murder across local, regional, and international 
press. In the Arabic press, numerous articles were published in the local Palestinian 
newspapers, including several articles that appear on the pages of MaanNews. See http://
www.maannews.net/Content.aspx?id=385985 and http://www.maannews.net/Content.
aspx?id=387164. Dunya Al Watan also published an article about the murder: https://
www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2011/05/17/176686.html. Coverage in regional Arab 
press includes an article in Laha Magazine and Al Imirat al Yawm. In the Guardian, Har-
riet Sherwood’s “Death in the West Bank: The Story of an ‘Honour’ Killing” (2011) provides 
important details about the case and also connects it to the local activism that ensued in 
its aftermath.
 10. The organization, whose Arabic name means change, launched the campaign to raise 
awareness about the killing of Palestinian women. The campaign sheds light on the con-
tinued abuse and marginalization and harming of women worldwide and in Palestine. To 
access the organization’s website, see https://mappingher.ps/?page_id=8.
 11. See Ebtihal Mahadeen’s “Doctors and Sheikhs: ‘Truths’ in Virginity Discourse in Jordanian 
Media” (2013) and “‘The Martyr of Dawn’: Femicide in Jordanian Media” (2017).
 12. On the workings of patriarchy and gossip in honor-related crimes in Palestine, see Manar 
Hassan’s “The Politics of Honor: Patriarchy, the State and the Murder of Women in the 
Name of Family Honor” (2002). See also Nadera Shalhboub-Kevorkian’s “Reexamining 
Femicide: Breaking the Silence and Crossing ‘Scientific’ Borders” (2003) for a discussion of 
the relationship between gossip against female kin and male reputation. On the discourse 
of gossip and shame and its workings in sanctioning honor-related violence, see Amani M. 
Awwad’s “Gossip, Scandal, Shame and Honor Killing: A Case for Social Constructionism 
and Hegemonic Discourse” (2001).
 13. Coverage of honor-related violence, in the Palestinian context, often reproduces the idea 
of deserved versus undeserved violence by questioning whether girls and women who 
are victims of violence upheld moral and sexual codes (including virginity) before their 
murders.
 14. Website available here: https://mappingher.ps/?page_id=8.
 15. On its website, the organization describes its goals thus: “fostering democracy and uphold-
ing human rights, taking action to prevent the destruction of the global ecosystem, 
advancing equality between women and men, securing peace through conflict prevention 
in crisis zones, and defending the freedom of individuals against excessive state and eco-
nomic power—these are the objectives that drive the ideas and actions of the Heinrich Böll 
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Foundation.” See https://www.boell.de/en/foundation/who-we-are for more information 
on the organization.
 16. See, for example, the article in Maan News on Aya’s murder: http://www.maannews.net/
Content.aspx?id=385985. 
 17. On March 18, 2019, the State of Palestine acceded to the 1989 Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which aims to abolish 
the death penalty. From its founding in 1993 till 2017, there have been forty-one executions 
in Palestine (thirty-nine of which took place in Gaza). The death penalty has not been used 
against men who murder women, and the calls for the imposition of such a penalty reflect 
the entrenchment of a punitive and carceral view in relation to fighting violence against 
women in Palestinian society, a matter I return to in my discussion of the Jordanian legal 
context.
 18. In the Palestinian context, the use of the discourse of martyrdom is primarily applied to 
men, women, and children who die or are killed as a result of Israeli occupation. The use 
of this language to speak about Aya’s murder constitutes a significant break from the domi-
nant discourse surrounding martyrdom in Palestine and signifies the honorable place that 
Aya occupies in remembrance discourses in Palestine. The bestowing of this status on Aya 
is directly related to her favorable reputation and the general societal agreement that she 
had not broken any sexual or moral codes prior to her murder.
 19. The full televised interview, which took place on May 16, 2011, is available here: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=HDTKrLEqFqE. Analysis of this interview is available from 
Maan News here: http://maannews.net/Content.aspx?id=387453.
 20. Two legal systems exist in the West Bank and Gaza. In the West Bank, the Jordanian Penal 
Code of 1960 is in effect and governs the lives of Palestinians who live there. In Gaza, the 
Egyptian Penal Code is in effect. This dual system creates complicated results in terms of 
people’s ability to navigate between these codes.
 21. I return to a discussion of these laws and efforts to upend and change them in more detail 
in the following chapter. It is important here to note that, contrary to his stated inten-
tion to put a stop to honor-related violence, a legal aide to Abbas would reveal that the 
announced changes were mainly to “garner public opinion” and that the president had no 
intention of changing the law since it would cause administrative and legal challenges (qtd 
in Al-Ghussein and Patchett 2012).
 22. The campaign was launched by a Palestinian women’s group called Sabaya Hai’rat and Al-
Muntada. The coalition of Palestinian men and women worked together to lobby the presi-
dent against gender violence, using media to solicit broad societal appeal for their work and 
working to expose the lack of appropriate government response and action on this issue.
 23. See Dalia Hatuqa’s “‘Paradigm Shift’: Palestinians Join Treaties” (2014).
 24. The Palestinian Authority ratified the convention without placing any reservations on any 
of its articles. Most Arab countries have placed reservations on aspects of the CEDAW 
agreement. For more information on this, see S. El-Masri’s “Challenges Facing CEDAW 
in the Middle East and North Africa” (2011) and Elizabeth Ann Mayer’s “Internationaliz-
ing the Conversation on Women’s Rights: Arab Countries Face the CEDAW Committee” 
(2004).
 25. As Noura Erakat makes clear, the Palestinian statehood bid was a strategic maneuver 
meant to help rescue the Palestinian Authority’s reputation, which had suffered serious 
setbacks. While it had the potential to enable the Palestinian Authority to make Israel 
accountable to international law and its own juridical standards, the Palestinian Authority 
repeatedly failed to do so, opting instead to return to bilateral talks in 2013. See Justice for 
Some: Law and the Question of Palestine (2019).
 26. In 2018, for example, the Palestinian Authority entered a five-year agreement with the Gov-
ernment of Canada and five UN agencies, including UN Women, UNFPA, UN Habitat, 
and UNODC, to launch “Haya: Eliminating Violence Against Women in the West Bank 
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and Gaza (2018–2022).” The program aimed to address harmful practices and causes of 
violence in Palestinian society by helping the Palestinian Authority develop comprehensive 
“prevention, protection, and response systems” (see UNFPA 2018). The project’s reported 
budget is 17 million CAD.
 27. In 2015 UN Women posted a job search for a national consultant to provide a midterm 
review of the Palestinian National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women. https://
jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=61905.
 28. See the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.
 29. The “Green Line” refers to the de facto borders of the Israeli state drawn in the Armistice 
Agreement of 1949 between Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. This designation 
separates the geographies of Palestine between 1948 (referring to villages and towns that 
now exist within Israel, or within the “green line”) and 1967 Palestine (referring to the West 
Bank and Gaza, areas that were occupied by Israel in 1967).
 30. Shira Robinson’s Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel’s Liberal State (2013) 
offers a clear and historical study of the formation of the Israeli state and the granting of an 
exclusionary form of citizenship to the Palestinian minority living in Israel. For discussion 
of the racialized system of rights and rightlessness structuring life for Palestinian citizens 
of Israel, see Shourideh C. Molavi’s Stateless Citizenship: The Palestinian-Arab Citizens of 
Israel (2013). For a focused analysis of the gendered aspect of differential citizenship in 
Israel and its impact on women, see Nahla Abdo’s Women in Israel: Race, Gender and Citi-
zenship (2011).
 31. See Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2015).
 32. See Yiftachel and Yacoubi, who note that “within the context of a Jewish settler society, 
the Arabs of Lod [sic] are both discriminated against as Palestinians in a Jewish state, and 
excluded as residents in their own city, which declares itself ‘mixed.’ This setting is com-
mon to settler societies, where conflict with the indigenous population is constructed as a 
pivotal axis for the formation of essentialized collective identities and geographies” (2003, 
689).
 33. The town is known as Lyd and Lod in Hebrew, as Lydda in Greek-Latin, and as Al-Lyd in 
Arabic.
 34. Bisan Abu Ghanem was murdered in a drive-by shooting. Six people were convicted of 
involvement in planning her murder. Two of her sisters were also murdered under similar 
conditions. More information on her murder can be found in Glazer (2019) and Salaime 
(2014).
 35. Sharon D. Lang notes that while in theory Israeli law “makes no distinction or concession 
in cases of murder motivated by sharaf,” there is an understanding that Israeli authorities 
may have provided more lenient sentences to perpetrators of honor-based violence (2005, 
72). As Lang explains, “The articulated rationale for community sentences in family sharaf 
killing cases is that the Israelis are trying to be flexible when it comes to Arab cultural or 
religious beliefs; they are trying to be cultural relativists” (73). 
 36. The second Palestinian intifada began in 2000.
 37. In an important article on the history of DAM, Ted Swedenburg (2013) reminds readers 
that DAM began their career as part of the Israeli rap scene and that the band’s earlier 
musical contributions focused in large part on issues like narcotics and the sales of drugs 
in Palestinian towns like Lyd. Swedenburg offers a cautionary note against efforts to claim 
DAM as a resistance band that ignore their ability to speak to multiple issues and audi-
ences, a facet of their identity as performers that is captured in their very name, which is 
translatable to English, Hebrew, and Arabic.
 38. See Maira’s Jil Oslo: Palestinian Hip Hop, Youth Culture, and the Youth Movement and Maira 
(2008). 
 39. Eqeiq (2010) makes the point that DAM’s music emphasizes the indigenous status of Pal-
estinians with Israeli citizenship in order to distinguish between their position and the 
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position of the refugee or resident. This particular claim subverts liberal Zionist discourse 
surrounding the Palestinian identity of the over two million Palestinians who hold Israeli 
citizenship and who are often described as “Arab-Israelis.”
 40. In an article that focuses on “indigenous hip hop,” Kyle Mays argues that indigenous art-
ists have taken up the genre in order to “challenge settler colonialism, white supremacy, 
and heteropatriarchy, among other things” (2019, 461). DAM’s work can be understood 
through the framework Mays provides.
 41. All videos for these songs are available on the band’s website: https://www.damofficialband.
com/media.
 42. In 2015 DAM launched a campaign called #Who_You_R that challenged sexism in Pales-
tinian and Arab society. On Twitter, the group asked fans to send pictures of themselves 
challenging traditional gender roles. See Tom Barnes (2015) for coverage of the campaign.
 43. The full transcript and translation of the lyrics are available on DAM’s website: https://
genius.com/Dam-if-id-go-back-in-time-lyrics. I use this version of the text throughout 
this chapter. Please note also that the band sometimes uses “If I’d Go Back In Time” in 
English translations of the song. 
 44. The choice of the brother as his sister’s murderer is not accidental. Studies show that once 
a decision to kill a woman is made, families may choose the younger brother as the perpe-
trator of the crime. The reasons for this relate to the recognition that the legal system may 
offer a younger perpetrator a more lenient sentence for the crime. See Glazer (2019) for 
testimonies from Palestinian men who have murdered their sisters about why they were 
selected and what this has meant for their later recognition of their guilt.
 45. In an interview with Ali Abunimah (2012) from Electronic Intifada, DAM band member 
Tamer Nafar explained that the band hoped that the video of the song would resonate with 
“the leaders in the Middle East so they can fix the law. Murder is murder, it doesn’t matter 
what is the cause.” In the same article, Abunimah reports that at an event to launch the 
song, Suhell Nafar explained that “the song is not a specific incident but it describes the 
phenomena of honor killing in general.”
 46. To be clear, collaborations between Palestinians and NGOs are not in and of themselves 
suspect or in question. In the context of a post-Oslo world order, such collaborations 
inform every aspect of Palestinian life as nongovernment funding continues to be used to 
produce all types of projects, many of them essential to Palestinian life and livelihood.
 47. See, for example, the anthropological debate in the 1990s around cultural relativism and 
female genital cutting. Walley (1997) reminds us that the controversies surrounding the 
range of practices that she labels “female genital operations” were intimately tied to con-
cerns about human rights and cultural rights in light of increased migration to Europe and 
the US. Significantly, the debates indexed broader anxieties over the meaning and viability 
of multicultural societies and nation-states. See also the debate between Joseph Massad 
and Helem, stirred by the publication of Massad’s article on the “gay international,” and the 
response to it, from Ghassan Makarem (2009). Another reflection on the tensions between 
activists and academics is presented in Abu Odeh (2015).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
 1. The ban put into place impacted applicants from eight states: Venezuela, North Korea, 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. In the later versions of the ban, signed by 
President Trump on March 7, 2017, Iraq was removed from this list in response to worries 
that this would impact Iraqi interpreters who had served with the US Army. This version 
also exempted citizens of these states if they were legal US permanent residents (or green 
card holders) and if they held valid US visas. See de Vogue, Diamond, and Liptak (2017) 
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for more information. The newer iterations of the ban also removed Chad and Sudan from 
the list.
 2. See “Purpose” section of the order.
 3. See 8 USC 1182: “Inadmissible aliens.” Full text available here: http://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title8-section1182&num=0&edition=prelim.
 4. Scholars have shown how the policies instituted by Trump constitute a continuation rather 
than a break with past legal practices. See Bill Ong Hing (2018) and Robert S. Chang 
(2018).
 5. For analysis of the nationwide protests that took place in response to the ban’s issuance 
in popular media and press, see Lauren Gambino et al. in the Guardian (2017), Andrew 
Buncombe in the Independent (2017), Andy Newman for the New York Times (2017), and 
Kelly Lunde in Al Jazeera (2017).
 6. The “no ban on stolen land” campaign started by indigenous activists on social media 
questioned the right of the settler state to prevent people from entering this country, 
showcasing the links between theft of indigenous lands and the closure and bordering up 
of the US state. See Lenard Monkman (2017) for more information.
 7. The full text of the recording is available in State v. Isa 1993 (No. 74479). I have chosen not 
to reproduce it in here to avoid reducing Tina’s life to the last and macabre scene of her 
murder. While I believe it is important to remember and document the terror and violence 
that women like Tina Isa experience, I do not wish to do so in a way that contributes to 
the further sensationalism that surrounds this case and the murder of women.
 8. During the trial, Maria Isa would later request that her case be tried separately from her 
husband’s. Maria Isa’s request was based on the argument that her role in the murder was 
diminished, as she did not kill her daughter but assisted in the murder.
 9. In State v. Isa (1993), the prosecutor reported that the conflict between Tina and her par-
ents was due to her relationship with a Black man, which they disapproved of. 
 10. The cultural defense is the use of “culture” as a mitigating excuse for murder in a criminal 
court. Defendants utilize “culture” as an explanatory framework for violent acts that they 
commit, seeking reduced sentences from judges sympathetic to their patriarchal world-
views. As Melissa Demian shows in an important article on the anthropology of the cul-
tural defense, it is a “technique of explication” that “tends to privilege the cultural rights 
of men over the rights of women and children to life, liberty, or bodily integrity” (2008, 
433). For a legal perspective on the problems with this defense, see Volpp (2000). For a dis-
cussion of its resonance in Canadian courts, see Pascale Fournier, Pascal McDougall, and 
Anna R. Deker’s “Dishonour, Provocation and Culture: In the Beholder’s Eye?” (2012). See 
also Sirma Bilge’s “Behind the ‘Culture’ Lens: Judicial Representations of Violence Against 
Women” (2006).
 11. The organization was also known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council.
 12. The act authorized the secretary of state (in consultation with the secretary of the trea-
sury and the attorney general) to designate an organization as a terrorist organization 
if it is believed to engage in terrorist activities that are threatening to the interests of 
the state or to the security of its citizens. For the full text of the act, see https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/senate-bill/735.
 13. According to the FBI, the organization’s targets include “the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries.” 
This information is reported in the FBI’s “Background Information on Designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations,” available on the FBI’s archive page: https://2009-2017.state.gov/
documents/organization/31946.pdf.
 14. The men’s houses were wiretapped in accordance with Title 50 of US code on “Electronic 
Surveillance.” Full text of the law is available here: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
USCODE-2011-title50/pdf/USCODE-2011-title50-chap36-subchapI-sec1801.pdf.
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 15. The four men indicted for racketeering charges were Zein Isa, Saif Nijmeh, Luie Nijmeh, 
and Tawfiq Musa.
 16. None of the reports that discuss Zein Isa’s involvement with ANO provide information on 
the political context that leads to the rise of this group or their plans to target the Israeli 
embassy. Instead, Zein Isa’s religious identity is blamed for his political association with 
this organization, and reports portray the organization’s hatred for the State of Israel as 
driven by anti-Semitism. 
 17. Zein Isa died in prison as a result of health complications in 1997. Tina’s mother, Maria Isa, 
died in prison in 2014. See Associated Press (2014).
 18. Volpp’s scholarship has been central to efforts to draw attention to culturalized framings 
of gender violence, and Volpp is one of a small number of scholars who have paid critical 
attention to Tina Isa’s murder and its public framings. In 1995 Ellen Francis Harris pub-
lished a book about the murder, Guarding the Secrets: Palestinian Terrorism and a Father’s 
Murder of his too-American Daughter. Harris amasses a wealth of information about Tina 
Isa’s murder, the investigation of her father and his terrorist accomplices, and the criminal 
proceedings and trials in both courts.
 19. Volpp argues that citizenship is composed of four interconnected discourses: “citizenship 
as legal status, citizenship as rights, citizenship as political activity, and citizenship as 
identity/solidarity” (2002, 578). Even though one might have acquired citizenship and may 
be guaranteed legal status, exclusion from the other categories of citizenship that enable 
community and kin-making are possible, especially for foreign-born citizens who are of 
minoritized and racialized backgrounds.
 20. The murder of Tina Isa never really disappears from public view. In recent years, it has 
existed primarily in the virtual archives of right-wing news sites. On the websites of news 
outlets like Fox News, Brietbart.com, Jihadwatch.org, and danielpipes.org, Tina Isa’s mur-
der is cited as one of the earliest accounts of honor-related murders in the US. Its occur-
rence evidences the threat that immigrants—and by extension migration as a whole—pose 
to the country. In a 2018 article, Brigitte Gabriel, a notorious anti-Muslim activist and 
founder of Act for America, an agency that bills itself as the largest grassroots national 
security organization in the US, wrote at length about the murder of Tina Isa to stoke 
right-wing rhetoric about the dangers of open borders and relaxed migration policies 
which would lead to eventual Sharia invasion and takeover of the US. See Brigitte Gabriel’s 
Rise: In Defense of Judeo-Christian Values and Freedom. 
 21. This point is further borne out in the fact that Zein Isa’s home was wiretapped for two 
years before the murder. This means that the FBI had targeted him and his family because 
of suspicion of his involvement with the organization well before the murder took place.
 22. Feminist scholarship has long maintained that the domestic sphere and the family unit are 
not spaces of safety for women and that the privacy of the domestic often makes it difficult 
to gauge and confront violence against women and children and vulnerable people that 
takes place in the homestead. In her work on the feminist fight against sexual violence, 
Kristin Bumiller shows how the recognition of the prevalence of violence within the struc-
ture of the heteronormative family unit shattered any illusions of the family as a safe space 
(2008).
 23. The full text of the strategy is available here: https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/196468.pdf.
 24. The text of the executive order is available here: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2012/08/10/executive-order-preventing-and-responding-violence-against-
women-and-gir.
 25. For the full text of the order, see https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/08/16/ 
2012-20259/preventing-and-responding-to-violence-against-women-and-girls-globally.
 26. S.2279-International Violence Against Women Act of 2007 is available here: https://www.
congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/2279. The bill has undergone various revi-
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sions, and the latest version issued under President Trump’s rule removes references to 
President Obama’s strategy.
 27. See Corinne L. Mason’s “Global Violence Against Women as a National Security ‘Emer-
gency’” (2013). Mason argues that the intertwining of US foreign policy and security inter-
ests becomes readily apparent when we review the development of the I-VAWA policy and 
Hillary Clinton’s record on fighting violence against women. She suggests that an analysis 
of both may help show how they “have the potential to be used as a tool to justify global 
interventions on the grounds of US national security emergencies” (57). Mason is careful 
to note that such a critique does not entail a complete “disapproval” of state feminism or 
a dismissal of the need for global policies for fighting gender-based violence (57).
 28. See The Council on Women and Girls: Violence Against Women Accomplishments (June 2016): 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Women 
%20and%20Girls_VAW.pdf.
 29. In her 2010 speech for TEDWomen, Hillary Clinton stated that “the subjugation of women 
is .  .  . a threat to the common security of our world and to the national security of our 
country.” See the full speech here: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.
gov/files/documents/Women%20and%20Girls_VAW.pdf.
 30. See Jacqui True’s The Political Economy of Violence Against Women (2012).
 31. See 60/15 69/150 “Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutila-
tions” at https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/150.
 32. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/116.
 33. See S. 1919—Girls Protection Act of 2011, available here: https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th 
-congress/senate-bill/1919 and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. 
Public Law 112-329 (January 2, 2013): https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/
senate-bill/1919.
 34. See https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/fact-
sheet-on-female-genital-mutilation-or-cutting.html and also the report submitted by the 
Government Accountability Office.
 35. See Enrolled Senate Bill No.337: http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2017-2018/ 
billenrolled/Senate/pdf/2017-SNB-0337.pdf.
 36. See the report submitted to the Honorable Harry Reid by the US Government Account-
ability Office of 2016: https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678098.pdf.
 37. For a chronology of all litigation against the three versions of the executive order, see 
https://www.nafsa.org/professional-resources/browse-by-interest/executive-order-travel- 
ban-nafsa-resources.
 38. The full text of Ferguson’s case is available here: https://www.uscourts.gov/cameras- 
courts/state-washington-vs-donald-j-trump-et-al.
 39. For the full text of Judge Robart’s ruling, see https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 
3446391-Robart-Order.html.
 40. For information on the waiver program, see https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-
visitors/visa-waiver-program/visa-waiver-program-improvement-and-terrorist-travel-
prevention-act-faq/. To de-exceptionalize Trump’s order requires its placement in longer 
historical iterations of migration control. The link between Trump’s order and Obama’s 
waiver program is made in Laleh Khalili’s “With Muslim Ban, Trump and Bannon Wanted 
Chaos, But Not Resistance” (2017).
 41. As Volpp (2019) states, the first version of the executive order has two references to honor 
killings. In the purpose section, the order places the word honor in quotation marks. In the 
second reference to honor killings, the quotation marks are suddenly dropped. The naming 
is again altered in the March 6, 2017, version, when the crime is referred to as “so-called 
‘honor killings’” in the reporting section. For the full version of the text, see https://www.
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-
entry-united-states-2/. Volpp connects the changing language surrounding honor killings 
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in the text of the order to its critical reception and the administration’s attempts to deflect 
the charge of anti-Muslim bias by removing, or at least somewhat mitigating, this rhetori-
cal evidence from the final version of the order.
 42. See the Department of Homeland Security’s website here: https://www.dhs.gov/topic/
preventing-terrorism-overview.
 43. See “Fact Sheet: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry to the United States” 
at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/29/protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united- 
states.
 44. Interest in tracking the number of honor-related murders that have occurred in the US 
precedes the government-issued mandate to do so. In 2014, Westat, an organization dedi-
cated to “improving lives through research,” helped publish a report on “honor violence” 
in the US (Helba, Bernstein, Leonard, and Bauer 2014). The report, which was funded in 
part by the Department of Justice, exists in full online on the government website of the 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). See Volpp (2019) for a detailed dis-
cussion of the methodological limits of this study. 
 45. The full text of Abu-Lughod’s declaration is available here: https://www.muslimadvocates.
org/files/DeclarationBanAdvancesStereotypesAgainstMuslims.pdf.
 46. See Brief of Social Science Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents no. Nos. 
16-1436, 16-1540, available here: https://www.muslimadvocates.org/files/MuslimAdvocates_
SCOTUSAmicusBriefonMuslimBan_FILED.pdf.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
 1. The king’s decision to form the committee is available in Arabic here: http://www.moj.gov.
jo/DetailsPage/MOJ/NewsDetails.aspx?ID=669.
 2. The full text of the report is available in Arabic here: http://www.moj.gov.jo/DetailsPage/
MOJ/NewsDetails.aspx?ID=756.
 3. The full text of these laws and their most current amendments are available in Arabic from 
the website of the Ministry of Justice in Jordan here: http://www.moj.gov.jo/EchoBusV3.0/
SystemAssets/5d38ea27-5819-443e-a380-b65c7e1f5b56.pdf.
 4. See Abu Odeh (1997), Warrick (2009), and Sonbol (2003) for comparative analyses of these 
laws that also place them within longer legal genealogies and histories. 
 5. Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2007) has made a distinction between the study of text (primarily 
the study of jurisprudence or legislation) and the operations of the text in legal and court 
cases. This distinction is crucial. While Mir-Hosseini focuses on the latter in her work, 
my study does not attend to the ways in which the law becomes interpreted or applied by 
judges in real-life cases or to how clerks, working the court and judiciary systems, and the 
police come to understand the law and apply it.
 6. Judith Tucker (2018) distinguishes between different modes of legal analysis that currently 
exist in the literature on Arab families and the law: exegetical approaches, sociological 
approaches, etatist approaches, culturalist approaches, discursive approaches, and feminist 
approaches. In reading the text of the law and its relationship to feminist activism, my 
work exists in the nexus between discursive and feminist analytic legal approaches and 
the etatist approach “which highlights the place of law in the governmentality of modern 
states, both colonial and postcolonial” (399).
 7. Much of the work of documenting cases of gender-based violence in Jordan has been 
done by the Sisterhood Is Global Institute Jordan (also known as SIGI or Tadamon), a civil 
society organization in Jordan that collects information on gender violence and its occur-
rence and collectively organizes against it. The organization has called on the Jordanian 
government to create a national database of these crimes. See http://www.sigi-jordan.org/ 
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for more information on the organization’s demands. Other information about the cur-
rent rates of honor crimes in Kingdom are available from Human Rights Watch; see Adam 
Coogle (2016).
 8. A discussion of the early role played by Princess Basma in leading some of these organiza-
tions and the government oversight over women’s issues and control of the feminist agenda 
is available in Sherry L. Lowrance (1998).
 9. For an important analysis of the Arab “first lady phenomenon,” see Mayssoun Sukarieh 
(2015). Sukarieh offers a critical reading of the discourse of empowerment and moderniza-
tion shaping public reception of two Arab first ladies, Queen Rania and Asma Assad, the 
wife of Bashar Assad, over a period that stretches from 1990 to the outbreak of the Arab 
uprisings in 2010.
 10. The Jordanian Nationality Law does not grant women and men the same rights; Jordanian 
women married to non-Jordanian men are unable to pass their citizenship to their chil-
dren. When her reign began, the queen spoke publicly about issues of equality in citizen-
ship rights. As a result of public pushback, her efforts were quickly deflected in favor of 
a less politicized agenda around women’s rights, one that was aligned more comfortably 
with the modernization efforts of the state and its neoliberal economic agenda.
 11. Importantly, these advances in women’s rights have often come at the expense of the most 
alienated members of Jordanian society, including the large segment of Palestinians living 
within Jordan and other refugee and minoritized communities who are continuously left 
out of such reform efforts.
 12. Two contemporary movements that complicate or challenge this framing are the hirak 
movement for day-wage worker rights and compensation and the campaign for equal 
citizenship rights called “My Mother Is Jordanian and Her Nationality Is My Right.” See 
Sara Ababneh (2016) for a detailed and ethnographic analysis of the hirak movement and 
its ability to engender women’s participation.
 13. Jordan established a woman quota in parliamentary elections in 2003 which allotted six 
seats to women in accordance with changes to the Election Law of 2001. See Abeer Bashier 
Dababneh (2012). Khulu’ was first introduced into law in 2001 and later amended in 2011. 
 14. The battle over the legal age of marriage continues in Jordan. In 2019 the Jordanian Parlia-
ment overwhelmingly voted to reject raising the marriage age from fifteen to sixteen. See 
Sawsan Tabazah (2019).
 15. The quest for equal citizenship rights for Jordanian women who are married to non-
Jordanian men has been an ongoing site of contestation. Jordan continues to define this 
issue as a sovereignty matter, but there is broad recognition that what is at stake in the 
state’s refusal to grant citizenship rights to women is the large number of Jordanian women 
citizens who are married to non-Jordanian men of Palestinian origin and the fear, on the 
part of the state, that granting citizenship to the children of these marriages would alter the 
national makeup of the country and tip it in favor of a Palestinian majority. In 2011 a cable 
sent by the Charge d’Affaires at the American Embassy in Amman in 2008 was released 
by Wikileaks. Titled “Jordanian Identity Politics Trump Gender Concerns on Citizenship 
Law Changes,” the cable made note of this issue, recognizing that “while the issue is on its 
surface a gender concern, it is more fundamentally about identity politics in Jordan” (qtd 
in Malkawi 2011).
 16. Since his ascension to the throne, King Abdullah has released seven discussion papers. In 
each one, he relays his vision for social, economic, and political change in Jordanian society. 
The sixth discussion paper is available at https://rhc.jo/en/media/sixth-discussion-paper- 
rule-law-and-civil-state.
 17. In Jordan, power is divided between three branches of government: the executive branch, 
which is represented by the king; the legislative branch, which consists of the appointed 
members of the Senate (majlis al-a’yan) and the elected members of the House of Repre-
sentatives or Parliament (majlis al-nuwwab); and the judicial branch, which includes the 
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civil, religious, and special courts. The king has absolute power over all three branches. 
Legal changes are initiated at the level of the House of Representatives, which has the 
capacity to accept, amend, or reject any proposed legal changes before they are passed on 
to the Senate and from there to the king for final approval before they become law. The 
judiciary’s independence is enshrined in the Jordanian Constitution of 1952, which states 
that judges are “subject to no authority but that of the law.” See http://www.kinghussein.
gov.jo/government4.html.
 18. Stefanie Eileen Nanes (2003) suggests that the campaign against honor-based violence 
began in Jordan as early as 1999. The focus of the initial campaign was article 340, which 
activists rightly argued provided legal cover for the murder of women.
 19. See Warrick (2005, 2009) for detailed analysis of the workings of the law and its concep-
tion of gender-based violence. See also Sonbol (2003), Abu Odeh (1997, 2010), and Faqir 
(2001).
 20. In Islam in Liberalism, Joseph Massad argues that “most laws on the books that discrimi-
nate against women in formerly colonized Muslim-majority countries, including national-
ity law, as we saw, are derived from Western liberal and secular colonial and national laws” 
(2015, 206).
 21. Alongside the legal system and Sharia law exists customary or tribal law. Tribal law func-
tions outside of and/or apart from the formal legal system, allowing tribes to resolve con-
flicts internally and through the jaha or tribal system of mediation. See Linda L. Layne 
(1994) and Ann Furr and Muwafaq Al-Serhan (2008). See also Amira El-Azhary Sonbol’s 
(2003) discussion of tribal law and “diyya settlements” in cases of murder. An examination 
of tribal resolutions of gender violence is outside the scope of this study.
 22. As Amira Sonbol states in her work on Jordan and the law, the Jordanian state primar-
ily utilized the Hanafi madhhab, but “when it came to laws of guardianship, they mixed 
between the Hanafi and Maliki madhahib” (2003, 37).
 23. Husseini has played a key and leading role in bringing societal attention to the occurrence 
of crimes of honor in Jordan; she has dedicated many articles to exposing these crimes 
and received much attention for her work, including being selected for the 1998 Reebok 
Human Rights Award. In 2009 Husseini published a book about her efforts to bring honor 
crimes to Jordanian and international attention. The book, Murder in the Name of Hon-
our: The True Story of One Woman’s Heroic Fight Against an Unbelievable Crime, is a mix 
between memoir and essay-style chapters, outlining the author’s commitment to fighting 
the “global phenomenon” (xiii) of honor crimes and her desire to “live as part of a system 
in which crimes are seen for what they are, freed of the double standards that mask their 
heinous nature, and punished with a severity that matches the crime” (xiv).
 24. The campaign’s website is available here: http://www.women.jo/.
 25. The film can be accessed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=belzQYQEUyA&t=1s.
 26. The mahr is traditionally an amount of money paid to the bride in cash, property, or 
gold. In some cases, the mahr is paid fully or partially prior to the consummation of the 
marriage.
 27. This move mirrors what scholars writing on gender violence in the US have uncovered 
about the connections between feminist antiviolence campaigns and women’s organiz-
ing and the state. For example, Kristin Bumiller (2008) carefully shows how feminist 
efforts to curb violence against women became aligned with the neoliberal state. Bumiller’s 
important study explores how, for over four decades, feminist campaigns against gender 
and sexual violence were able to transform public discourse around this phenomenon 
and how a feminist agenda shaped national action against the broad and frequent occur-
rence of gender violence in US society. Bumiller links campaigns against gender violence 
to core feminist agendas regarding the promotion of freedom, equality, and autonomy. 
Bumiller provides a historical genealogy of the alliance between feminist movements to 
end violence and state institutions and practices, demonstrating how the twinning of the 
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feminist agenda with state concern to curb violent crime coincided with the rise of the 
neoliberal state. Through this alliance, gender violence was transformed “into a social, 
medical, and legal problem” (13). By relegating women’s safety and health to the power of 
the state, feminist efforts to curb violence against women became increasingly reliant on 
the juridical and “carceral capacities of the state” to protect women from the occurrence of 
violence in their lives (2). Similarly, Emily L. Thuma has also demonstrated how the 1994 
passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which enabled a “crack down on 
individual perpetrators of violence against women[,] became a critical lever of legitimacy 
for expanding the carceral state” (2019, 7). Thuma’s argument demonstrates the ways in 
which certain forms of feminist antiviolence activism challenged the criminalization and 
statist approach adopted by “feminist advocacy for criminal justice–based approaches” (7). 
These works, while focused on the US context, help place the turn toward the state within 
transnational histories of antiviolence campaigns that wed justice to the realm of the legal 
and the carceral.
 28. Elizabeth Bernstein has explored how feminist agendas to curb violence against women 
“have become intricately interwoven with punitive agendas in contemporary US (and 
by extension, global) politics” (2012, 235). Bernstein’s work focuses on the efforts of anti-
trafficking movements in the US, showing how they propelled border control practices, 
stricter immigration law, and the expansion of the prison industrial complex. Bernstein 
names this phenomenon the “carceral turn” in feminist movements, which emanates from 
a broader shift toward the governance of crime through more extensive and pervasive 
forms of punishment. Bernstein shows how feminist antitrafficking activism shifted from 
a focus on the economic, political, and structural conditions that allowed for the abuse 
of women’s sexual labor to the “sexual violation” itself (242). This shift, as she notes, was 
essential for transforming antitrafficking activism “into a legal framework with powerful 
material and symbolic effects” (242).
 29. The 2017 repeal of article 308 and the amendment to article 98 coincided with the Parlia-
ment’s adoption of the Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which prohibits 
discrimination against people with disabilities and imposes limits on pretrial detentions, 
except in cases associated with security and intelligence. In addition to adoption of this 
important law, the reforms were accompanied by the passing of harsher penalties for a 
number of crimes, including acts of terrorism, crimes against legal persons or property, 
crimes against public officials, and electronic crimes (Jordan Times 2017).
 30. See Dena’s interview in this video by Rosie-Lyse Thompson and Shanshan Chen: http://
news.trust.org/item/20170816090413-sc4e7/.
 31. It is important here to highlight the groundbreaking research conducted by the jour-
nalistic website 7iber, which has released detailed, carefully researched, and well-docu-
mented investigative journalism on the phenomenon of protective custody as well as on 
honor-based violence in Jordan. Some of this work is available here: https://www.7iber.
com/2014/12/honor-crimes/.
 32. See Rimaz Musa’s work here: https://www.7iber.com/2015/02/administrative-detention-
governer/?utm_source=yarpp&utm_medium=post&utm_campaign=related.
 33. In December 2019 I had the opportunity to meet Eva Abu Halaweh, who generously shared 
her wealth of knowledge and information about the creation of Dar Amneh and helped 
shed light on its formation and the concerted efforts of Jordanian women activists in its 
setup. I am deeply grateful for her willingness to help me better understand Jordanian 
efforts to combat gender violence and their various intricacies and complexities with 
respect to the women’s movement and to legal reform in the country.
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